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 Andreas Marchetti 
Introduction 
The last months have seen numerous proposals for a profound change of 
the relations between the Greater Middle East, Europe and the United 
States. One of the most far-reaching and ambitious plans was put forward 
by the United States, being labelled Greater Middle East Initiative. The ini-
tial plan, leaked to the public in February, was loosely modelled on the 
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The issue has 
been a central topic on the agenda of numerous meetings and summits over 
the past months, including the EU-US summit in Ireland and the NATO 
summit in Turkey. The G-8 summit at Sea Island in Georgia, USA, agreed 
on a – watered-down – version of the initiative. The approved Partnership 
for Progress and a Common Future intends to reframe Western relations 
with the “governments and peoples of the Broader Middle East and North 
Africa”. 
However, the identification of a certain area is already where the problems 
of any grand design for the region begin, since there is no general consen-
sus on the geographical limits to any kind of CSCE-analogous framework. 
The “V. Mediterranean Forum” held at the Center for European Integration 
Studies (ZEI) on June 24 and 25, 2004, addressed this and other issues that 
need to be considered for any new framework for the relations with the 
Greater Middle East. The “Mediterranean Forum” at ZEI is part of a larger 
project of co-operation between ZEI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
on the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue. It takes place in the framework of 
Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) activities. ZEI and 
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation graciously recognize financial support of 
the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. 
 Andreas Marchetti 
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The statements and interventions made during the “V. Mediterranean Fo-
rum” under the title “A CSCE-analogous framework for the Greater Middle 
East?” are assembled in this Discussion Paper. As fascinating and ambi-
tious as a CSCE-analogous framework for the Greater Middle East might 
be, the concept is not totally new and revolutionary, however. Already in 
1976, then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin proposed the establishment 
of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East, framed 
on the CSCE accords of 1975. The idea of transposing the CSCE experi-
ence to the region was then again put forward by Jordan since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Little has been done, though, to identify potentials and 
obstacles of such a process. The contributions published in this Discussion 
Paper intend to give answers to some of the questions still and again being 
debated in Europe, the United States and in the Greater Middle East. Ludger Kühnhardt 
System-opening Cooperative Transfor-
mation of the Greater Middle East.         
A New Transatlantic Project and a Joint 
Euro-Atlantic-Arab Task 
I.  Redefining the strategic setting 
It is impossible to predict what will be the course of world politics in the 
twenty-first century. Possible trends have to be extrapolated from past ex-
perience. And yet potential quantum leaps in science and technology, for 
example, are entirely unpredictable; indeed, no other development could 
have been less foreseeable in the early days of the twentieth century. Will 
mankind again witness comparable developments in science and technol-
ogy over the next decades? Will they revolutionise health and energy sup-
ply, demographic patterns and the geographical distribution of success and 
failure? Will nuclear fusion become possible, with revolutionary conse-
quences for the energy needs of a growing world population? Will food, 
water and health services match rising global demand? Will territorial con-
flicts arise as a result of unbalanced distribution of resources and wealth? 
Will migratory patterns, mostly involuntary in nature, have an impact on 
world stability, as was the case during much of the twentieth century? Will 
the two demographic giants, China and India, accompany modernisation 
with a sustainable relationship between homogeneity and pluralism, de-
mocracy and stability? Will Africa catch up developmentally and in re-
sponse to globalisation? Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Whatever future of the twentieth century, world order is not a given. It will 
change as it always has done in the past.
1 During the twentieth century 
Europe was at the heart of the struggle for world order and the root cause of 
world disorder. This chapter in world politics came to a close with the 
unique transformation of Europe into a continent of democracies, market 
economies, integration and cooperation. America’s commitment made this 
transformation possible and gave rise to an exceptional Euro-American 
success story. It gave sense and value to the notion of an Atlantic civilisa-
tion. Transatlantic relations have become the strongest element of global 
stability and the most successful expression of trans-regional prosperity and 
peace in the world. The enlargement of the European Union (EU) and 
NATO laid the foundations for lasting Atlantic peace and prosperity, for 
democracy and security from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. While Euro-
Atlantic relations with the Ukraine, Russia and Turkey are still evolving, 
they are most likely to follow the path of ‘inclusion’ that emerged after the 
end of the Cold War.
2 
The greatest danger for Americans and Europeans today comes from 
threats emerging from outside of Europe.
3 The danger of Americans and 
Europeans becoming victims in big numbers results more from terrorism 
and rogue and failed states in the Greater Middle East than from any threat 
– real or potential – within Europe. Dealing with this strategic challenge to 
stability and security in the Western world will be the most crucial test put 
to this generation of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. This is true where 
the resolution of a new set of problems is concerned, but also as regards the 
ability to reinvent transatlantic relations as a cornerstone of a stable and 
prosperous world order. This new challenge should be seen as a great op-
portunity to revitalise an ‘Atlantic civilization’ and to change the relation-
 
1  Karl Kaiser, Zeitenwende. Dominanz und Interdependenz nach dem Irak-Krieg, 
Internationale Politik, 58, 5, 2003, pp. 1 ff. 
2  Hüseyin Bagci, Jackson Janes and Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.), Parameters of Partner-
ship: The US-Turkey-Europe, Baden-Baden, 1999; Jackson Janes, Oleg Kokoshin-
sky and Peter Wittschorek (eds.), Ukraine, Europe, and the United State:. Towards a 
New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, Baden-Baden, 2000. 
3  Here I agree with Asmus and Pollack. Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack, 
The New Transatlantic Project, at: www.policyreview.org/OCT02/asmus_print.html System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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ship between the Atlantic partners and the countries and people in the 
Greater Middle East through a cooperative system-opening transformation 
of that region. 
The fierce transatlantic dispute over Iraq – which has generated an internal 
Western Cold War of sorts – has raised doubts as to whether the Atlantic 
partners will be willing and able to give a new sense and direction to their 
common future. Indeed, a new transatlantic project can only emerge from 
this dispute if both sides are willing to develop a shared understanding of 
the threat they face and the opportunities that dealing with it together pre-
sents over time. A new transatlantic project should not be based solely on 
dealing with a new threat; it can only succeed if it also defines new positive 
goals. Transforming the Greater Middle East must therefore be linked to 
cooperation between the transatlantic partners and the countries and socie-
ties in the Greater Middle East. Transforming the Greater Middle East 
through cooperation wherever possible, and with the help of legitimate de-
terrence whenever necessary, could become a joint Euro-American-Arab 
task for the next decades. 
There are some obvious preconditions to make a strategic redefinition of a 
transatlantic project with implications for world peace possible. Any global 
partnership – indeed, any kind of world order – cannot be based on nega-
tive aims alone. Threats and fear may result in deterrence and veto-
capacities over the potentially disturbing behaviour of others, but they can-
not generate genuine and reliable stability. Such a limited horizon would be 
self-centered and autistic. On the other hand, putting one’s faith only in co-
operation and invoking a common interest of survival cannot resolve real 
conflict and disputes over interests, resources or political goals either. Such 
faith would be naïf and apolitical. A new transatlantic project for coopera-
tive transformation of the Greater Middle East must therefore avoid both 
extremes. 
Leading the Greater Middle East towards democracy and a market econ-
omy does not cover the universe of American or European interests. A 
positive agenda with both policy-consent and institutional mechanisms is 
necessary to bind interests in a sustainable way and to establish the limits Ludger Kühnhardt 
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of partnership with the Greater Middle East. Only such mechanisms make 
sustainable and successful policies possible over time. A new Euro-
American project has to look beyond threat perceptions and, due to its very 
nature, plan in terms of decades rather than years. 
We are confronted with two challenges: redefining the ‘frame of mind’ of 
the transatlantic partnership and transforming the Greater Middle East. A 
differentiated analysis of problems, and a sober assessment of common in-
terests and of the limits of commonality are called for. Different layers of 
operation and realistic considerations about timing and obstacles are also 
necessary. We face a challenge in the decades to come that is similar in 
scope and importance to that which confronted the US and Europe after 
World War II. We may look in vain for a new Truman for our times, but 
we must not be caught by the simplistic illusion that the Greater Middle 
East is the contemporary equivalent of the Soviet Union and any of their 
leaders the equivalent of Josef Stalin. A system-opening strategy that can 
generate cooperative structures between the West and the Greater Middle 
East over time is therefore necessary. 
II.  Policies for the cycle of instability 
Differences in transatlantic approaches to new challenges stemming from 
the cycle of instability from “Marrakech to Bangladesh“ (Asmus and Pol-
lack) were intensely debated and experienced during the Iraq crisis in 2002-
2003. Power and weakness, wimps and imperialists, asymmetric distribu-
tion of hard power and soft power – all kind of arguments and name-calling 
were trade during American Euro-trashing and European America-bashing. 
None of this fundamentally destroyed the underlying importance of transat-
lantic relations. 
One can identify two sets of disputes: on the one hand, there are those that 
are a result of proximity (mainly debates about values and domestic devel-
opments). They are a part of trans-Atlantic domestic policy and evidence of 
the connexion between social and cultural developments on both sides of 
the Atlantic. On the other hand, there are the disputes that obviously reflect 
different foreign policy choices and strategic orientations in the aftermath System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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of the terrorist attacks of September 11.
4 Both kinds of disputes are inter-
woven, emanating from differences in interpreting common ‘Western val-
ues’. They prove the existence of strong links between the Atlantic part-
ners. This is why the failure to generate a new transatlantic paradigm would 
be so devastating for the well being of both.
5 
The nature of the crises in the Greater Middle East, and their possible im-
plications for the West, has often been underestimated. In an over simplifi-
cation, the region has been seen mainly, if not solely, one of failure, threat 
and chaos, and the potential for a common agenda between it and the West 
has been underrated. Failed states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
refugee migration, economic underperformance and political oppression 
are the key-words used to assess the Greater Middle East, the hotbed of fu-
ture conflicts that can easily spill over into the West or be directly waged 
against it. There is also obvious positive potential. There are oil and gas 
resources, the dynamics of modernising societies, and the potential for joint 
initiatives to optimise Western and Arab use of resources in favour of the 
marginal regions of the Greater Middle East and Africa, our common 
neighbour. The path that Islam will take regarding the challenges and op-
portunities of globalisation is still unclear, however.
6 
If the US and the EU fail to define a new and lasting transatlantic project, 
their strategic divorce could be imminent. If both Atlantic partners fail to 
make the transformation of the Greater Middle East a common interest of 
the West and the peoples of the region, a strategic confrontation between 
both or some of its constituent parts could evolve. The dual challenge 
posed by a new era is enormous: how can it be dealt with best? Much de-
 
4  Roberto Aliboni et.al. (ed.), North-South Relations across the Mediterranean after 
September 11. Challenges and Cooperative Approaches, Rome 2003; Carlo Masala 
(ed.), ‘September 11 and the Future of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation’, ZEI Dis-
cussion Paper C 120, 2003, Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn. 
5  Ludger Kühnhardt, Constituting Europe. Identity, Institution-building and the 
Search for a Global Role, Baden-Baden, 2003; Jackson Janes, Transatlantische 
Brüche? Partnerschaft in Schwieriger Zeit, Tutzing 2003. On the economic rationale 
for a continous transatlantic relationship: Joseph P.Quinlan, Drifting Apart or 
Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy, Washington, 2003. 
6  See “Islam und Globalisierung”, Special edition of Der Bürger im Staat, 53, 2-3, 
2003, Stuttgart, Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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pends on the willingness to honestly analyse the challenge, courageously 
face implications and consistently work towards turning the challenge into 
a visible opportunity for all involved. This is what has happened in Europe 
over the course of the twentieth century. With the end of status quo-
oriented crisis management came the pursuit of a strategy of unprecedented 
success of inclusive transformation of the continent based on common val-
ues and political systems. In the end, this benefited all Europeans, includ-
ing the bitter enemies of the past. While the Greater Middle East is cultur-
ally different and politically highly complex, the challenges are compara-
ble. At root, the challenge is that of establishing a world order through the 
transformation of regional structures and trans-regional relations. It is one 
that calls for intellectual honesty, moral and cultural farsightedness, and 
political leadership by all actors involved. This is why the cooperative 
transformation of the Greater Middle East will be the most important test 
case for building order and achieving progress in the twenty-first century.
7 
The Atlantic community – be it the US, the US and Canada, NATO, or ei-
ther the EU or to the Council of Europe – is clearly marked by a common 
history and a mutually recognised identity. By contrast, the arch of instabil-
ity spanning from ‘Marrakech to Bangladesh’ is less defined and definable. 
The EU emphasises partnership with the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
including Israel.
8 The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue includes only pro-
Western countries, but is wider than the Barcelona-Process group, as it in-
cludes Mauritania.
9 The relations of the US or the EU with the countries of 
 
7  For an intrusive European perspective with policy implications see: Michael Emer-
son and Nathalie Tocci, The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2003. 
8  Stephen Calleya, “Is the Barcelona-Process working?”, ZEI Discussion Paper C 75, 
2000, Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn; Felix Maier (ed.), “Managing 
Asymmetric Interdependencies within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, ZEI 
Discussion Paper C101, 2002, Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn; Mas-
simo Silvestri, “Le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen”, Revue du Marché Commun et 
de l’Union Européenne, March 2002, pp.183 ff.; Annette Jünemann, “Six Years Af-
ter: Reinvigorating the European-Mediterranean Partnership”, in: Christian-Peter 
Hanelt et.al.(eds.), Europe’s Emerging Foreign Policy and the Middle Eastern Chal-
lenge, Munich: Gütersloh 2002, pp. 39 ff. 
9  Sven Biscop, “Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western 
Security Dialogues with the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics 7(1), 2002, System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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the Arab peninsula, the Middle East strictly speaking (the region of the 
conflict that has absorbed the world for decades), or with the extended 
Middle East including Iraq and Iran, are neither identical nor overlapping. 
There is as much ambiguity regarding the inclusion in the region of the 
Caucasus region and the newly independent republics of Central Asia, as 
there is the inclusion of Afghanistan and even Pakistan (not to mention In-
dia and Bangladesh). Not all countries of the region are Arab, not all Arab 
countries are purely Muslim, not all Muslim countries are in the region, and 
Israel, Turkey and India fit neither category. 
Since NATO formally took command of peacekeeping troops in Afghani-
stan, the rebuilding of the country has been recognized clearly as a com-
mon Euro-American task. In that sense, the Hindukush has become the 
natural eastern border of a region that is undergoing strategic and domestic 
transformation and is of concern for both the US and the EU. No matter 
how grave the potential for trouble and how great the opportunities for co-
operation the republics of the Caucasus and of Central Asia must be in-
cluded into the arc of instability. EU Commission President Romano Prodi 
has talked about an ‘arc of stability at Europe’s gates’ stretching from Mo-
rocco to Russia, in which the EU is attempting to play a developmental 
role.
10 Asmus and Pollack provide a useful point of reference. However, 
like all geographic lines, the region ‘from Marrakech to Bangladesh’ falls 
short of responding definitely and authoritatively to some of the intricacies 
and contradictions of this vast region. Regions, like conflicts and opportu-
nities, overlap depending on the criteria one emphasises. 
 
pp.92 ff; Mustapha Benchenane, “Les Ètats-Unis et la Méditerranée”, Défense Na-
tionale 4, 2002, pp. 79 ff.; Thanos Dokos, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: Pros-
pects and Policy Recommendations, Athens 2003. 
10  Romano Prodi, “An Enlarged and More United Europe, a Global Player. Challenges 
and Opportunities in the New Century”, Romanian Journal of International Affairs 
8 (1-2), 2002, p 22. See also: Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, 
presentation at the the European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003 at 
www.ue.eu.int/newsroom, and Commission of the European Communities, Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, Brussels, 11 March 2003, COM (2003),104 final. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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III.  A new “Conference on Security and Cooperation”? 
There appears to be an Atlantic consensus when defining the ‘Greater Mid-
dle East’, a region that includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. For a number of dif-
ferent reasons, Afghanistan as well as Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen 
and Mauritania should be included in the search for a new regional order. 
The Arab world is the core ‘problem area’ and should therefore, strictu 
sensu, include Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros, and exclude Israel given 
differences in religion, governance and economic organisation. However, 
the prospects of the region will always be conditioned by the very existence 
of Israel, as will any post-Middle East conflict scenario.
11 As a non-Arab 
country, a member of NATO and the Council of Europe, and as a candidate 
for EU membership, Turkey is clearly on the Atlantic side of the equation, 
albeit involved in certain key ways in some aspects of the development of 
the Greater Middle East.  
More difficult than the issue of geographical delimitation is defining the 
scope of the Greater Middle East ‘problem’. Is it about the war on terrorism 
or is the latter only one dimension of a deeper structural crisis and a 
broader set of challenges? How to assess the relationship between the Mid-
dle East conflict and the evolution of the Greater Middle East?
12 Even if the 
most inclusive agenda is adopted, covering all the root causes of terrorism 
and regime instability, how should the region be viewed in the final analy-
sis? Is it a permanent threat that can only be contained and tamed at best? Is 
it a region that faces irresolvable problems or a potential partner whose 
 
11  For the best analysis of the current situation in the Arab world including Israel by a 
German-language author, see Volker Perthes, Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische 
Welt, Berlin, 2002. 
12  On overlapping dimensions in an historical and a structural context see also: Roger 
Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Lon-
don/New York 2003 (2nd edition); about the European Relationship with the Arab 
world see the older study of Andreas Jacobs, Europa und die Arabische Welt. Be-
standsaufnahme und Perspektiven der inter-regionalen Kooperation, Internal Stu-
dies 110, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Sankt Augustin 1995. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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puzzling problems can be fixed? There is little Atlantic consensus regard-
ing these questions. Until recently country and regional experts predomi-
nantly addressed these questions. After 9/11 the agenda became the key 
challenge for Western strategists and policy-makers who often have limited 
regional expertise. Contradictions and divergent views stemming from do-
mestic considerations in the US or Europe are therefore natural and are 
likely to continue. One thing is certain, however: the Greater Middle East is 
no longer a region for regional experts only. For better or worse, it is a re-
gion that elicits all kind of feelings in the Western world. Likewise, percep-
tions of the West and its constituent parts are under intense discussion 
within the Greater Middle East. 
One of the perennial marks of Arab or Greater Middle East discourse about 
the West is the expression of an obvious inferiority complex. While the 
West simplifies the Arab or Islamic world as non-rational, aggressive and 
dangerous, the Arab world perceives the West as superior, arrogant and 
imperialistic: equal partnership is impossible to achieve. The only source of 
contemporary pride in the Arab world that is not of a destructive nature 
seems to be the successful Al Jazeera TV station in Qatar, labelled the 
CNN of the Arab world. Many in the region are proud of the channel, 
which has revolutionized the media landscape in the Greater Middle East – 
not always to the delight of the regimes it unequivocally criticises. 
It will be easier to find common ground between the West and the countries 
of the Greater Middle on practical issues rather than on questions of princi-
ple. Incremental progress is the most likely path towards cooperation than 
full-fledged comprehensive strategies and approaches. The Western ambi-
tion to comprehensively transform the whole region will require not just 
strongly differentiating specific countries, but also specific issues and fu-
ture prospects. An ongoing obstacle will be the difficulties of finding 
common ground between ‘us’ and ‘them’ when defining common interests 
and the long-term potential of comprehensive cooperation. This asymmetry 
seems to be inevitable: whatever one might have wished the fact is that the 
urgent need for a new transatlantic project was imposed upon the West by 
the attacks of 9/11. The starting point is fear. Rarely has global transforma-Ludger Kühnhardt 
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tion been driven by academic scenarios of good will according to conven-
ient time frames. 
Uniting the US and the EU to implement a project of the above mentioned 
scope will inevitably cause internal Western debates about priorities and 
outright power struggles over leadership as with the ‘cold war’ within the 
West over Iraq. Nevertheless, there is ample room for common ground, 
views, action and even interests and goals, and to ensure complementarity 
where necessary. The quarrel over Iraq was a wake-up call for both sides. 
Although the Atlantic partnership still stands, it has led to a reshuffling of 
power within the Western camp, not least within the EU – mainly to the 
detriment of the role of Germany. 
The Atlantic partners must define the challenges and opportunities before 
engaging the countries and societies of the Greater Middle East. They must 
be aware of possible reactions and interests of the Greater Middle East for 
the project to succeed, whether they consult the region’s representatives or 
not. Only a gradual development and implementation is realistic. The most 
crucial question to be addressed is regarding the definition of nature of the 
problem. The most obvious definition is the terrorist threat coupled with 
the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or radical 
groups sponsored by such states. 
The root causes of the multiple and interlinked crises in the countries and 
societies of the Greater Middle East are best summarised in the 2002 UN-
sponsored Arab Human Development Report written by 22 eminent Arab 
scholars.
13 In it the main causes of the crisis of modernisation in the Arab 
world are lack of political freedom, corruption, economic stagnation, the 
absence of the rule of law and reliable legal systems, inappropriate market 
economies, insufficient education systems, and gender inequality. The re-
port has been criticised for various reasons, not the least in the Arab world. 
However, criticism is part of the process that it was hoped the report would 
initiate. Public debate about the need to transform the societies and regimes 
 
13  United Nations Development Programme/Arab Fund for Economic and Social De-
velopment, Arab Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future 
Generations, New York 2002. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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of the Greater Middle East and the Arab world in particular is no longer a 
taboo. In fact it is becoming a visible part of political developments, as 
countries wave between resistance and closure and fear of the kind of radi-
cal change that could be counterproductive. 
There is no other recent report about development in the Arab world that 
has been more outspoken about the harsh realities of the region. Three 
quarters of all global oil reserves are located in 13 countries of the Greater 
Middle East but their people do not benefit from this wealth. The average 
growth rate of 1.3 per cent is behind that of most other developing regions. 
Per capita income is shrinking. Yearly population growth rates of 2.5 are 
higher than that of most other regions and absorb the little economic pro-
gress there is. The world economy benefited from 651 billion dollar foreign 
investment in 2002, and yet Arab countries were able to attract only 4,6 
billion, which were, moreover, unevenly distributed throughout the region. 
This is an under performing region, with 7.5 per cent of the world popula-
tion but only 2.5 per cent of global gross domestic product
14. These figures 
alone should be a source of concern for Europe, as they refer to an immedi-
ately neighbouring region. 
All freedom and human rights indices paint a bleak picture of the Arab 
world. The region gets consistently low marks for political participation, 
legal security, corruption, stability, transparency, governmental efficiency 
or the quality of governance. Unsurprisingly, unresolved problems are ac-
cumulating in this neighbouring region and endangering European stability. 
The export of instability to Europe has many labels: illegal and legal migra-
tion, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism 
 
14 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 216, 17 September 2003, p. 15. The situation 
among the Southern Mediterranean partner countries of the EU is likewise bad. 
They generate only about 5 per cent of all direct investments in all developing coun-
tries of the world. See: Christian-Peter Hanelt and Felix Neugart, “Die Europa-
Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft. Stabilität und Prosperität im Mittelmeer-Raum”, Interna-
tionale Politik 56, 8, 2001, p. 57. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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and terrorism. Lack of opportunities in the region has begun to threaten the 
stability of the Western world.
15 
This is why the relationship between the West and the Greater Middle East 
cannot be based solely on deterrence. The Cold War taught us that deter-
rence may freeze a conflict but it cannot resolve it. However, the relation-
ship between the Greater Middle East and the West is not comparable to 
the Cold War relationship between the West and the Soviet Empire. There 
is no Arab equivalent to the Soviet Empire or an Arab Moscow, although 
Ryad could be a potential candidate. Further, and most importantly, there is 
no Cold War between the whole of the Greater Middle East and the West. 
Some analysts see it arising and some even seem to wish for it, but the rela-
tionship is much more complex and differentiated than the one that shaped 
the Cold War. 
While there is no Cold War, recent trends debated over the past years indi-
cate the potential for conflict and even confrontation between parts of the 
Greater Middle East and parts of the West. Thus, the future relationship 
between the two cannot be based on the promise of cooperation alone. The 
history of the encounter between the West and the cultures and regions of 
the Greater Middle East has witnessed as many periods of cooperation as of 
confrontation. The challenge for today’s leaders is to define a framework 
for a relationship between the Atlantic and the Arab-Islamic civilizations 
that is broad and forward-looking enough to tap on the potential for coop-
eration and yet realistic and cautious enough not to neglect deterrence. 
The strategy must be based on two pillars: a transformed relationship be-
tween the Atlantic civilization and the Greater Middle East to resolve exist-
ing problems, threats and obstacles, and internal transformations within the 
Atlantic civilization and the Greater Middle East to change attitudes to-
wards ‘the other’. The Harmel Report of 1967 defined the two-track strat-
 
15  In light of this it is astonishing that Europe tends to identify the quarrel over the 
Greater Middle East as an obsession of the US despite the fact that Europe is much 
more dependent on Middle East oil than the US. While the US imports 13 per cent 
of its oil from the Gulf region, Europe is importing 20 per cent; see: Friedemann 
Müller, “Gas für uns alle”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 194, 22 August 2003, p. 
6. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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egy of NATO vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites for the following 
two decades of the Cold War: a similar two track strategy is necessary for 
the cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East, which must see 
well beyond hard security and defence issues to succeed. It must be based 
on a system-opening strategy equivalent to the one that initiated the trans-
formation of the communist world and its gradual integration into coopera-
tive Western structures. 
A two-dimensional implementation is also necessary. The US and the EU 
need partners in the region and the support of forces that ‘aspire to the 
same changes’ (Asmus/Pollack). This could lead to a new variant of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A Conference 
on Security and Cooperation between the US, the EU and the countries of 
the Greater Middle East could be a crucial instrument to intensify a coop-
erative transformation of the region and its relations with the West. Opti-
mists may see it as the key to system-opening cooperation; for pessimists 
the outcome of any cooperative rearrangement is the ultimate embodiment 
of a new regional system. Western strategic thinking must focus on this 
approach to bring about system-opening cooperation. 
A Euro-American-Arab-Israeli Conference on Security and Cooperation 
would open a debate about the ultimate aims of a common project and 
about regime change and transformation. It is imperative to understand that 
the war on terrorism and regime change are not strategic goals in them-
selves. They are necessary answers to the challenges that became evident 
after 9/11. They are necessary preconditions to achieve strategic goals. By 
themselves they cannot be a long-range strategic goal of Western politics. 
There has been much talk since 9/11 about the need to develop 11a com-
mon threat perception in the EU and in the United States. We need a com-
mon threat perception but we also need a common goal for a new strategi-
cally important common transatlantic project to succeed.
16 
 
16  On the European threat perception since 9/11 see Harald Müller, “Terrorism, Prolif-
eration: A European Threat Assessment”, Chaillot Papers 58, March 2003, Institute 
for Security Studies, Paris. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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IV.  Advancing a model of statehood 
The future and global position of the Greater Middle East must be defined 
in line with Western interests. The war against terrorism, regime change 
and structural transformation are tactical issues. The question of final aims 
must be addressed. The Western world – indeed modern complex industri-
alised societies as a whole – are both exporters and importers of the effects 
of globalisation. They depend on successful globalisation and so must deal 
with a specific domestic reform agenda to manage it properly. Successful 
globalisation calls for stability, transparency, efficient and accountable po-
litical and corporate governance structures, open societies and social condi-
tions that distribute the benefits of globalisation. In turn, this means a solid 
state of rule of law and predictable public procedures in line with Western 
interests. All this flourishes best in an open society. During the twentieth 
century the struggle was between open societies and their totalitarian ene-
mies; this century faces a struggle between global society and its enemies, 
who try to squash open societies and the evolution of a global society. 
It is not easy to develop constitutional politics and procedures that are more 
or less in line with Western notions of an open society and democracy-
based rule of law. The West views democracy as conducive to stable global 
development, but it has happily cooperated with many countries and socie-
ties that do not stand the test of democracy. Although transformation in the 
Greater Middle East may mean regime change, there is no certainty that 
this will lead inevitably to more democracy. The opposite could happen. 
This is because the West is unable to predetermine and manage the process 
of transformation in everywhere in the region at each stage of development. 
Democracy and the rule of law depend on locally rooted and created condi-
tions, which have their own locally determined incubation period. 
The West should therefore focus more on a specific model of statehood 
rather than on the details of democratic governance. The Western model of 
a secular, pluralistic state that protects human rights, which first and fore-
most includes the right of religious freedom requires the rule of law, pre-
dictability and transparency. As far as control and sharing power, account-
ability and the efficient management of public resources are concerned System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
  21
these are best served through the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy. 
Here, the West has many experiences to share with the countries of the 
Greater Middle East – although it also has a good number of domestic 
shortcomings to address. 
There is nothing wrong with basing the transformation debate on the prin-
ciples of democratic rule and the universality of human rights. However, 
these values cannot be imposed from the outside nor should they be im-
posed by force. This would be counterproductive, as the case of Iran shows. 
One decade after the end of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still an ex-
tremely weak state that has not really benefited from the more than half a 
dozen free elections and its constitution. The conditions that burden Bos-
nia-Herzegovina must be dealt with in their own right. This is also true for 
any country in the Greater Middle East undergoing change. Democracy 
may be the final aim, but it may not be the means to success. 
This is not just a tactical question or a typical ‘chicken and egg’ problem. 
The issue must be addressed in light of global Western interests and time-
horizons for action. The West shares three interests: a stable Greater Mid-
dle East that is a good economic and political partner, which cannot mean 
the absence of open and pluralistic societies; the end of the Greater Middle 
East as an exporter of instability, threat or terrorist violence, which means 
that its governments and regimes fight the root causes of terrorism and all 
possible expressions of violent movements out of self-interest; an open 
Greater Middle East, which means it must address the issue of successful 
integration into the globalising world. 
Clearly, such goals are best achieved by democratic states that comply with 
the rule of law and support the idea of open and pluralistic societies. This 
Western vision is not matched by Western instruments or will. In order to 
prevail, stable democracies must grow over time and be domestically 
rooted. In the absence of traditions that are favourable to democratic rule, 
patience and a longer time-span must be factored in. 
Regime change and transformation thus require the cooperation of the 
countries and societies in the Greater Middle East even after enforced re-
gime change, as evident in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, positive results Ludger Kühnhardt 
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are only possible if the local population develops a sense of ownership of 
the new reality rather than just ‘sitting on the fence’, observing foreign in-
tervention as a curse rather than a blessing. The majority of citizens must 
therefore be interested in regime change and transformation in order for 
such processes to gain enduring local legitimacy. This may be an uphill 
battle and a source of friction as it can produce local power struggles. It is 
therefore imperative for the West to develop a common Atlantic project 
that induces win-win-strategies for countries that undergo a fundamental 
transformation (such as Syria, Iran and definitely Saudi-Arabia). Although 
the reality on the ground will not be without tensions, the Western ap-
proach and attitude must at least be clear: the call for change must not be 
seen only as a Western interest, but as a mutual interest of the peoples of 
both hemispheres. If this is not the case, it will remain an artificial quest 
and an imposed process. 
Asmus’ and Pollack’s initial proposal for a new transatlantic project based 
on the transformation of the Greater Middle East rightly notes that the West 
“needs a strategy that is more than a military campaign.” Thus, it is neces-
sary not only to fight terrorists and failed states, but “to change the dynam-
ics that created such monstrous groups and regimes in the first place.” They 
define ‘transformation’ as the need for “a new form of democracy in the 
Greater Middle East”, and “a new economic system that could provide 
work, dignity, and livelihoods for the people of the regions” and thus help 
“Middle Eastern societies come to grips with modernity and create new 
civil societies that allow them to compete and integrate in the modern 
world without losing their sense of cultural uniqueness.”
17 They offer no 
systematic outline of the implications of what they rightly describe as a 
“tall order.” Developments in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein in May 
2003 demonstrate the potential for problems and the danger of Western 
scepticism and even cynicism: post-conflict situations or post-dictatorial 
transformation never evolves according to a blueprint. 
There is evidence everywhere of the different approaches of the US and the 
EU. The US debate tends to be strategic, security-biased and driven by uni-
 
17  Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack, ibid, p. 4. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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versal norms. The European debate tends to be regional, multidimensional 
and institutional. Superficially, the issues are the same: weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism, failed states, democracy, human rights, and energy 
supply. Differences of a moral and political nature become all too apparent 
once one goes into details. The Iraq crisis shows that it will not be easy to 
develop a common Western strategy based on overlapping interests and 
commonalities, including the optimal use of complementarity. And yet, a 
common project requires a strategy that focuses on common ground and 
complementarity; if this does not happen, the frustrating internal Western 
Cold War will continue. The obvious differences between the US and many 
EU positions might engender new quarrels over the ability of either side to 
set the agenda, launch initiatives and gain diplomatic ground. 
A US-led strategy for the region could well focus on military solutions and 
short-term effects.
18 The EU may well object as leading European oppo-
nents to US policy in Iraq have done since the 2002-2003 crisis. In fact, the 
US was forced to return to multilateralism when the stabilisation of Iraq 
came into play.
19 European opponents to regime change in Baghdad self-
righteously tended to indicate that they were unsurprised with the obvious 
difficulties involved. And yet, they had to admit that it was the US led coa-
lition that initiated change in the first place, whatever their plans to bring 
the US back the multilateral fold under the aegis of the UN. European part-
ners could support the stabilisation of Iraq. 
An EU-led strategy for the Greater Middle East will be based intuitively on 
the Barcelona Process experience, Europe’s Middle East policy, the consis-
tent reservation against the dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, 
the insistence on a constructive dialogue with Iran, the cooperative ar-
rangements with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the EU 
 
18  I am fully aware that this is a dishonest simplification of the US National Security 
Strategy, but it is the perception that prevails in Europe today. See: The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. 
19  See also: Anthony H. Cordesman, “Victory in Iraq and the Not so New Middle 
East”, Discussion Paper at CSIS Washington DC at www.csis.org/features/iraq_ 
notsonewme.pdf. On US credibility see: Marina Ottaway, “Promoting Democracy 
in the Middle East. The Problem of Credibility”, Working Paper 35, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, March 2003. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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focus on economic cooperation, which obscures the fact that the EU is 
more dependent upon Middle East oil than the US. The US will not object 
to most of this – with the exception of EU policy towards Iran – but it will 
insist that it and not the EU should be the key mediator in the Middle East, 
despite the arrangements of the Quartet Powers
20. The EU must recognise 
that many hopes attached to the Barcelona Process have been held hostage 
by the Middle East conflict notwithstanding the participation of Israel, all 
the Arab Middle East countries and the Palestinian Authority since the in-
ception of the Barcelona Process in 1995. 
A Western strategy driven by events in the Greater Middle East would be 
limited to ad hoc reactions to crises and therefore unable to contribute to 
transformation. It is in the interest of the US and the EU to approach the 
future of the Greater Middle East and Western policy in a comprehensive 
and pro-active way. Individual steps must be pragmatic and incremental, 
but they must be based on a comprehensive strategy to attain global goals. 
Otherwise they will time and again fall victim to ‘events’, what former 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan called the defining element of 
politics. 
A flexible approach is necessary for a comprehensive Atlantic strategy for 
system-opening, cooperative transformation and for the inclusion of the 
Greater Middle East in the process of globalisation. The overlapping nature 
of issues and the need for gradual progress in the most daunting fields must 
be recognised, and patience and strict schedules and mechanisms of condi-
tionality to cover all participants are necessary. The US and the EU must 
decide whether they will approach the challenge with enabling or vetoing 
intentions. Both have are legitimate and necessary (deterrence and coopera-
tion) but the enterprise will be frustrated if the Atlantic partners quarrel and 
use veto capacities rather than working towards the same goals and offering 
system-opening support to the countries of the Greater Middle East that 
want to be partners in transformation. It is imperative for the West to com-
 
20  See Gisela Dachs, “Vier Verschworene plus zwei Streithähne. Das diplomatische 
Quartett: Amerikaner, Europäer, Russen und die UN schmieden gemeinsam Frie-
denspläne für Nahost”, Die Zeit, 25 July 2002, p. 12. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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bine a comprehensive strategy with a pragmatic sense of priorities, possible 
next steps and an appropriate mix of goals and instruments. 
V. Priorities 
The next most urgent test cases of the ability of the US and the EU to de-
velop a new transatlantic project are: 
1. Rebuilding Iraq and returning sovereignty to the Iraqis through constitu-
tion-based secular statehood, the rule of law and democracy, emerging 
from a new development bargain among Western and Arab donor coun-
tries; 
2. Establishing a constitutional and multi-ethnic state in Afghanistan that 
institutionalises peaceful and democratic solutions for cleavages in Afghan 
society; 
3. Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict and creating a two-state solution 
in line with the Quartet ‘Road Map’, and engendering long-term coopera-
tion between the two states; 
4. Bringing about peaceful regime change in Iran by supporting domestic 
reform that promotes an open society and the rule of law and full compli-
ance with the internationally recognised non-proliferation mechanism for 
nuclear weapons; 
5. Introducing a comprehensive CSCE-like (Helsinki-Process) mechanism 
for the whole region that includes the EU and the US as well as Russia,
21 
possibly under UN mandate. 
The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and regime change in both has set the 
immediate agenda regarding the Greater Middle East. They have estab-
lished the bases for a lasting US military presence, brought back multilater-
alism and NATO, and have made the West clearly aware of the existence 
of the Greater Middle East and its status as the most crucial challenge 
Western countries as a whole. While crisis management will focus on un-
 
21  On Russia’s internal dealings with Islam see Uwe Halbach, “Rußlands Welten des 
Islam”, SWP Studies 15 April 2003, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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rest and the unpredictability of developments in countries such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia will remain crucial in light of potential global implications, 
the core issue is the overall development of the Greater Middle East. 
From a global perspective, the successful system-opening and cooperative 
transformation of the Greater Middle East could stabilise the world order, 
lessen the danger of proliferation of terrorism that also threatens various 
countries in the region. It would facilitate the inclusion of the Greater Mid-
dle East in the global economic structures and thus critically support poli-
cies of inclusive development. In geo-political and geo-economic terms, the 
inclusion of a stable Greater Middle East that makes optimal use of its re-
sources can contribute to a more stable, multipolar world order. 
In regional and bi-regional terms, a successful system opening and coop-
erative transformation would enhance the potential for regional cooperation 
along the lines of the EU, NAFTA or the Council of Europe. It would leave 
room for sub-regional cooperation, as in the Maghreb and the Gulf, and for 
continuity in Barcelona Process mechanisms. It would increase the poten-
tial for enhanced trans-regional and bi-regional cooperation, although this 
leads to the question of the role to be played by the different Western part-
ners: while the US might focus on strategic cooperation along the lines of 
Mediterranean policies of NATO, the EU might favour civil cooperation in 
line with the Barcelona Process model. Overlap and conflicts of interests 
could arise – over the relationship of the Gulf Cooperation Council with the 
Barcelona Process – for example.
22 This is all the more relevant for Euro-
pean policy makers as the Gulf Cooperation Council could cooperate to 
rebuild Iraq and even to foster change in Iran. 
It is in the interest of the EU to broaden its horizon and develop strategies 
towards the Greater Middle East that focus on concentric circles and pro-
vide specific solutions to the range of existing problems. Some of the issues 
of what is a long and challenging agenda are supporting the development of 
human resources that are crucial for the rule of law and democracy in coun-
tries like Egypt, engaging Saudi-Arabia in a dialogue about a more open 
 
22  See Bertelsmann Foundation, Center for Applied Policy Research (eds.), The EU 
and the GCC. A New Partnership. (Munich: Gütersloh 2002). System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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definition of Islam that takes into account a modern secular and pluralistic 
state, encouraging the reconciliation of Islamic interpretations of society 
with state that is secular, inclusive and pluralistic, supporting the economic 
diversification of the Gulf economies, and encouraging Israel and Palestine 
to search for ways to link positively their development. 
What are ‘concentric circles’? The term refers to an overlap between insti-
tutional and policy mechanisms that are strongest at the core and overlap as 
they extend to outer regions. The Atlantic partnership between the US and 
the EU is clearly at the heart of any such scheme. A second layer is the 
Barcelona Process, which is directed by the EU, and the NATO Mediterra-
nean Dialogue in which the US is in the driving position. A third layer must 
connect the US and the EU more comprehensively with the Gulf, where 
both pursue bilateral (US) and bi-regional (EU) policies with different pri-
orities and density. In the medium term, Iraq will be considered part of the 
Gulf region. A fourth layer must link the US and the EU with the other 
parts of the Greater Middle East – with Iran and Afghanistan as special 
cases – the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It remains to be 
seen how Russia is or wishes to be linked to one or another or all the layers 
of the cooperative concentric circles. Turkey is involved on the sides 
through NATO membership and EU candidate member status. 
In terms of policy, the different layers of concentric cooperation establish 
different priorities and vary in density. The Barcelona Process is a largely 
civil and socio-economic enterprise. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is 
strategic and security-oriented in nature. Reaching out to the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council countries means defining a common agenda that includes spe-
cific bilateral and bi-regional cooperation (on trade, security, and energy) 
and links to overall regional development (a role in the implementation of 
peace in the Middle East, and the reconstruction and constitutionalization 
of Iraq and Afghanistan). Both hold likewise for the countries of the Cau-
casus and of Central Asia, albeit with a special economic cooperation ar-
rangement. A stable Afghanistan can be considered a part of Central Asia. 
A transformed Iran could be considered a Gulf country, eventually estab-
lishing a link with the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is an anticipation 
that goes well beyond the current situation and serves only as a compass to Ludger Kühnhardt 
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outline the potential of a Helsinki-like process that encompasses the whole 
of the Greater Middle East. 
As far as the Middle East peace process is concerned, a Helsinki-like Con-
ference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the Greater Middle 
East could serve to guarantee the implementation of a final Middle East 
peace solution, whatever its final shape. Russia’s participation in this 
global project is useful and a mandate of the United Nations for a new re-
gional security and cooperation framework will be imperative as it was for 
the CSCE. A Conference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the 
Greater Middle East would eventually be able to make use of the US and 
the EU (and Russia and the Gulf countries) as guarantors and enablers. It 
would encourage the continuation of specific and dense regional schemes 
of cooperation such as the Barcelona Process, with the NATO Mediterra-
nean Dialogue, and specific forms of cooperation with Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Further, a global regional process must enable, support and 
gradually incorporate and transform the very focused activities that are 
necessary while Afghanistan and Iraq require external support for stabilisa-
tion and reconstruction, and while the relationship between Israel and Pal-
estine has not produced a viable two-state solution. Ultimately, these coun-
tries could become ‘normal’ participants of the overall process, overcoming 
their current status as centres of conflict or post-conflict crisis management. 
This kind of ambitious scheme can only materialise and work on the basis 
of a pragmatic and gradual evolution that takes into account the different 
levels of cooperation that already exist or dominate mutual perceptions. It 
is unlikely that the Barcelona Process can be extended as a model to the 
Greater Middle East as it does not include the US. It is insufficient to ex-
tend the NATO Mediterranean policy to the Greater Middle East, as it is 
too security-driven. The most difficult countries like Iraq and Afghanistan 
cannot set the priorities of a system-opening and cooperative transforma-
tion of the Greater Middle East. It is likewise important to encourage the 
constitutional development of the Gulf states, establish more frank and 
conditioned relations with Saudi Arabia, learn from the Algerian tragedy 
and prevent Tunisia and Egypt falling back more than their peaceful, open System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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and stable development can afford.
23 It will be useful for the West to sup-
port Libya’s return to the international community and its transformation 
into a relevant regional partner. It will be important to support the countries 
of the Greater Middle East with fundamental development problems, such 
as Yemen, Sudan, some of the Central Asian and Caucasus republics. 
The two most crucial issues for the next two years are the peaceful trans-
formation of Iran and a two-state solution to the Middle East conflict. The 
fate of a common long-term strategy will depend on the latter, whether the 
solution is bilateral or part of the Quartet that includes Russia and the 
United Nations. Failure to coordinate a peaceful transformation in Iran and 
to bring about a sustainable two-state solution will be more critical test 
cases for the renewal and reorientation of the Atlantic partnership than any 
others. Scepticism is in order regarding the implementation of the Road 
Map within the allotted time frame. This does not enhance, but rather un-
dermines, Western credibility in the region. As far as Iran is concerned, the 
US must abstain from unilateral and military solutions, while Europe must 
increase pressure through conditionality to give sense and teeth to its con-
structive dialogue with the Islamic regime in Tehran.
24 
While old and newly emerging conflicts will dominate the daily agenda of 
policy-makers and the media, it is critical that there should prevail a long-
term realisation of the idea of a common Atlantic project to develop a 
framework for a bi-regional mechanism with instruments comparable to 
 
23 It is interesting to note that Western initiatives that apparently support positive 
change in the Arab world could easily produce negative results. The countries of 
Northern Africa, for instance, are enormously dependent upon import taxes on EU 
goods, although this practice runs counter to European commitments to free trade. 
During the 1990s import taxes on EU goods resulted in 19,2 per cent of all tax in-
come for Algeria, 10.3 for Morocco, 15,9 in Tunisia, and 7.9 for Egypt. On the am-
bivalence of an early free trade zone between the EU and its Southern Mediterra-
nean partners, see Jörg Wolf, “Staatszerfall: Die riskante Stabilisierungsstrategie 
der Europäischen Union für den südlichen Mittelmeerraum”, in: Christopher Daase 
(ed.), Internationale Risikopolitik: der Umgang mit neun Gefahren in den internati-
onalen Beziehungen, Baden-Baden 2002, p. 248. 
24  See Johannes Reissner, “Europas „kritischer“ Dialog mit Iran”, in: Klaus Schubert 
and Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (eds.) Die Europäische Union als Akteur der 
Weltpolitik, Opladen 2000, pp. 173 ff.; Gawdat Bahgat, “The Future of US-Iran Re-
lations”, Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies XXV(2) 2002, pp. 68 ff. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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those of the Helsinki Process that brought the Cold War to a peaceful end. 
Peace in the Middle East could trigger the beginning of a process that 
should reach beyond the Israeli-Palestine problem.
25 It would be worth ex-
ploring the launch of a CSCE-type conference to prepare the final stages of 
conflict-resolution between the two parties. The presence of all relevant 
regional and international actors would increase the legitimacy of a solu-
tion and pressure to induce it. Israel and Palestine should not be merely two 
neighbours living separately: if the vision of a transformed Greater Middle 
East is to become a reality, these former adversaries must at some stage 
find a mechanism similar to that which brought about confidence, coopera-
tion and integration between France and Germany. Water and energy, 
which are both scarce and abundant, could play the role in the Middle East 
that coal and steel played for France and Germany in the 1950s. 
Cooperation must be part of a wider bi-regional framework that includes 
the US (and possibly Russia) and is supervised and legitimated by the UN. 
A Helsinki Process approach must include criteria and mechanisms for 
various ‘baskets’, and provide for package-deal solutions that are mutually 
satisfactory. The most relevant ‘baskets’ of such a process should include 
the following issues: security, the fight against terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, and the transformation of military and militia forces into ar-
mies accountable to civil leaders; mutually beneficial economic and tech-
nological cooperation that addresses investor security, migration, and 
minimal social standards; greater free links between social and non-
political actors, including media representatives, and a religious dialogue 
 
25  Volker Perthes, “The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European Policies 
Towards the Middle East Peace Process”, in: Volker Perthes (ed.), Germany and the 
Middle East. Interests and Options, Berlin 2002, p. 53 ff.; Jerrold D. Green, “La 
politique américaine et le conflit israélo-palestinien”, Politque étrangère 3, 2002, 
pp. 617 ff; Joseph N. Yackley, “Politikkoordination im Nahen Osten: Transatlan-
tische Strategien zur Konfliktlösung?” Internationale Politik 57 (1), 2002, pp.45 ff.; 
Martin Ortega (ed.), “The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East”, 
Chaillot Papers 62, July 2003, Institute for Security Studies, Paris; Muriel Asse-
burg, “Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten”, SWP Studie S 28 July 
2003, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. System-opening Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East 
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and search for the preservation and use of a common cultural heritage
26; 
and sustainable human development, including training of human skills. 
The goal of this process should be the sustainable transformation of the 
Greater Middle East and of relations between it and the Atlantic partners 
for cooperation and common approaches to global challenges. 
A burning question remains: who could launch this initiative? It is in the 
interest of the EU to do so. For the sake of a strong Union, both the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Commission should take the initiative 
and seek the support of leading EU member states that can sustain the idea 
within the European Council. In June 2004, a new European Parliament 
will be elected; this will be followed by the nomination and approval of a 
new European Commission. Both elections come after the enlargement of 
the EU to ten new member states, and so both institutions will have added 
weight. Thus, the European Parliament and the European Commission 
should prepare a joint venture for the Winter of 2004-2005: a version of the 
Helsinki process for relations between the Greater Middle East, the EU, the 
United States and perhaps the Russian Federation, possibly under the aus-
pices of the United Nations. 
For Washington and Brussels alike, the Greater Middle East will be the 
centre of strategic, political and socio-economic as well as cultural and re-
ligious concern for many decades to come. It is important to consider the 
region as a whole. This means comprehensive approaches, not least within 
the foreign policy and academic communities, which tend to under use the 
potential for mutual interface. Sub-regional forms of cooperative develop-
ment must be intensified without losing sight of the greater picture. Promis-
ing issues must be identified that can have an impact on cooperation inside 
the Greater Middle East, in a post-conflict Middle East or between the 
 
26 On the difficulties this already presents for the established Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership see: Ulrike Julia Reinhardt, “Civil Society Co-operation in the EMP: 
From Declarations to Practice”, EuroMesCo Papers 15, 2002, EuroMediterranean 
Study Commission, Lisbon. For the broader context of culture and politics in Medi-
terranean governance see: Indra de Soysa and Peter Zervakis (eds.), “Does Culture 
Matter? The Relevance of Culture in Politics and Governance in the Euro-
Mediterranean Zone”, ZEI Discussion Paper C 112, 2002, Center for European In-
tegration Studies, Bonn. Ludger Kühnhardt 
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Greater Middle East and the West. The prevalence of a threat potential and 
the dangers stemming from the export of instability to the West must be 
addressed with cautious realism. A trans-regional or bi-regional framework 
should link the Atlantic partners with the countries and societies of the 
Greater Middle East. 
Overall, the key to success is a clear focus: a transatlantic project must en-
gage as many countries and societies in the Greater Middle East as possi-
ble, including Israel. This is the best recipe for sustainable success. This is 
a tall order for the EU and the US given that this is a region whose prob-
lems have divided the Atlantic partners in the past more than any other in 
the world. But the attempt must be made.
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27  On the EU experience with the promotion of democracy in Northern Africa through 
the Barcelona Process see: Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds.), The Euro-
pean Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa, London 2002. Armin Laschet 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:        
Beyond the Iraq crisis 
The administrative and political structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership (EMP) is organised on a bilateral and regional basis.  
The main instruments of this bilateral character are the Association Agree-
ments between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. They vary from one 
Mediterranean Partner to another, but still have certain aspects in common. 
The Association Agreements contain political, security, economic and fi-
nancial partnerships, and cooperation in social, cultural and human affairs. 
Once ratified by the national parliaments across the EU, the Associations 
Agreements are to be accompanied by the Association Council Meetings 
between the EU and each of the partner countries in question.  
The Barcelona Process 
In 1995 after 20 years of increasingly intensive bilateral trade and devel-
opment cooperation between the European Union, its 15 Member States, 12 
Mediterranean Partners, the Conference of EU and Mediterranean Foreign 
Ministers in Barcelona began a new partnership phase in this relationship, 
which included bilateral and multilateral or regional cooperation (hence 
called Barcelona Process or, in general, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). 
The Barcelona declaration was the first attempt to combine all three chap-
ters into one comprehensive policy, which attested that political, economic, 
cultural and security issues cannot be effectively approached separately. 
 Armin Laschet 
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was meant to alleviate genuine fears 
of a number of recent issues in Europe, such as the development of illegal 
migration into the EU or the overflow of widespread forms of violence in 
the Middle East and North Africa into the European countries. Among its 
objectives was the re-structuring of the national economy on the Southern 
shore, so that these economies become more receptive to investment and 
commodities from the North and, therefore, to partly fill the gap in terms of 
development and growth between the two sides of the common sea. 
In comparison to the former Mediterranean policy of the EU, the proximity 
policy, inaugurated in Barcelona, innovated in three respects: 
1.  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a global and comprehensive 
policy as has already been discussed above. 
2.  Regional cooperation has been introduced among Mediterranean 
states, to encourage South-South integration, which complements 
and supports bilateral actions and dialogue.  
3.  Increased funds were made available to the EU's Southern 
neighbours (for 1995-99 MEDA compared to the PHARE Pro-
gramme for the EU's Eastern neighbours with a ratio of 3.5 to 5) 
without pre-established allocation of funds among Mediterranean 
Partners.  
The Barcelona process has been an ambitious and innovative initiative, but 
there is still room for improvements. Its practical implementation has 
proved to be extensively complex.  
The Mediterranean countries have to cope with structural problems of for-
eign policy-making in the European Union’s multilevel-system. They find 
it difficult to comprehend the complex decision-making procedures regard-
ing various protagonists within the European Union.  
The democratisation process of the Mediterranean countries has been ad-
vancing lamentably slow. Regarding the economy, the Mediterranean re-
gion is far from being “a region of stability and prosperity” as it was in-
tended in the Barcelona Declaration. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis 
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The political and security dialogue is the most stagnant area of this partner-
ship.  
Furthermore, it will continue to be so until the European Union becomes 
more clearly involved in the resolution of urgent conflicts, which have pre-
vented, to date, the approval of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace 
and Stability.  
Nevertheless, we can also quote considerable progress on the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.  
The grid of bilateral agreements is now close to being complete. Cyprus 
and Malta joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey has a customs union agree-
ment with the EU. Association Agreements with Algeria (April 2002) and 
Lebanon (June 2002) have also been signed. The EU-Jordan Agreement 
entered into force in May 2002 and the interim EU-Lebanon Agreement in 
March 2003. A new trade agreement between the European Union and 
Egypt came into force in January 2004 and negotiations with Syria are in 
progress. Thus, of the twelve Mediterranean partners, four of the Associa-
tion Agreements (Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Jordan) and three Interim 
Agreements (Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Egypt) have been now en-
tered into force. 
Nevertheless, the ratification process of the Association Agreements with 
the rest of the Mediterranean Partners must be sped up. 
The introduction of the Agadir Agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia in January 2003 has been welcomed, because it encour-
aged the participants to conclude the agreement as soon as possible. The 
Agadir Agreement was an initiative launched in May 2001 to create a re-
gional free trade area. The implementation of free trade agreements be-
tween the Mediterranean partners themselves is essential if the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership is to acquire a genuine south-south dimension.  
The proximity of the Mediterranean countries constitutes a geographical 
neighbour on our Southern flank. Thus, the stability of this region is ex-
tremely important for the security and prosperity of the European Union. Armin Laschet 
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The EU and its Mediterranean partners share many common interests, vary-
ing from trade, investment, protection of the environment and energy sup-
ply, to maintaining internal regional peace and stability. The partnership 
established at Barcelona recognises the fact that common objectives and 
common interests need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility, leav-
ing behind the more 'patronising' approach which often marked European 
policy in the past.  
Especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership plays an increasingly important role for the dia-
logue between Western and Arab nations. 
The European security and defence policy (ESDP) 
A major Mediterranean concern is that the European security and defence 
policy (ESDP) has been operating outside the EU.  Prior to the events of 
September 11th it did not look very likely that the ESDP would be ready in 
time for EU's self-imposed time-limit (scheduled for 2003). Intervention in 
Afghanistan brought the ESDP once again into the limelight and as a result 
such a development has accelerated.  
Yet, as the ESDP comes closer to reality, EU's neighbours have become 
suspicious. The ESDP produces, in the same way as enlargement, contra-
dictory feelings: it is desired and yet feared. In the Mediterranean, although 
some sectors would wish the ESDP to represent an assertion of Europe's 
power to provide peace enforcement forces in the Mediterranean area under 
an UN mandate, the ESDP is at the same time feared among EU's southern 
Mediterranean neighbours in that their particular country might become the 
involuntary target of a EU military intervention some day in the future. To 
remove the existing lack of information, or even outright misinformation 
among EU neighbours, regarding the ESDP, there has been a large scale 
information campaign explaining the ESDP to EU's neighbours during the 
regular meetings of the Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process. This has 
been going on to reassure southern Mediterranean countries through regular 
Euro-Mediterranean defence and security dialogue within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis 
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the Barcelona Process. We need a process of conflict resolution and crisis 
management. 
After the regime change in Baghdad and the enlarge-
ment of the EU 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership will be affected by three profound 
changes:  
-    first, EU acquisition of new EU members such as Cyprus, Malta 
changes the geometry of the partnership, and leaves eight Arab part-
ner countries and Israel.  
-   second, after the regime change in Baghdad it would make sense to 
attach Iraq to the partnership, but this will render the geographical 
basis of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership even more questionable.  
-    third, the new EU neighbourhood policy will offer non accession 
countries a share in the single market. Therefore the EU should en-
visage such an establishment of the Euro-Middle East partnership as 
a new umbrella for a number of bi- and multilateral cooperation clus-
ter.  
Impact of the war in Iraq 
The war on Iraq and the split within the European Union into pro-war and 
anti-war camps will certainly have an additional detrimental effect on the 
Euro-Med Partnership. So, it will require more than cosmetic efforts on the 
EU’s part to re-install new confidence in southern Mediterranean countries, 
not only towards governments but, equally important, towards the peoples 
of those countries.  
September 11th and the Iraqi war seemed to underline the urgency to 
strengthen the policies previously outlined in the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership initiative in order to avoid the Mediterranean becoming a new 
fault-line. Notably, the risk of popular support for terrorists among North 
African populations developing into further confrontations has become Armin Laschet 
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more visible since the terror attacks on Madrid. Obviously, the mainte-
nance of social stability in North Africa and the stability of Arab regimes is 
in the interest of the EU as much as it is that of Arab elites themselves. 
Therefore, the reinforcement of dialogue and co-operation in the fight 
against international terrorism, agreed in the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference in April 2002, is just a coherent adjustment of na-
tional security policies into the new international situation. 
However, the situation in Iraq has not yet been settled, despite resolution 
1483 passed by the UN, which lifts the Iraq-Embargo, extends the oil-for-
food program, and supports Iraqis in directing their own political and eco-
nomic future. More importantly, resolution 1546 endorses the transfer of 
sovereignty to Iraq on 30th June 2004 and gives authorization for a U.S.-
led multinational force. It has to be noted that this Resolution has not been 
able to prevent the continuation of terrorist actions in Iraq. The current se-
curity situation aggravates the implementation of reconstruction programs 
as much as the work of humanitarian assistance organizations.  A great 
amount of effort is required in order to solve the current problems in Iraq. 
The Mediterranean Arab countries, which were quick to condemn the sui-
cide attacks in New York and Washington, have nevertheless become new 
subjects in the war against terrorism, which has put many of them in an in-
creasingly uneasy situation.  
Syria is one of the countries whose governmental statements regarding the 
war in Iraq correspond to internal public opinion. The war in Iraq has been 
denounced as a violation of international law and the UN-Charter, not only 
by Syria, but also by the majority of the Arab population.  
Lebanon has followed its dominant neighbour, Syria, condemning the mili-
tary operations in Iraq as an aggression. 
Nevertheless, Jordan has taken a different position. Owing to economic cir-
cumstances (Jordan receives 420 Millions US-Dollars a year from the 
American Government), it participated in the war in Iraq, despite adversary 
avowals. Therefore, Jordan fears its next parliamentary elections, which 
have already been delayed. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis 
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Egypt has reason to be even more concerned by this issue. The reaction of 
the Mubarac government against illicit demonstrations, which call for the 
prohibition of US military use of the Suez Canal, has been so severe, that 
Human Rights organizations such as Amnesty International have been 
called upon to intervene. 
At a time when America was criticized for its supremacy, the Moroccans 
were renegotiating a free-trade agreement, being very cautious about any 
statements concerning the war in Iraq. 
Turkey`s parliament soured its relations with the United States, refusing to 
let American troops cross its territory. Further to that, Turkey's decision not 
to send troops to Iraq, where it was clear that such a presence would be 
unwelcomed by the Kurds, appears to be part of a rather wider revamp of 
Turkish foreign policy. Yet, the Turkish offer of military aid seems to have 
re-established their position, without having to suffer any consequences. 
It is quite significant, that so many Arab countries officially endorsed the 
war in Iraq, though they are part of the Arab League, which expressly con-
demns the “American-British aggression” against Iraq. 
However, there is also another group of the Arabic countries, which shares 
their condemnation of the situation in Iraq, particularly with European 
countries, such as Germany and France. 
In fact, this apparent pro and anti war division can be found both independ-
ently within the European Union and the Mediterranean countries. More-
over, one can also recognise some similarities in regards to anti-war senti-
ments expressed by the people. 
The joint position on Iraq has become evident after the 10th Mediterranean 
Forum in October 2003 (held by Foreign Ministers and top officials of Al-
geria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tuni-
sia and Turkey). The reunion in Antalya ended with the following state-
ment: "The ministers shared the view that the presence of foreign forces in 
Iraq should be of a temporary nature and that their gradual departure should 
be completed in a certain time frame". Armin Laschet 
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Despite the war in Iraq, the positive continuation of the Barcelona Process 
seems to be even clearer, regarding the Sixth Meeting of Euro-
Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Naples in December 2003, 
which optimistically constituted the implementation of the Barcelona Proc-
ess further. 
Nevertheless, Europe and its Mediterranean partners find themselves in a 
similar situation in regards to the threat of possible terror attacks, which are 
meant to influence the political line in Iraq, such as Madrid. This resem-
blance intensifies the co-operation between the European Union and the 
Mediterranean countries in their fight against terrorism which comes under 
the domain of Justice and Home Afairs. The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-
Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Dublin, in May 2004 did 
not only reinforce joint activity in preventing terror attacks, but also 
strengthened its common position to continue to help the Iraqi people to 
rebuild their country and to regain a proper place in the international com-
munity. 
The European Commission has already made a gesture towards Iraq, by 
proposing a contribution of 200 million euros financed by the 2004 com-
munity budget. This can be seen as a way to encourage the Mediterranean 
partnership to view Europe in a favourable light. 
The war in Iraq could possibly be regarded as not having an impact on the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The well established relationship, (not 
only in political, security, economic and financial affairs, but also in re-
gards to the cultural partnership existing between Europe and Mediterra-
nean countries), led to a consolidation of relations, which were sufficiently 
strong enough to withstand a war in Iraq. This long-term relationship did in 
fact help to prevent a possible clash caused by the Iraqi crisis. 
It must be recognised that – making any direct link between the Middle 
East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process should continue to be 
avoided – it is undoubtedly true that when there have, from time to time, 
been positive developments in the former, they have indirectly contributed 
in large measure to creating a more progressive atmosphere in the latter. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis 
  41
American position 
America’s war against terrorism can be said to have had an effect on most 
Mediterranean countries, since such countries have been encouraged to 
adapt their political regime to America’s specifications. 
The U.S. plays the predominant role in issues demanding military interven-
tion, which may accentuate its role in security arrangements in the Mediter-
ranean. The possible perception of the EU as coming second to the U.S. as 
a major military power may discourage security co-operation between the 
North African Arab states and the EU.  
To accelerate progress in the Middle East and increase inter-Arab trade, 
President George W. Bush proposed to create a Middle East Free Trade 
Area (MEFTA) with the United States within 10 years. The conditions for 
integration into the MEFTA depend on economic, political and social re-
forms, implemented by the countries of the Middle East. The main instru-
ment of such a progression is the Free Trade Agreement, which has already 
been ratified with Jordan and Morocco. 
However, a quartet system established between the US, EU, Russia and the 
United Nations should still be regarded as the best means to involve Iraq in 
world policy and economic affairs. 
Nevertheless, not everything is about hard politics, but the successful pro-
motion of dialogue between cultures and civilisations, as has been devel-
oped by the Barcelona Process. This may signify an essential complement 
to the battle against religion-inspired intolerance and totalitarianism. 
For the future 
The regime change in Iraq is bound to result in relations between Iraq and 
the EU. At some point this will prompt the question of how Iraq can be in-
tegrated into the EU`s neighbourhood policies, which are currently divided 
into four different sections: EMP, co-operation with GCC countries, rela-
tions with Iran, and relations with Yemen. Given Iraq's close economic and 
cultural ties with the eastern Mediterranean territory, it would make perfect Armin Laschet 
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sense to attach Iraq to the EMP, at least in the long term. Future Iraqi ac-
cession to the Barcelona process will render the somewhat artificial con-
cept of the partnership with "Mediterranean" countries even more question-
able, since Iraq, after Jordan would be the second southern partner country 
without access to the Mediterranean Sea. The introduction of Iraq into the 
EMP is certainly a more favourable option for the European Union than a 
long-term commitment to humanitarian assistance. This would avoid any 
need to implement defensive measures against terrorism, migration and 
drug trafficking, which are currently issues facing the EU since the Iraqi 
crisis. Solutions to such problems could be incorporated into the Barcelona 
process.  
 Lothar Rühl 
Can the CSCE be a Role-Model to Frame 
the Political Processes of the Greater 
Middle East with Europe and the United 
States? 
At the end of the East-West conflict, when the Soviet Union broke down, 
which was not the intended result of the CSCE process, but after all, was its 
result, the first idea that was thrown out was to create a Conference on Se-
curity and Co-operation for Central Asia. At the time, the ex-Soviet repub-
lics in central Asia were sort of on the loose. You will remember that in 
1992, one year after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the then-German 
Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the US Secretary of State, 
James Baker III., made a speech together in Berlin, in which they suggested 
the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security zone or sphere from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok. That was, of course, a little bit large and in order to fill this 
out the idea was advanced, that between North America and Russia, which 
was part of the CSCE as were North America and the rest of Europe, one 
might organise Central Asia in such a manner, applying the role model of 
the CSCE. However, this was not really pursued, because it was quite ob-
vious that the ex-Soviet central Asian republics did not want to be con-
trolled by any international process beyond what they had agreed to any-
way, because that was part of their international promotion. On the first of 
January, 1992, they found themselves as born members of the CSCE and 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, west of Central Asia, and Georgia found them-
selves as sovereign participants – as it was then called – in the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe (TCFE). Thus, Europe was expanded be-
yond the Caucasus, onto the borders of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Lothar Rühl 
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So the idea has risen of applying the CSCE or the Helsinki process to cre-
ate a possible framework for processes of conflict resolution, military con-
fidence building and to agree on a rulebook for international conduct and 
on economic co-operation in the Near and Middle East – and what has now 
become something equivalent again – the “Greater, or Wider, or Broader 
Middle East”. There are, by the way, different geographical connotations 
between the Bush exposition of this issue and what the British, the French, 
the Italians, the Greeks and the rest of the Europeans would have called 
“the Greater Middle East”: Between the Russians and the British, the 
Greater Middle East was basically the Middle East plus Iran and Afghani-
stan as a land bridge to India. Bush, of course, has included – if I am not 
mistaken – North Africa to this, which you will quite often find as part of 
the Middle East in English books. In French and German literature, we 
make a difference between the Near East and the Middle East and for us, 
“Proche Orient” or “Naher Osten” is what the English sometimes calls “the 
Levant”. The Levant of the Mediterranean, which did include, at the time, 
the Ottoman Empire with Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, and then Egypt, 
and Greece. That was the Levant. So between our perception of the Greater 
Middle East and the Bush geopolitical connotation exists a difference. 
There are layers of various Near and Middle Easts. 
If we want to apply the CSCE rules of conduct, principles, and guidelines 
to the Middle East, we should first look at the situation in Europe in 1973-
75, when the Final Act of Helsinki was prepared, first in Geneva and then 
signed in Helsinki. It was an attempt to bridge the East-West divide simply 
by limits to the political conflict, based on recognition of the existing terri-
torial boundaries, notwithstanding legal objections to the de jure recogni-
tion, for example of the GDR, or of borderlines between Poland and Ger-
many, which did not exist as a sovereign territorial entity. It was only the 
GDR that had a border with Poland. Notwithstanding these delicacies of 
international law and of diplomatic language on the definition of interna-
tional frontiers, the general agreement was that the borders, as they stood, 
would be respected. That is the first part in the central piece of the CSCE. I 
shall not take you to the three baskets because this is bureaucratic, diplo-
matic language, which results from negotiations on criteria that have to be The CSCE as Role-Model for the Greater Middle East? 
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agreed on between the participating governments in order not to prejudice 
any later solution. The recognition of the borders as they stood, with the 
rule that no unilateral or imposed change of international borders would be 
valid, formed the main part of the CSCE. What does this mean for the 
Middle East, especially for the Near East?, where we have a territorial con-
flict between Syria and Israel and an unresolved territorial issue between 
Israel and the surrounding former parts of the Kingdom of Jordan west of 
the river, which are destined to become an Arab state of Palestine 
In 1973-75, in the preparation of the Final Act, all the governments of the 
participating states, the United States, the Soviet Union and all the Euro-
pean states, agreed that the main purpose of a conference would be to cou-
ple a renunciation of the use of force with the de facto recognition of the 
existing borders within this territorial sphere of Europe. This, of course, 
extended to the borders of China and Afghanistan and even to Japan, but 
was no problem since nobody proposed to divide the Soviet Union into a 
European and an Asian part. Therefore, the whole of Central Asia and Si-
beria were part of the CSCE area of negotiations and agreements. Now, 
when you apply the principle of the CSCE, that borders as they stand, shall 
be recognised de facto, and that the de jure considerations shall be reserved 
for further agreement, which might be multilateral or bilateral, you have a 
model for a possible multilateral agreement: not on recognition of the bor-
ders of either Israel with Syria, or Iraq with Kuwait, or Israel with the “Pal-
estinian entity”, as the Israeli government calls it, but you would have an 
agreement that these borders be respected. Further negotiations between the 
interested parties on how to change these borders would be possible and the 
result of this would then be the object of international recognition. When 
you look at the Arab League side, and of individual Arab countries, you do 
not see a joint position. We have the Beirut Declaration of the Arab League 
in 2002, which offers the recognition of the borders as they stand but ex-
presses the Arab League’s position, that these borders cannot be changed 
unilaterally against the will of the Arab neighbours of Israel. This, of 
course, creates a considerable problem, the kind of issue that did not arise 
during the CSCE negotiations. Lothar Rühl 
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The CSCE experience is based on the principle that standing borders will 
be de facto recognised and the rest will be reserved for whoever can resolve 
the problem without conflict, but the renunciation of the use of force to set-
tle the conflict is the first and essential part of it. How this can be applied to 
the relationship between Israel and Syria and between Israel and the Pales-
tinians is not clear. For reasons that I need not to go into, this is related, of 
course, to the settlements on the former territory, the Westbank territory 
and the Gaza territory, of the Kingdom of Jordan, which King Hussein had 
abandoned to the responsibility of the PLO. It is an extraordinary act in 
terms of international law, that a sovereign state abandons claims to re-
cover parts of its occupied territory to a non-state organisation, which this 
state, the Kingdom of Jordan, releases from its own sovereignty. This prob-
lem of international law can only be resolved politically by the govern-
ments concerned, in agreement. In the CSCE this would not have been pos-
sible because the Soviet government was essentially interested in the terri-
torial and political status quo it had itself created after 1944/45 in Eastern 
and Central Europe. Its goal was not “peaceful change” but stability of the 
fait accompli. Therefore, you have a chance that we did not have, that you 
can settle these points of conflict by simply agreeing politically to either 
reserve them for the future, what has been done in the Oslo Declaration, or 
to settle them by any agreement on the exchange of territory. 
The second main point in the CSCE process is much more conducive to the 
creation of problems or to the aggravation of existing ones. When the gov-
ernments started to negotiate on the criteria for security and co-operation in 
Europe they were all fixed on territories, on boundaries and the renuncia-
tion of the right to use force to settle a border dispute or other political con-
flicts. This, finally, was not to become critical. The critical area was what 
everybody in the beginning thought would be secondary: The general prin-
ciples of relations between the countries and of dealing with human rights, 
minority rights and with the political or civic rights of your citizens. When 
you read the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 and the statements that 
Brezhnev and Tito made before they signed the Final Act. They made it 
clear that they had their own interpretations, that they would not accept the 
Western connotations of what these civic rights, minority rights and nation-The CSCE as Role-Model for the Greater Middle East? 
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ality rights meant. It is most interesting to look back at this and at what 
happened afterwards, especially between 1991 and 1999. It was Tito’s 
qualification that the right of the people to determine their own destiny was 
the right of “the Yugoslav nation”. Brezhnev had said the same thing about 
“the Soviet people”. The lawyers and diplomats in the Western delegations 
agreed on the main point: This was an interpretation that would allow Rus-
sians and Yugoslavs to shove this entire agreement out of their way and to 
continue to act as they choose. That was to say, “the people”, for self-
determination, are determined by the sovereignty of the Soviet Union and 
not by nationality and they are not the people of federated Soviet republics. 
It is “the people of the Soviet Union”, Brezhnev said. And Tito made a 
statement like this, saying, it is “the people of Yugoslavia”, the Yugoslav 
nation. Everybody accepted this and it was written into the record. This 
was a main political concession by the West to the unified multinational 
states, and France, Spain, Italy and Britain benefited from this for their own 
unity against separatist claims for independence. 
What would this mean for the Middle East? It means that if you apply not 
only the written principles and rules of the Final Act of Helsinki but the 
statements of the signatories, which were written into the record, which 
said, ‘this is our interpretation, this is how far we oblige ourselves politi-
cally’ – there was no legal obligation anywhere because the Final Act of 
Helsinki is not an international treaty, it is a political agreement between 
governments. This would mean that the existing state would claim the 
privilege of dealing with the question of autonomy or of the right of seces-
sion for independence and be responsible for a composite nation or a com-
posite state and not for its various parts. In the case of Iraq this means that 
an Iraqi government, if we apply the CSCE rules and the accepted interpre-
tations of the signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975, that the Iraqi 
signatory of such an act, or even of an agreement to enter into negotiations 
for this purpose, would say ‘we do not recognise any right of the Kurds to 
secede from Iraq in the name of self-determination’. This must be kept in 
mind. Therefore, it is not necessary to transpose the CSCE process or the 
Final Act of Helsinki or the later agreements over the next 18 years and 
finally the Charter of Paris for a New Europe point by point into the Middle Lothar Rühl 
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East. The focal thing is to bear in mind that the renunciation of the use of 
force was based on the existing frontiers and the right of self-determination 
of the people was based on the composite states and on their territory as 
they existed at the time. This meant, in 1988, when the Baltic and the Cau-
casian Soviet Republics began to demand independence and when the 
Transdniestr problem arose between Ukraine and Romania, that the CSCE 
Final Act of Helsinki could not be invoked on these grounds. But the CSCE 
managed to treat the issue of Transdniestr with observers, not invoking any 
interpretation of the Final Act of Helsinki but just invoking its mandate as 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and with the 
agreement of the concerned parties. Ever since, Transdniestr is not a re-
solved problem but is a neutralised problem. On the question of Nagorny-
Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan the CSCE also acted as an ob-
server in the role of a mediator, very limited in its possibilities. Finally 
nothing was agreed upon apart from some particular matters and a sort of 
cease-fire control. Again, the CSCE as a corporate association receded 
from its principles and rules of conduct in order to do what was possible to 
do: a sort of limited mediation and interposition to prevent the worst – po-
litical damage limitations. 
There again you have a possibility to apply CSCE rules and procedures and 
instruments to the situation whether in the Near East or in the Middle East, 
or in the Wider Middle East, if you apply them pragmatically. The beauty 
of the CSCE was that one could be pragmatic. It was drawing away from 
the front lines of principles, formal rules, and legal considerations that al-
lowed you to be flexible and to apply the procedures and the guidelines for 
the process of solving complicated problems, ambivalent issues and to 
really exercise diplomacy instead of legalistic doctrine. This is very impor-
tant in international politics and it is a positive aspect of the CSCE. 
Now as to the third subject apart from the central theme, the “Confidence 
Building Measures” in the military sphere: What are these confidence 
building measures? There are essentially three. The least demanding one is 
the exchange of information on troop movements and exercises to be held 
in a border zone. Now the depth of the border zone has been discussed and 
has been changed between the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 and later addi-The CSCE as Role-Model for the Greater Middle East? 
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tions and changes and the 1986 Stockholm Conference agreement on con-
fidence building measures and disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. However, that is not so important, because between Israel and 
Syria you have such an agreement on the removal of longer range heavy 
arms and missile systems and the deployment of aircraft. There and in the 
framework of what might be called the ‘Madrid process’ you have a begin-
ning of mutual constraints on forward deployments, considering ranges of 
land-to land-missile systems, and also ground-to-air missile systems. You 
have the beginning of arms control. It is not quantitative arms control, it is 
deployment arms control. And this is an important point: I recall statements 
by General David Ivry, who was at the time Director General of the Israeli 
Defence Ministry, and before that he had been chief of the Israeli Air 
Force, who had participated in the Madrid conference and the follow-on 
talks with Arab countries. He said, that in the talks they had advanced 
much further, especially with the Syrians, than the Madrid conference had 
agreed upon, and were on firm ground with a positive perspective. Nothing 
much more has come of it, but this result was much and the effort could be 
resumed. If you had a CSCE-process you could re-activate the Madrid 
process because both the United States and Russia, which are the patrons, 
the protectors or the moderators of the Madrid Conference, are participants 
of the CSCE, since 1994 members of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. They can very well fit into such a framework if it was 
applied to the Near East, The Middle East, The Gulf region. It could be the 
Wider Middle East they could survey and manage such negotiations. Of 
course, these negotiations could also be resumed bilaterally between Israel 
and the Arab countries. Now these confidence building measures are ex-
change of information on such things as troop movements and exercises but 
also on deployment of certain larger range weapon systems. But this is 
where it stops. One has to bear in mind that the CSCE was started in the 
same year, in which the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions 
in Europe began. This is a major point: The CSCE never was a negotiation 
on armed forces. It was a negotiation on constraints for troop deployments, 
movements, concentrations and other exercises, but on the armed forces 
themselves the negotiation was between the Warsaw Pact and NATO coun-Lothar Rühl 
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tries. In a different framework, therefore, transposing the CSCE process or 
the CSCE principles, rules of conduct, and guidance to the Middle East 
would mean to come to determine whether this would include armed forces 
and armaments or whether armed forces and armaments would be left out 
of it and be reserved for a distinct arms control negotiation. One will never 
understand the CSCE process if one does not bear in mind this separation 
of negotiations on the force levels of armed forces and later heavy arma-
ments from the general matter of the CSCE and of the various later agree-
ments. 
Finally, there was economic co-operation and cultural exchange. And that 
was the least important part. At the beginning, since the Soviet Union and 
the East European countries were so interested in economic co-operation, 
one had thought that the main subject of the CSCE would neither be the 
general political conduct of affairs and political relations, because ideology 
and political systems where incompatible, but that the economic co-
operation would be the main basket. It turned out that the economic basket 
remained empty, because the Soviet Union and all its Warsaw Pact allies 
were members of the socialist state and trade system and wanted to be on 
their own. They wanted to negotiate terms of trade with the Western coun-
tries not linked to questions of freedom, democracy, human rights, minority 
rights, or nationality rights. They wanted economic co-operation, period. 
And this is why it was taken out and the CSCE was not important on this 
point. 
When you look at the possibility of transposing the CSCE criteria, princi-
ples, rules, procedures, and instruments to the Middle East, however you 
define the Middle East geographically, one has to understand that the result 
of the CSCE process in the end was disastrous for the Soviet Union. And 
the question then is: who would take the place of the Soviet Union in the 
Middle East? This is why I am always a little bit shy of making these com-
parisons, because the Soviet Union had a counter-productive operation run-
ning with the CSCE. Without the CSCE, the Soviet Union could have more 
easily suppressed or continued to suppress human rights, opponents, dissi-
dents, or minorities that advocate nationality claims or autonomy. It is not 
for nothing that in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary the opponent groups The CSCE as Role-Model for the Greater Middle East? 
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called themselves “Helsinki groups”. It was the Helsinki opposition, it was 
the people who claimed – not the right, because there was no right – but the 
principles and rules of conduct contained in the Final Act and the follow-on 
agreements in their favour. That contributed considerably to the rise of the 
anti-totalitarian and anti-communist opposition in the Soviet Union itself. 
So the important question to ask here is: What does the CSCE example 
mean for the major regional powers in the Middle East? What does it mean 
for Syria? What does it mean for Israel? What does it mean for post-
Saddam Hussein Iraq, for Iran if it were included, for Saudi-Arabia or for 
Egypt? Now here we have to turn to the basics: Such a process as the 
CSCE was meant and engineered and steered as a process for transforma-
tion of the existing facts that had first been recognised. What had been rec-
ognised was not only the territorial status quo within the international fron-
tiers, but also – not explicitly but implicitly, by the fact of the negotiation 
and the agreement – the political regimes. This is what Brezhnev and Tito 
and others meant in their statements at Helsinki: ‘We are your partners, the 
stability is ours.’ And this is why the Final Act of Helsinki was very often 
compared to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the “Holy 
Alliance”: It was a ‘status quo agreement’, not only on boundaries but on 
regimes. Here you do have a problem when you apply this to the Middle 
East, whether to the Near East or the Wider Middle East, including Central 
Asia and North Africa. The issue is that of distinction between stability of 
the territorial status quo of international frontiers and the stability of the 
internal status quo of the political regimes. The whole thrust of the Eastern 
argumentation, the Eastern diplomacy and the Eastern refusal to subscribe 
to Western definitions of certain rules like self-determination, human 
rights, civic rights and so on, was to maintain, preserve and promote the 
self-interest of the existing political regimes and their continued existence. 
One will be confronted with the same issue in the Middle East. It is not an 
issue for Turkey, it is not an issue for Israel: There are issues of govern-
ment, but not issues of political order, not issues of constitution, not issues 
of political regimes. But with the other partners, you are confronted with 
the essential regime interest of being continued and maintained in interna-
tional agreements and to use the international agreement – as the Soviet Lothar Rühl 
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regime and the Yugoslav regime and all the others, the Polish, the Czecho-
slovakian regimes tried, to use the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki and all the 
follow-up agreements over 18 years including the Paris Charter for a New 
Europe in 1991 – as means to consolidate their own already shattered and 
undermined existence. This is a major political problem, a strategic prob-
lem. It is not a diplomatic problem. This is the key problem that has to be 
solved together with the problem of territorial borders. 
How can you accomplish all this? The essentials are recognition of mutual 
interests in regional peace and stable security; then the question arises: is 
this compatible with the teaching of the “Djihad” rhetoric and the glorifica-
tion of war against “the infidel”? This is not an issue that is restricted to 
totalitarian Djihad Islamism or islamists, this is an issue with which are 
concerned the governments of all Arab and other Muslim states: The teach-
ings in the Mosques, the teachings in the Coranic schools, the language 
used on television and on the radio programmes as well as in the press. 
When the CSCE process started out in 1973, there was of course hostile 
propaganda – especially from the Soviet Union against the United States 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, but it was not to the extend that we 
have seen so far in the Middle East. It was not that Soviet television, Soviet 
radio asked for the murder of the American president, or let people speak 
there who would ask for the murder of the American president, or let 
preachers speak on radio and television about killing – and now we have 
the internet websites encouraging to wage “holy war” against “the Jews, 
the Crusaders and all the Western Imperialists”. This is entirely incompati-
ble with the kind of negotiation that you would need to have to arrive at an 
agreement on the model of the CSCE. One wonders how the governments 
of the Muslim states – particularly the Arab governments – will act once 
you enter into such a process. 
To sum up: The CSCE Final Act of Helsinki in 1975was the beginning of a 
change, it was not the result. The result took 18 years and many things 
changed. This is a positive remark. It is important when we talk about this, 
to note that we did not have a problem like that, we did not have a territo-
rial problem like the war-like situation of occupation and opposition to the 
occupation in the Palestinian territories and we did not have a state of war, The CSCE as Role-Model for the Greater Middle East? 
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a legal state of war between participants of the negotiation, let alone armed 
hostilities. There was no war in terms of international law in Europe be-
tween any European states, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and West Germany. But in the Middle East, you do have a state of 
war between several Arab countries and Israel. Therefore, when we look at 
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the interesting question is: How will the new 
Iraqi government or a future Iraqi government deal with these questions 
vis-à-vis Israel, also vis-à-vis Kuwait, and how will the Syrian government 
or Syria as a state accept rules and principles that will make it necessary to 
change the regime in Damascus? And how will the Arab League moderate 
all this? We talk about states in the CSCE process, because in the CSCE 
process we had only states, there were no official non-state organisations. 
We had the European Community and we had the North Atlantic Alliance, 
we had concertations between allies and between bordering countries. But 
they did not participate as such in the negotiations. Negotiations were being 
conducted by the governments, but here, you have the Arab League and 
this is not a side issue but a central issue, because it was the Conference of 
the Arab League in Beirut that has offered Israel certain terms of peace. 
Therefore it would be opportune, advisable and necessary to have the Arab 
League take part in this negotiation. Then we have the ‘Barcelona’ and the 
‘Casablanca processes’ which are about multilateral co-operation; they are 
not directly about security, but they link all Mediterranean countries and 
they can be brought into such a general framework as to give it a more co-
operative structure apart from the border and military security and arms 
control issues. There is no use trying to transpose the CSCE experience if 
you do not take care of the issue of arms control and disarmament and de-
militarisation in the Middle East, in order to free politics and regimes from 
the fixation on arms and war, as well as public opinions, and to moderate 
political attitudes, language and teachings. There is an issue of militant Is-
lam as there is one of Arab and Israeli militancy in dealing with each other, 
based on the use of force and on violence. As long as governments use or 
tolerate such attitudes and resort to or rely on terrorist acts and deny the 
other side security in order to continue the state of war as a matter of prin-Lothar Rühl 
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ciple, it would not serve the purpose of peace by applying the CSCE ex-
perience to the Middle East. 
The general strategic-political problem of using the all-European CSCE 
experience for the Middle East lies in the difference between the geopoliti-
cal conflict structures: There are no “block politics” and no moderating 
“neutrals and non-aligned” countries within the confrontation frameworks 
of the Middle Eastern region: Iran has no declared or reliable allies, Iraq 
has been isolated and made the object of a foreign intervention with the de-
clared objective to change its regime and to disarm it. Israel has only one 
conditional security partner in the region: Turkey, but a powerful ally in the 
USA as an external strategic corner for its security. Egypt and Jordan are 
formally at peace with Israel. All the other Arab states have maintained a 
state of war with Israel. The US does not directly participate in security ar-
rangements in the region, but maintains bilateral alliances or coalition part-
nerships with countries like Saudi-Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Turkey is a 
member of NATO. This configuration complicates negotiations on either 
“collective security” in a multilateral framework or on mutual arms control. 
The US proclaimed objective of “strategic change“ in the region, based on 
a new international security order and the induction of democracy, is not 
necessarily a policy of “stabilisation”. It can lead to further crises and in-
ternal upheavals. The “stabilisation pact” proposals suppose a positive and 
peaceful development. The Palestine “peace process” and the continuing 
problems in Iraq as in Afghanistan show the limits of success of such an 
ambitious strategy. The CSCE had no such far-reaching and revolutionary 
goals. That it contributed to such change was not pre-ordained by any law 
or Lord “of history”. Nabil Alnawwab 
Conflict of Mythologies: The Debate on 
Reform of the Greater Middle East 
Background 
On February 13, 2004 Al-Hayat, a leading Arab newspaper, opened the 
gates of hell when it published (or leaked) the Arabic translation of the US 
working paper in preparation for the June G-8 Summit at Sea Island, Geor-
gia. The document represented the Bush Administration’s plan to promote 
political, economic and social reforms in what has been termed as the 
Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). For the past five months, GMEI 
competed vigorously with Iraq and Palestine for the prime attention of pol-
icy makers and citizens alike, in the Arab region. Greater Middle East be-
came the catch phrase in vogue.    
The Initiative caused great commotion among Arab leaders. Not only did it 
cause (indirectly) the postponement of the Arab Summit, but also it 
prompted a flurry of initiatives (formal and non formal) by Arab countries. 
Also, there have been daily articles in the Arab press, mainly attacking the 
Initiative for lacking in transparency, “imposing reform from outside”, and 
neglecting to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
The US working paper was a purely American initiative. On 26 February 
2003, on the eve of Iraq invasion, in a speech before the American Enter-
prise Institute – a neo-con think tank - President Bush set out his vision to 
spread democratic values in the Middle East. Then on 9 May 2003, in a 
speech at the University of South Carolina, he proposed “the establishment 
of a US-Middle East free trade area within a decade”. These speeches were Nabil Alnawwab 
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followed on 6 November 2003, with a speech to the National Endowment 
for Democracy, with its main theme democracy in the Muslim world.  
The Initiative, however, is not a theoretical proposition or vision. It should 
be viewed within the duel context of the new thinking dominating the Bush 
Administration and its occupation of Iraq. The US is talking basically of 
Iraq destabilizing the Middle East in a positive way, of making authoritar-
ian governments fall, and creating liberty and democracy in their place. The 
Initiative noted, “a region that stands at the crossroads. The GME continue 
on the same path, adding every year to its population of underemployed, 
undereducated, and politically disenfranchised youth. Doing so will pose a 
direct threat to the stability of the region, and to the common interests of 
the G-8 members. The alternative is the route to reform.” 
Regional Responses 
Within the above context the Initiative was regionally viewed as an Ameri-
can tool for foreign policy, not a partnership for reform. It was considered 
by many Arabs as a form of punishment. With Iraq presence so violently 
visible, the stick was evident, and the carrot was absent.  
The responses to the Initiative were varied, but generally unfavorable. In an 
interview with an Italian newspaper the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
noted the American Initiative could cause a “storm of violence and anar-
chy” reminiscent of the “Algerian tragedy”, a pointed analogy with the 
1991 Algerian elections when the Islamists won. He also pointed out, 
“freedom and impromptu democracy could lead to shock”; adding, “What 
will happen if a majority of extremists won in Parliament?” “We will not 
let the outside dictate to us norms that could lead to drowning and anarchy. 
We know our country more than anyone else.” The President repeated that 
he believes reform must be gradual. Later, he was more studied and cau-
tious in his opening speech to the Alexandria Library Conference for Arab 
Reform, when he pointed out, “If some reports showed deficiencies in im-
plementing plans for development and modernization of Arab societies, 
they merely emphasize the need to push further the reform efforts with 
more assertiveness and seriousness; they also reflect, at the same time, the Conflict of Mythologies 
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need for strong outside support for our efforts for modernization and re-
form, however, without forcing an outside unified norm, or to strive to 
achieve goals that do not agree with our plans”.  
Bahrain’s Prime Minister asserted that “the imposition of any foreign view 
is not in the interest of the countries of the region”. The Syrian Vice Presi-
dent went, as far as to claim “the GMEI is reminiscent of the situation after 
World War One, when major powers sought to carve up the region.” Jor-
dan, Morocco, Qatar were somewhat less critical, calling for discussions 
with the United States and European countries rather than dismissing the 
Initiative out of hand. All Arab countries, however, insist that any US plan 
to promote reform must be accompanied by serious diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.   
One of the main reference points for the Initiative’s survey of present state 
in the Arab region, were the Arab Human Development Reports. The Ini-
tiative fully utilized the Reports, prepared by a group of independent Arab 
intellectuals and issued under the umbrella of the Regional Bureau of Arab 
States, UNDP. The Initiative borrowing heavily from the Reports, gave a 
grim bird’s eye view of the situation in the Arab region (not the GME re-
gion, of course). Yet contrary to general belief in the West, the Reports 
were not appreciated by substantial numbers of the intelligentsia. The Re-
ports were severely criticized, often unjustly, for failing to emphasize the 
role of outside pressures and interventions that led to derail development, 
its over zealous criticism of Arab countries and societies, and for neglect-
ing to point out positive aspects of development in the Arab countries.
1  
On a regional institutional level, the opinions of Amr Mousa, the Secretary 
General of the Arab League, are always interesting. While he competently 
represents the Arab League and its 22 Member States, he has always been 
sensitive to the opinions of the Arab intellectuals as well as the average 
person, more than any other official with similar status. In a long interview 
with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper (19 March 2004), he noted that reform 
 
1   All too interestingly, the Initiative as approved by the G-8 in June, fully omitted any 
mention of the Arab Human Development Reports. It opted to cite official declara-
tions and government sponsored conferences. Nabil Alnawwab 
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has been on the agenda of most, if not all Arab countries, well before 
GMEI. However, he went further in his criticism than other officials when 
he pointed out, “I question the logic behind the formulation of GMEI. I say 
the issue is not ballot boxes or a reform in this or that area, it is the general 
environment that is at stake and the great problems facing this region that 
affect peace and security. That is why I find the logic of these initiatives 
unclear, and their agenda not acceptable. They revolve around dropping or 
marginalizing the major problems that occupy the conscious and minds of 
our public opinion. They did not deal with the problem of the Middle East. 
And I question the intention to divert the minds away from problems, in 
particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. Is it a repeat of what was advocated by 
Shimon Peres in the nineties about the “New Middle East” and how it had 
become imperative to forget about existing institutions and arrangements, 
such as the Arab League and Arab Nationalism?”     
While Arab intelligentsia was less sympathetic and more vociferous than 
many leaders in their opposition to the Initiative, there were many who 
gave different emphasis and nuances that could give a better indication of 
Arab public responses to the Initiative. Among the participants of the Alex-
andria Library Conference, 18 leading intellectuals published a statement 
noting, “Domestically based reform is a national demand that goes back to 
the middle of the nineteenth century, we reject reasserting this noble de-
mand for the servicing of Arab totalitarian regimes, and for enhancing 
American control over the Arab countries.”  This statement raises the im-
portant issue of credibility of both parties to the present reform process, 
i.e., Arab regimes and USA.  
However, other public figures, like Prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan, em-
phasized in an article on the subject, “critics (of the Initiative) are at fault 
for two reasons: our region needs reform initiatives, both domestic or ex-
ternal; also reform could accelerate the peace process rather than hinder it.” 
He also noted that it was not wise to assume that the resolution of the Pal-
estinian-Israeli problem, Iraq’s, or regional reform, should be resolved in 
any neat chronological sequencing. The resolution of any of the above 
problems should not be contingent on the resolution of others. They all 
could be handled simultaneously”. Amr Mousa in his (above) interview Conflict of Mythologies 
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agrees with the later point. He thinks the issue is not that of predetermined 
linkages, but rather “balanced and parallel approaches.” 
The famed Egyptian intellectual Saad Al-Din Ibrahem, Amin Hewadi a 
leading Islamist writer, and Salama Nemat a leading Arab journalist, 
among others, while doubting the credibility of US intensions and the Arab 
regimes’ strive for reform; all think the Initiative should not be rejected 
outright. The needs for reform are overwhelmingly urgent.  
The G-8 Initiative 
It is clear from reviewing the final version of the Initiative, approved by the 
G-8 in its June 2004 Summit, that considerable effort was made to take into 
consideration much of the criticism levied above
2. The American Admini-
stration, unlike its usual practice manifested in the preparation of the earlier 
Initiative and their other policy issues, undertook serious consultations with 
the European Union and other members of the G-8 as well as Arab gov-
ernments. Marc Grossman was dispatched for talks with Arab friendly gov-
ernments (Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Bahrain). The results of such en-
deavours became apparent. The disturbing references to the Arab Human 
Development Reports were omitted, clearer methodology on follow up 
were specified, the theme of partnership spelled out clearly, and urgent 
conflict issues were mentioned (though timidly). In addition, the two 
documents (“Partnership” and “Plan of Support”) were presented as con-
tinuation of earlier Arab attempts at reform, or a serious push for “domesti-
cally based” reform efforts. The indications were for a gradual move to-
wards a CSCE model with its famed Baskets. The Plan of Support calls for 
the formation of a “Forum for the Future”, with basically three reform 
tracks: “Deepening Democracy and Broadening Participation in Political 
and Public Life”, “Building a Knowledge Society to Combat Illiteracy and 
Advance Educational and Technological Systems”, and “Accelerating Eco-
 
2   “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa”, and “G-8 Plan of Support for Reform”, Sea Is-
land, Georgia, June 9, 2004. Nabil Alnawwab 
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nomic Development, Creating Jobs, Empowering the Private Sector, and 
Expanding Economic Opportunities”. 
The landscape for US international involvement and intervention changed 
radically post 9/11. The clearest example for this change is not Afghani-
stan, but rather Iraq where an occupation was undertaken with limited in-
ternational support and no legitimacy. It was undertaken not for oil, WMD, 
or democracy. It was the signpost for changing hegemony on the ground. It 
was/is an attempt at redefining the political and strategic map of the Middle 
East. It is within this setting that the “Partnership” and “Plan of Support” 
should be read. A Middle East lacking in development, stability and de-
mocracy will continue to be a source of destabilization. The Arab Human 
Development Reports clearly showed “the writings on the wall”. Interven-
tion was necessary, before destabilization becomes threatening. The re-
sponse from the US and the G-8 was considered opportune.  
However, given the US track record of interventions in the region, Arab 
governments’ poor appetite for reform programs, and low credibility of the 
primary players, the viability of GMEI and its success were questionable. 
As one Arab journalist bluntly noted, are we in a situation where the well-
known Arabic proverb holds true, “the mountain went into labour and gave 
birth to a mouse”? 
Conflicting Myths 
The present arena for GMEI is plagued with conflicting myths perpetuated 
by both, US and Arab regimes (i.e. the primary players). There is need to 
weed out mythology before an apt intervention is formulated with higher 
chances for success, and before the scene is set for a CSCE model with real 
political bargaining options is set on center stage. 
Myth One, the Divergent Regional Membership 
In attempting to establish links with on going regional reform priorities, the 
“Plan of Support” repeatedly referred to the Arab League Summit Tunis 
Declaration, the Alexandria Library Statement, the Sana’a Declaration, and Conflict of Mythologies 
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the Arab Business Council Declaration. In the earlier working paper the 
reference point was the Arab Human Development Report. All reference 
points are Arab countries; yet it is certainly not clear if the said Arab priori-
ties are relevant to the none Arab countries of this Initiative. The member-
ship modality for the regional partnership that encompass such divergent 
membership is not comprehensible. 
The awkward formulation of the GME membership is a post 9/11 concoc-
tion suited as a US foreign policy tool, rather than a response to regional 
needs or realities.  
Myth Two, Softening Hard Authoritarian Regimes 
The basic question that needs to be competently dealt with is whether the 
authoritarian regimes prevalent in the Arab countries are capable of pro-
moting socio political and economic reforms that could lead to a democ-
ratic regime change. Though most these regimes are not dictatorial in the 
strict sense of the term, yet they are authoritarian with tremendous concen-
tration of power at the top of the power pyramid. There are certainly seri-
ous differences among the authoritarian regimes of the region, yet they are 
more homogenous when the issue of regime change or transfer of authority 
is at stake.  
However, with modernization and globalization the expanding networks of 
interests that dominate the political-economic scene of present regimes, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to enact radical reforms that could lead to 
fundamental changes. The balancing of these complex networks of diver-
gent interests is leading to a form of stalemate.  
Conventional wisdom has informed us that economic reforms could lead to 
more democratization and political reform. Yet experience in a number of 
developing countries has strongly indicated the adaptability of authoritarian 
regimes to a large variety of economic reforms. The Arab region is no ex-
ception to this phenomenon. 
    Nabil Alnawwab 
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Myth Three, Domestically Based Reform vs. Externally Induced Re-
form 
The Arab Human Development Reports excellently expounded the urgency 
of reform in the Arab countries. It is fairly accurate to note that demands 
for reform extended over a very long period of time, preceding GMEI and 
the Barcelona Process. The earlier demands for reform and initiatives took 
varied forms and approaches. Yet success has been limited or generally 
lacking. The very same regimes elucidating the primacy of domestically 
based reforms have studiously refused such domestically inspired reforms. 
The present GMEI does not seem to be fully aware of the lessons that could 
be learned from past experiences of reform and their failures.  
Many Arab writers, such as Saad Al-Den Ibrahem and Salama Namat, 
while noting the urgency of reform, are pointing out that the issue is not the 
domestic vs. the external. With post 9/11 as the dominant political culture 
in USA, the options for choice are severely constrained. If the Arab coun-
tries do not choose to accept GMEI, the probability is that these countries 
will be “forced” to accept.    
It is becoming increasingly clear that the debate in the Arab countries about 
the intrinsic value of domestically based reforms as opposed to externally 
induced reforms is basically an attempt to push USA into further dialogue 
and concessions. After all, the same Arab countries were willing partners 
with USA in its violent and externally induced regime change for Iraq.  
Myth Four, Disaggregating Reality 
GMEI is presented as a pathbreaking endeavour by presenting a wide-
ranging package of reforms. The idea is to disaggregate complex reform 
concepts into their basic components. Thus democracy is disaggregated 
into programs on rule of law, independence of judiciary, civil society, ac-
countability, etc.; and the same applies for the other concepts. Yet most of 
these disaggregated programs are mostly already present in existing US and 
other G-8 members’ aid programs in the region
3. GMEI is more of an as-
 
3   Some of these programs have been implemented for many years, with limited 
success. A study on microfinancing projects in the Arab region studied 60 such Conflict of Mythologies 
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sortment of aid programs rather than an assertive and comprehensive 
framework for reform. As an editorial in Al-Hayat observed, the two G-8 
documents were fitting to be issued by an Arab Summit. As far as authori-
tarian Arab leaders are concerned, cosmetic reforms through piecemeal 
programs could lead to gaining international legitimacy and “bleed off ac-
cumulating pressure” for real political reform.  
What has been missing out in GMEI, is a more assertive policy framework 
towards authoritarian, but friendly, regimes that are non-reforming. The 
GMEI listed programs for reform are certainly worthy, but are essentially 
“secondary issues” to the primary issues of banning political parties, in-
creasing political inclusion, enacting parliamentary elections and ensuring 
powers of the legislatures, among others.  
Myth Five, Political Reform in a Crisis Situation 
Neither the independence of Iraq, nor the resolution of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, is adequate pre condition for reform of the region. Reform 
cannot be put on the shelf awaiting political resolution of complex prob-
lems. As Prince Hassan Bin Talal noted, political reform could accelerate 
and facilitate the peace process. However, while pre conditionality is not 
appropriate, recognition of the crisis situations and dealing with them is a 
certain pre requisite for the success of GMEI. The assumption that a major 
regional initiative could lightly touch on urgent and violent regional crises 
is at best illusory.   
It is true, as many writers in the Arab press have noted, most Arab coun-
tries have long ceased to give priority to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yet 
many continue to use it as a pretext for delaying reform. This, however, 
does not change the fact that resolution of violent regional crises is impera-
tive for the success of reform. Raghdad Dirgham, a senior Arab journalist, 
 
projects and came to the conclusion that out of the total, only two were sustain-
able and eight on the way to sustainability, with the remaining 50 lacking in sus-
tainability, see Judith Brandsma and Rafika Chaouali, Making Microfinance 
work in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank 1999. 
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succinctly put it when she advised European Arab friends; there are “no 
preconditions for reform”, and “no preconditions for ending occupation”.      
Myth Six, the Message or the Messenger 
In the Arab press, much of the debate on GMEI was on form not content. 
Hardly any discussion was evident on the viability of the suggested reform 
programs. This situation was largely due to the prevalent lack of credibility 
of both primary players. The issue was the messenger not the message. 
Even with the changes introduced to the Initiative after the publication of 
the working paper last February, there was silence on the content of the G-
8 “Plan of Support”. Public knowledge of such content remains absent in 
the region. 
Conclusions 
The GMEI faced a difficult birth with abundance of mistrust and skepti-
cisms. The chances for success are vague and limited. This situation begs 
the question whether or not a different formula should have been intro-
duced? The CSCE, with its long preparatory discussions, three Baskets 
modality, and public compliance reviews, could have been theoretically 
more appropriate. The GMEI certainly attempted to borrow some of the 
tool (the Baskets and the Forum for the Future). The analogy, however, is 
seriously flowed. The Arab countries have neither a towering Arab regional 
power (Soviet Union), nor a Warsaw Pact type organizational structure, 
suited for regional deliberations and bargaining. More importantly, unlike 
CSCE, GMEI lacks the clarity of what is at stake. There are no real bar-
gaining situations among the GMEI partners.           
It was noted by Al-Hayat newspaper, around 4000 journalists covered the 
June G8 meeting that focused on the Middle East, yet out of the 4000 only 
12 Arab journalists took part: a sad comment on the regional enthusiasm 
for reform, or an appropriate comment on the mythologies of reform? Carlo Masala 
Is the Model of the Baskets Applicable 
to the Greater Middle East? 
If you consider transposing the CSCE experience to the Greater Middle 
East, one of the trickiest questions is, if the basket model is really applica-
ble to the Greater Middle East. It is tricky because if you look at the basket 
model, which is basically the CSCE model, it is impossible to talk about 
the basket model for the Greater Middle east without – very briefly – going 
back to the CSCE. 
Why was the basket model in the CSCE so successful? From there you can 
start thinking about the basket model for the Greater Middle East initia-
tives. The end of the question, why the basket model was more or less suc-
cessful in the CSCE is that, first of all, within the baskets we had more or 
less three stable blocs. We had the Western bloc, around the US, the East-
ern bloc, around the USSR, and we had what was at that time called the 
neutral and non-aligned states. So we had a stable negotiation structure, 
which made it possible that from time to time during the CSCE annual con-
ferences, you had interesting meetings between the two bloc leaders: the 
American delegate, the Russian delegate and then more or less the spokes-
man of the neutrals. Those meetings were much more important than the 
open debate among all participant countries because in those meetings cer-
tain things were negotiated, which were then presented to the rest of the 
CSCE-states and more or less accepted, with some minor changes. 
The basket model worked, first of all because you had clear negotiation 
structures, you had leaders within each group who were able to negotiate 
something for the rest of the group. Secondly, the basket model was suc-
cessful because there was a common interest between the western, the east-Carlo Masala 
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ern as well as the neutrals and non-aligned. This common interest was to 
preserve the more or less stable situation in Europe between the two blocs. 
The CSCE took round the idea when the creation of the western and the 
eastern bloc, when the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, came to an 
end. We had a stable situation, and both sides were interested in preserving 
that and in getting some kind of legitimacy for their own bloc and for their 
own borders. This was the over-reaching goal and the common interest that 
all members of the CSCE shared. Thirdly, and this is of great importance 
for the Greater Middle East, we had a kind of bargaining deal. If you look 
at the interest of the Communist bloc at that time: concerning the CSCE, 
the interest was mostly economical. It was in their interest to have closer 
economic co-operation with the West. The West on the other side had an-
other interest, which was more related to human rights, i.e. to human rights 
in the Eastern countries. Consequently, the bargaining deal was: You give 
us a little bit more of human rights and we give you a little bit more of eco-
nomic co-operation. That worked at the time, together with the other two 
points mentioned, with stable bloc structures and with the overreaching in-
terest. 
These three things have to be borne in mind before talking about the ques-
tion if the basket model is applicable to the Greater Middle East. If we look 
at the three conditions, one can be very sceptical, because first of all, I 
don’t see any clear negotiation structure in the whole Greater Middle East 
Initiative. I am not only talking about the Arab world, where it is clear that 
we have no strong regional or sub-regional organisation that can take the 
lead to negotiate for the Arab states, we have the Arab-Israeli conflict, all 
things with which we are familiar with. But I think we also have no stable 
negotiation structure at the moment in the West. The G8-meeting showed 
that and I am quite surprised how the interests of certain NATO-members 
are diverging when it comes to the Greater Middle East. So we have no 
clear negotiation structure in the West. We are – I will not say deeply – but 
we are very much divided over the question how to deal with the Greater 
Middle East or even – put the “great” aside – with the Middle East. One of 
the conditions is lacking at the moment. In a Greater Middle East Initiative 
with a basket model approach we would have more than 50 countries Is the Model of the Baskets Applicable? 
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around the table. Each of them with a different interest, even the two sides, 
the West and the South, divided over their interest in the Greater Middle 
East Initiative. We have then in the West a division, we have in the South a 
division, not only because of the Arab-Israeli conflict but also because of 
the differences and divergences of the countries themselves and their inter-
est in the Greater Middle East Initiative. If we look at North Africa, they 
have a completely different interest in being part of this initiative than 
probably the states in the Persian Gulf. So it will be quite difficult to define 
a common interest. Where is the common interest? We had a clear common 
interest in the CSCE, but where is the common interest in the Greater Mid-
dle East Initiative? I cannot see it at the moment. That is my basic problem 
why I say you can create a basket model but you will have difficulties to 
get to results within the negotiation, within each basket. This is exactly one 
of the problems in the Barcelona Process. The Greater Middle East Initia-
tive is the Barcelona Process plus twenty others, so it will make things 
much more complicated. Therefore, I am quite sceptical if the basket model 
is applicable. 
If it comes to security – and I was asked to talk about a basket for security 
basically – one has to raise two questions and the answers do not lead to 
optimism about the applicability of a basket model in the security field. 
First of all, if it comes to security, once again, the analogy to the CSCE is 
flawed. For the simple reason that if you go back to Helsinki, you will see 
that security issues were not dealt with within the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe. It was outside; it was in the Mutual Balanced 
Force reduction talks only between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Both, the 
US and the Soviets, had an interest to keep those tiny, disturbing, little neu-
tral and non-aligned countries outside and to negotiate on this clear alli-
ance-to-alliance structure on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. Those 
talks did not lead to anything until the midst of the eighties. I am not going 
back to history and telling you that this was the cause of SDI and then the 
change in the Soviet Union with Gorbachev etc. But then, the Mutual Bal-
anced Force Reduction they really took off, they were integrated into the 
CSCE afterwards and led to the CFE first treaty and CFE second treaty, 
which were the basis for arms reductions in the nineties. But, most impor-Carlo Masala 
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tantly, security issues, hard security issues, were not part of the original 
CSCE. So if you want to bring hard security issues – and some states, some 
countries have an interest in talking about hard security issues within the 
Greater Middle East Initiative – you have a two-fold problem: Firstly, there 
is no real military or powerful state in the Arab world you can deal directly 
with and who has also the power to convince other Arab countries to follow 
the results of that talk. So the bloc-to-bloc structure is absent, which is one 
of the problems. Secondly, the CSCE took off when we had a stable situa-
tion in Europe. We do not have a stable situation in the Arab world right 
now. And this is not only due to the Israel-Palestine conflict – I think the 
Israel-Palestine conflict is a problem for the Arab world but even if this 
conflict will be resolved, we will see inter-Arab competitions for dominant 
regional hegemony. So we have no stable structure in the Arab world. We 
have territorial conflicts between Arab countries as well as between Arab 
countries and Israel and also the special problem of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict. Therefore, I do not expect that the security basket in the Greater 
Middle East Initiative will have any result. 
Secondly, if you take a closer look into the Arab world or the Greater Mid-
dle East world, you will find that the security situation, the security needs, 
and the security problems are too different within the sub-region. If we 
have a security basket and if we talk about security issues, we cannot put 
North Africa, the Middle East as well as the Persian Gulf in one basket. All 
those regions have different security interests, different security problems 
and different security needs. Therefore, a basket for all of those countries is 
extremely difficult. If we look at the Western side and the relation, I also 
see a problem here, because if we look at the United States, their main in-
terest now understandably is in Central Asia: the Caucasus and the Persian 
Gulf. These are the regions, the US is most interested in when they are talk-
ing about the Greater Middle East Initiative, going then to Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan. The Europeans are much more concerned about the situation in 
the Middle East as well as in North Africa. The Middle East is also an area 
of concern, partly for the United States. What does this mean? This means 
that you cannot put this in a whole basket. You need – if you want to talk 
about security issues within the Greater Middle East Initiative – a sub-Is the Model of the Baskets Applicable? 
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regional approach, which focuses on North Africa, which focuses on the 
Middle East, which focuses on the Persian Gulf and probably then on coun-
tries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e. everything which is close to China. 
If you focus on this sub-regional approach, you need different players tak-
ing the lead in it. I would see the Europeans much more interested in the 
talks with North Africa. I see a shared interest of the United States and 
Europe in the Middle East, while I see a really strong US-interest in the rest 
of the Greater Middle East and no interest in letting the Europeans be part 
of that. So if you want to talk about security issues and want to have a bas-
ket model, you have to break the basket down into sub-regional baskets, 
where you have different countries or organizations taking the lead from 
the western side to negotiate on security issues. How this will fit together, I 
do not know, because it is geographically too different. Secondly, not even 
the issue of WMD is a unifying factor because it does not affect North Af-
rica, more or less. It is more a problem of the Middle East, it is more a 
problem of the Persian Gulf and the areas bordering the Persian Gulf. If it 
comes to the modernization of military force – NATO is obsessed with that 
–, even here the situation is different. North Africa does not really need 
modernization of military forces, most of the countries in the Middle East 
need modernization of their military forces. But I am quite sceptical if the 
Persian Gulf countries need that. They are very well equipped, basically by 
the US and France. So even here I think the problems are too different. 
This leads to the general point: who is taking the lead in that security bas-
ket in the Greater Middle East Initiative? Here lies a further problem. 
First of all, the EU still lacks military muscles and not all EU-countries are 
interested in taking the lead in those talks. Secondly, NATO is over-
stretched at the moment and NATO is deeply divided among its members 
about the role of NATO in the Greater Middle East Initiative, especially the 
role of NATO in countries like Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The basic prob-
lem is, however, that NATO has a perception problem in the Arab world. It 
simply is seen as an imperialistic alliance. It simply is seen as a US-led, not 
Western-led, alliance. So if NATO would take the lead in those talks, it 
would have a big perception problem in the Arab world, which will hamper 
any efforts of NATO to come to results with the Arab countries. Carlo Masala 
  70   
The US alone cannot do it because of the same problem NATO has, which 
is basically a perception problem. It is not only due to the intervention in 
Iraq; in the Arab world the US is seen as a colonialist power, more or less, 
due to the history of US engagement in the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf. Therefore, the US as well as NATO, cannot take the lead in that ef-
fort. 
I would say that if we talk about security in the Greater Middle East, I 
would recommend, that first of all, every initiative should be founded on 
the basis of self-differentiation, we cannot expect all countries to join, we 
cannot expect all countries to participate in that basket, so it has to be on a 
basis of self-differentiation. Secondly, more successful than the current de-
sign of the Greater Middle East Initiative, which puts all those countries in 
one basket, is a sub-regional approach. And thirdly, probably, I am not 
quite sure about that, the involvement of different actors in the sub-regional 
talks about security. But if this is the solution, then it has little to do with 
the old basket model of the Barcelona Process and the Conference on Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe. Stefan Fröhlich  
How much Regional Differentiation is 
Necessary to Establish a Successful 
CSCE-analogous Process? 
Introductory remarks 
After near-fatal fracture of the transatlantic relationship over the American-
led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating that 
the US was determined to rather impose its vision of a new order in the 
Greater Middle East in which there will be no opportunity for terrorism to 
breed, Washington’ message, maybe because of the upcoming elections, 
has become distinctly emollient and more promising. Over the past two 
years Washington thought to bring about radical change across the board in 
many countries of the region under pressure from the US and its allies, with 
the threat of military action looming in the background. The Bush admini-
stration, driven by the neo-conservatives, wanted to see the Middle East to 
adopt Western style democracy and to adapt to modern socio-cultural pat-
terns. This meant giving up much of what the Islamic world holds dear in 
terms of social conduct. Hence the campaign to reorder the Middle East 
was to unfold in various phases, which were to be implemented in parallel 
but at different speeds and through different models. The first phase of the 
creation of the new order involved the ouster of the Taliban and Baathist 
regimes. Having won the war in these countries, the US since then has been 
attempting to keep the peace and bring about the change it wants to see. 
Although the situation is not “another Vietnam”, this is proving harder than 
expected.  Stefan Fröhlich 
  72   
The second phase was targeting the remaining member of the “axis of evil” 
in the region, Iran, and other countries characterised as “rogue states”. The 
US was likely to face more resistance from its Western counterparts to any 
sort of military action against targeted states in the Greater Middle East - 
such as Iran, Syria and Libya - and thus demonstrated that it is adept at ap-
plying pressure through non-military means. The cases of Iran and Libya 
were illustrative in this regard.
1 
The third phase involved targeting countries that Washington considered 
close allies throughout the Cold war – for example Saudi Arabia and Paki-
stan which persist in their refusal to democratise in the way America wants. 
By targeting them in the final phase of its efforts to establish a new order in 
the region, the US would also give these countries enough time to make the 
necessary changes on their own. Though most observers in Washington 
still believe radical reforms won’t occur without considerable pressure 
from Washington, it is at that point where the idea of a new transatlantic 
initiative to build peace, security and democracy in the entire Middle East 
region is slowly starting to take shape. The US finally made a big move 
towards embracing some European ideas in its campaign for political and 
social reform in the region. Though there remains a difference in their ap-
proach with regard to the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the 
progress of reforms in the Arab world, both sides have agreed on basic 
principles.  
Washington spelt out a three-pronged strategy, backing away from impos-
ing reforms and instead insisting, as US undersecretary of state Marc 
Grossman put it, that “the best reforms would come from the people”, 
countries should introduce and choose what reforms to implement at their 
own pace, and the US should stop viewing the Middle East as monolithic.
2 
Such a strategy complements the EU’s Barcelona process – the only multi-
 
1  „The US is shaping a new order in the Greater Middle East“ (3 parts), in: APS Dip-
lomat Strategic Balance in the Middle East: Part 1 - A Survey, Oct. 27, 2003, v46, 
i4; Part 2 - “Rogue States”, Nov. 3, 2003, v46, i5; Part 3 – Tackling the Allies, Dec. 
29, 2003, v46, i6. 
2  Financial Times, March 17, 2004, p. 3. How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary? 
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national forum so far that brings together most of the North African and 
Middle Eastern countries including Israel.  
The Greater Middle East initiative 
The idea that NATO extends a new form of partnership to the Middle East
3, 
including training for peacekeeping missions, border security and counter-
terrorism, as well as reforms to encourage civilian control of the military, 
and to bring in both the EU and the Group of Eight leading industrialized 
countries to provide political and economic backing is very ambitious and 
still very vague. To link the existing NATO Mediterranean dialogue with 
the EU’s Barcelona process, as the German Foreign Minister has sug-
gested, will be not an easy task. The EU would expand these complemen-
tary exercises to include the whole of the Arab League, whereas the US 
would like to define the Greater Middle East as including all the Gulf 
States, Iraq and Afghanistan but is much more cautious about involving 
Syria and Iran. Who will be involved thus is one potential source of fric-
tion. Another is just how the absolute priority in the region, the achieve-
ment of a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, will be bound 
to the wider initiative; the failure to resolve that conflict will only under-
mine the finest sounding plans for stabilising the region. Even the White 
House has finally realized that its much trumpeted plan to promote reform 
in the Greater Middle East would be empty as long as fires still raged in the 
Israeli-occupied territories. That is why it has to push Sharon for an even-
handed political settlement with the Palestinians avoiding any impression 
that the real intention behind Israel’s departure from the Gaza is the de 
facto annexation of large parts of the West Bank. Last but not least, it is 
also not clear how many Middle Eastern countries will want the proffered 
partnership with NATO. Some may see it as just another back-door route to 
US control and dominance in the region. 
Nevertheless, that Europe and the US need to join forces and demonstrate 
their constructive engagement is undisputed. Iraq has proven the fact that Stefan Fröhlich 
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US military capability and money alone cannot deliver peace and stability. 
The US now knows it needs friends and as most of the European allies are 
not prepared simply to ride behind the US, NATO has become the part of 
the multilateral system that an instinctively unilateralist US administration 
now values. Not to fight wars but to provide the peacemaking forces and 
the strategic security vital to Bush’s broader ambitions in the Muslim 
world.  
The logic is obvious. One does not have to be a supporter of the Iraq war or 
of Washington’s policy in the Israel-Palestinian peace process to agree that 
the principal threats to European and US security are centred on instability 
and conflict in the Greater Middle East. And European allies are needed to 
help make the peace. Suspicion of US intentions is widespread in the Arab 
world, while European ties are more positive. There is a lot of frustration at 
the region’s relative backwardness, poor economic performance and a re-
cord of bad government became clear enough when the United Nations 
Development Programme released its damning report on the region in 2002 
- written by Arab scholars. The Arab world puts more trust in the EU’s im-
perative that the agenda of modernisation, embracing education, the rule of 
law, democratic reforms and opportunities for women, should be “owned” 
(Chris Patten) by Arab countries themselves.        
On the other hand the US is the only country that can influence Israel in the 
peace process, whereas the Europeans have more clout with the Palestini-
ans. The two can and should therefore pool their resources, not only to 
reignite a sense of shared mission between the US and Europeans but be-
cause its in the interest of an enlarged EU to shape its strategy for a wider 
Europe as an area of vital concern and the US to ensure that it receives the 
full backing of its allies, the UN and the American public in order to reach 
the goal that the promised elections in January, 2005 in Iraq confer real le-
gitimacy and power on a future Iraqi administration. 
 
3  Jeffrey Simon, Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a new Era, in: Strategic 
Forum, 206 (March 2004), pp. 1-6. How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary? 
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Arcs of Instability on Europe’s periphery  
The borderlands of the enlarged EU are strung out like a long chain – from 
Murmansk down to Jerusalem and round to Marrakesh. Every link in that 
chain throws up concrete policy challenges for the EU. These are the places 
where the enlarged EU will find either its security or its insecurity; each 
conflict there will automatically affect the EU. “Arc of instability” is one 
expression that has tended to be used for the EU’s periphery. But the attack 
on the US on September 11, 2001 showed that the region harbours security 
risks that now rank at the level of existential threats. 
This is why the EU needs now to shape its strategy vis á vis a wider Europe 
as an area of vital concern. The area consists of three huge sub-regions, 
each having categorically different political characters: 1. the enlarging EU 
space, defined as all countries that are, or want to be full members, even if 
only in the long-run; 2. Russia, as the outstanding European state that does 
not seek membership but rather s special status; 3. the Greater Middle East, 
a region of which there is no single, agreed definition of its political or 
geographic boundaries but which, since 9/11, has become an area of vital 
concern like never before.  
In the US one usually speaks of the “Near East”, to include North Africa, 
the Levant, and the Gulf countries – not Turkey, since it is a member of 
NATO. Another geographic interpretation, often provided by the Depart-
ment of Defense, includes Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Soma-
lia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Excluded are Turkey, Israel, 
Syria, Turkey, and India.
4 With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of the newly independent republics of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia the question has been raised about where exactly the Middle East 
begins, where it ends, and whether it can be consistently delimited. One 
option was to use the phrase “Greater Middle East”. 
 
4  Geoffrey Kemp, Arcs of Instability. US relations in the Greater Middle East, in: 
Naval War College Review, 55, 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 61-71. Stefan Fröhlich 
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Though there remains the question of which countries to include and which 
to exclude, say in terms of the line between Asia and Africa, it is usually 
accepted to include the traditional Middle East countries, the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, Turkey as well as South Asia in a broad definition of the 
“Greater Middle East”. In this huge area we have several arcs of instabil-
ity/crisis, the most obvious being the one from North Africa (Morocco, Al-
geria, Tunisia) along the Mediterranean coast through Libya and Maurita-
nia (often called the southern countries of a greater Maghreb), the Levant 
(Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan) and Syria into Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the 
Northern Persian Gulf. Another arc is running from Turkey through the 
Caucasus to Iran, the third from Iran through Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
India. 
In these three arcs today’s most dangerous conflicts and potential crisis 
spots are located – Arab-Israel, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, India-
Pakistan, Afghanistan. The situation also is getting worse in the Maghreb, 
with possible radical takeovers in Algeria or Egypt that could create eco-
nomic, political and social problems for the countries of Southern Europe, 
which have become destinations as well conduits of migration and could 
one day be within the range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa and 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Three countries in these three arcs already 
have nuclear arsenals (Israel, India, Pakistan), and Iran still aspires to be a 
nuclear state. If proliferation is continuing, Turkey and Saudi Arabia could 
also join this list. 
The EU, even more than the US, is exposed to all these “threats” in the 
three arcs of crisis. Thus, at their meeting in December 2003, EU leaders 
endorsed a joint security strategy that cited terrorist groups acquiring 
WMD in the Middle East as “the most frightening scenario” threatening 
their countries. The EU also shares with the US a clear interest in securing 
the free flow of Energy from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian region at 
reasonable prices and in preventing the proliferation of WMD. In an area 
stretching from southern Russia to the southern Persian Gulf lies a “strate-
gic energy ellipse” (Kemp) that contains more than 60 percent of the 
world’s proven oil reserves and almost 80 percent of the world’s proven 
natural gas. How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary? 
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A regionally fragmented area  
The Greater Middle East is of course anything but a homogeneous and 
monolithic bloc. The Mediterranean alone has become more of a frontier. 
As disparities between the North and the South multiply the area is rapidly 
becoming a fault line between two separate and increasingly polarized re-
gions. And while regional dynamics of integration are active in Western 
Europe, patterns of fragmentation continue to dominate regional relations 
in this part of the world. The North African sub-region seeks to shape 
closer economic and perhaps political ties with the EU (in addition to the 
Barcelona process, there are bilateral (Spanish-Moroccan and Franco-
Algerian), and multilateral-bilateral (NATO-Egypt; NATO’s dialogue with 
the Mediterranean states) relations), trans-national ties however are limited 
to areas of energy, Islam, and ethnicity, with comprehensive international-
region features almost non-existent (see e.g. the Sub-Saharan conflict be-
tween Algeria and Morocco, or the border clashes between Libya and Tu-
nisia). 
In the Levant sub-region, in which Turkey is a political, economic and 
military player, intergovernmental cooperative regional links have recently 
supplemented dominant conflictual patterns of relations. Trans-national ties 
remain at an embryonic level and comprehensive interaction is completely 
absent. This region includes a strong American political and military pres-
ence, and a strong European and Japanese economic presence. 
Last, but not least, an extraordinary realignment of relationships is taking 
place in the Middle East with the most challenging hot spots; as a result of 
the terrorist events, new ties with the US have been formed by many na-
tions.
5 
Now all sub-regions are net importers of military hardware, but this is 
where similarities end. The northern shore is far superior when it comes to 
technological sophistication of military equipment or in terms of infrastruc-
ture (roads, ports, pipelines etc.) and industry (petrochemicals, crucially), 
 
5  Stansfield Turner, The Critical Nature of US Policy in the Middle East, in: Mediter-
ranean Quarterly, 14, 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 42-55. Stefan Fröhlich 
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and in terms of modern communications, electricity grids, and the like.
6 
This makes a matter of urgency not only whether the Middle East will be a 
“zone of turmoil” (Singer/Wildavsky), somewhat left out of globalization, 
but also whether part of it will continue to identify with the “southern” half 
of a North-South divide. Apart from that, the whole region can be broadly 
characterized by an absence of democracy, internal instability and endemic 
violence, and offer little encouragement that this region is at the end of ma-
jor warfare and security rivalries.  
Additional security challenges of course arise in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, among them regional destabilization by the Chechen war and frozen 
conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh; growing authoritarian-
ism in countries ruled by Soviet-era networks; ethnic and unsolved border 
conflicts (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); and the rise of militant 
and radical Islam.
7 Finally, ensuring that oil and gas from the Caspian re-
gion can safely reach the outside world is a fundamental reason for US en-
gagement in that region, whereas the EU holds that without promoting de-
mocracy all the rest may be at risk.    
Against this background there remain some doubts as to what there is real 
chance for the wholesale modernization of the swath of territory from Mo-
rocco to Afghanistan that the allies have taken to calling the Greater Mid-
dle East. 
Prospects for the new initiative – a new kind of an 
OSCE for the Greater Middle East  
For all these reasons, the Greater Middle East initiative, in theory, certainly 
is a great idea. The multiple security problems and challenges in the region 
certainly could be addressed by a meaningful multilateral security mecha-
nism. Any approach that brings together regional leaders and outside pow-
 
6  Robert Harkavy, Geoffrey Kemp, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle 
East, Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1997, chapter 10. 
7  Jürgen Schmidt, Security challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia – A German 
and European perspective, SWP-Discussion paper, March 2003, 6 p. Available at: 
www.swp-berlin.org/produkte/diskussionspapier. How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary? 
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ers alike to seek security in a more balanced way encompassing multilateral 
frameworks - where possible – and short-term bilateral deals is worth being 
persecuted. No other foreign policy issue divides Europe from the US as 
much as this area, whether it is the war in Iraq, the Israel-Palestinian peace 
process, or the question of constructive engagement in Iran. So if the two 
sides can come together, it cannot only help the region, but also revive 
transatlantic co-operation.   
The purpose of some kind of regional security forum/conference to reduce 
political tensions, promote co-operation on common security threats and 
increase transparency on military postures comes close to the idea of 
Europe’s Organisation for Security and Co-operation. Such a forum needs 
differentiation in several ways:  
1. The Middle East, other than the former Warsaw Pact, does not constitute 
a power centre of that sort that can develop and exert integrative power; the 
region has been and is an object of several regional players and major 
power rivalries. Hence, a peaceful model of economic co-operation as well 
as social patterns of intercourse and some kind of common civic culture 
will be extremely difficult to develop in this heterogeneous area. 
2. What will certainly not work is to send to this region the Copenhagen 
criteria catalogue as the standard model for their future. Their modernisa-
tion and democratization, according to their own model, needs helping 
along the way by the US and the EU, so also to facilitate the harmony of 
these different civilisations. But certainly most countries in the region are 
not as susceptible to any kind of westernization as the majority of former 
Warsaw Pact members. Rather democratization and change of systems 
along western lines are felt as interference into inner affairs in this Arab 
and Muslim world. Anyhow, these are long-term issues of societal evolu-
tion. In the meantime there are the dramatic, existential threats to be 
curbed. In other words, there are soft and hard security reasons for the US 
and the EU immediately to be addressed. 
3. Earlier grand designs to remake the Middle East especially by the US 
have always given way to a more practical and pragmatic program of po-
litical and economic development in the region. This is why Arab govern-Stefan Fröhlich 
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ments are dismayed by and sceptical of Washington’s decision to include 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the geographical construction called the 
Greater Middle East. They fear that the parameters of the new initiative 
have been drawn to fit the US interests to fight international terrorism in 
that wider region rather than the particular challenges in the Middle East, 
with the Israel-Palestinian conflict being the most pressing one. Thus it also 
remains to be seen whether the new co-operation agreements would repre-
sent merely an extension of NATO’s existing “dialogue” with Mediterra-
nean states or whether the Alliance is really ready to offer deeper relation-
ships comparable with the original PfP programs with former Warsaw Pact 
states, now having achieved full NATO membership. There remain deep 
suspicions in the Arab world that NATO still is just an extension of the US 
– a multilateral cloak for American power. 
4. To increase the chances of success, it will be necessary to limit the 
membership and to focus tightly on key Gulf security issues either in multi-
lateral or in a bilateral way. Like the Helsinki process the Greater Middle 
East initiative, in a first step should try to break down the barriers between 
the Arab/Muslim and the western world through confidence-building 
measures by finding creative solutions for the Israel-Palestinian peace 
process, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. After the transfer of sovereignty to 
Iraqis, the provisional Iraqi government, the Gulf States, together with the 
US and the EU, should develop plans to restructure Iraq’s army and to in-
tegrate it into a broader regional structure. The main protagonists should 
also persuade Tehran that the development of a nuclear weapons capacity 
will not be an answer to its admittedly threatening regional perspective be-
cause of Israel’s extensive nuclear arsenal and the US presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Concrete steps on both the Israeli’s and the US’ side in terms 
of confidence-building measures to tackle these problems are as necessary 
as a clear message, especially by the EU, not to succumb to any blackmail 
attempts by Tehran in order to divide the transatlantic allies.
8  
 
8  On Iran see Johannes Reissner/Eugene Whitlock (Eds.), Iran and Its Neighbors: 
Diverging Views on a Strategic Region, Vol. I (July 2003) and II (March 2004), 
SWP-Discussion paper, Berlin. How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary? 
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Such a regional security platform could also deal with Saudi Arabia’s prob-
lems, including extremist Islamic groups, the declining authority of the 
Saud family, and the lack of political reforms in the country. Only if re-
gional tensions decrease, the current regime might be willing to such re-
forms towards more pluralism. A more stable Saudi-Arabia, Iran and Iraq 
in turn could reduce threat perceptions of the smaller Gulf monarchies vis á 
vis their bigger neighbours and also their dependence on a strong US pres-
ence in the long run. 
Finally, it is clear that without a serious Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 
progress with wider regional initiatives will never be achieved. A broader 
regional security forum can be of success if the Gulf States and the “Quar-
tet” do not revive sustained political pressure on Sharon’s government in 
Israel, as well as on Arafat and the Palestinians. 
5. The EU and the US need a common approach also to the challenges in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, but this process has to be separated from its 
Middle East initiative as to avoid the impression that the US and the EU 
treat the whole project as the geography of international terrorism, the 
problem of proliferation and failed states which have to be contained 
somehow. In other words, what is needed here is another, separated form of 
a regional security forum to come up with a strategic neighbourhood con-
cept including the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as an energy policy 
that would comprise infrastructural concepts and their implementations as 
well as a political safeguarding in Europe and this second arc of crisis. In 
this context, it was important that the EU, after 9/11, last triggered a Coun-
cil strategy on Central Asia to promote regional co-operation between the 
five countries regarding trade, fight against international terrorism and drug 
trafficking as well as water management. 
Conclusion 
The Greater Middle East initiative, understood as a multiple task in this 
sense and with a differentiated approach towards its many sub-regions, is a 
chance to break out of the loop of continuing wars and instability in the 
whole area. For the first time, there seems to be widespread support for a Stefan Fröhlich 
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regional security initiative in the USA and the EU as well as in the region 
itself. For the EU, criticising US Middle East policies, though often justi-
fied, simply is not enough and sometimes even sounds cynical due to its 
own dependencies and exposure to threats from the region. At least there 
are no convincing arguments against any common EU-US approach. The 
US willingness not to single out the Israel-Palestinian problem any longer 
is an important step in the right direction. If it were accompanied by sincere 
efforts to pressure Israel into withdrawing from most, if not all, of the West 
Bank, this would be another step to comply with European primacies. The 
EU on the other hand should give up its restraint towards rushing the proc-
ess of democracy in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where au-
thoritarian regimes considered friendly to Western interests might be 
ousted in any free election by radical Islamists, on the ground of suspicion 
that Washington’s initiative is more about public relations and the US elec-
tions than about practical progress. If the EU and the US would agree on 
these first steps, there would be a real chance for some lasting progress in 
this troubled region. Hüseyin Bağci 
The Greater Middle East Project and 
Turkey’s Attitude towards it 
1. Introduction 
Although there has been a rising popularity and an enormous flow of in-
formation regarding “Greater Middle East Project” throughout the mass 
media nowadays, the term and the meaning attributed to it still continue to 
be vague for the most part of the public opinion. In general most of the 
comments on the issue come to the conclusion that this is part of the grand 
design brought on the international arena by US to continue its new world 
order by removing the barriers like international terror and weapons of 
mass destruction. The project is aimed to be a multidimensional regional 
initiative, which would bring fundamental political, social and economic 
changes to the region in the long term.  
This paper attempts to examine the reasons and the bases, which leads to 
the preparation of the Greater Middle East Initiative by US and at the same 
time Turkey and EU’s attitudes towards this project. Whether the initiative 
resembles the Helsinki Process or not will be my research question. My 
argument will be that considering the hurdles and pitfalls compared to the 
Helsinki Process, it will definitely be extremely difficult for US and her 
prospective allies to reach their aimed goals at the end of the GMEI proc-
ess.  Hüseyin Bağci 
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2. Background Information 
We can see the term “Greater Middle East” used as back as in 1980 accord-
ing to Washington Post newspaper. “US lack of experience and precision 
about the region is so great that there is continuing uncertainty about what 
to call it-The Middle East, Greater Middle East, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf 
or Southwest Asia. All have been tried.” mentions the newspaper regarding 
the confusion on terminology.
1 Under the directorate of Zalmay Khalilzad, 
“Greater Middle East Studies Center” at Rand Corporation was established 
in 1995. The aim of the research center was stated as to undertake inte-
grated multidisciplinary studies of the underlying socioeconomic and po-
litical issues in the Middle East and adjacent areas of North Africa, Central 
Asia, and Southwest Asia. These studies proposed a series of practical 
strategies and approaches to achieve the goals of material well-being, po-
litical development, and respect for human rights that are the prerequisites 
for regional stability and enduring peace.
2 
2.1 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a Presidential initiative 
founded to support economic, political, and educational reform efforts in 
the Middle East and to create opportunity for all people of the region, espe-
cially women and youth. MEPI is structured in four reform areas under four 
pillars. These are the economic, political, educational and women pillars. 
Economic pillar envisages to support trade, investment and small busi-
nesses. Political pillar concentrates on strengthening democratic practices 
and civil society, promoting the rule of law and accountable, effective gov-
ernment institutions and strengthening the role of free and independent me-
dia in society. Education pillar focuses on expanding access to basic and 
post secondary education for all people, especially girls and women, im-
proving the quality of basic and post secondary education, promoting the 
 
1  Cited in the introduction of  “Allies Divided-Transatlantic Policies For The Greater 
Middle East” Ed. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, 1997, Center for Sci-
ence and International Affairs, p. 1. 
2 www.rand.org. The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
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development of employable skills. And the MEPI women's empowerment 
pillar strives to reduce cultural, legal, regulatory, economic, and political 
barriers to women's full participation in society.
3 
The Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, is the coordinator for 
MEPI and to date, the US administration has committed $129 million to the 
initiative. 
2.2 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) 
This partnership program was launched in 1995 to foster the cooperation on 
political reform, economic liberalization and social issues between the EU 
and the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean. The 
agreement calls for reform in three areas, known as the political, economic 
and social chapters. This process has made some limited progress towards 
the goals of the economic chapter, which contains specific trade liberaliza-
tion requirements to culminate in the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
by 2010. But Mediterranean countries have been slow in enacting reforms 
for fear of angering key domestic constituencies. EU members have also 
refused to reduce agricultural subsidies for the same reason.    
There has been limited or no progress on the goals of political and social 
chapters. Today Euro-Mediterranean Process does little more than host 
seminars, sponsor exchanges and provide a forum for dialogue. 
2.3 Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI)  
US administration officials have been preparing this new initiative to be 
launched at the G-8 summit in Georgia in early June. This initiative is 
planned to bring together the US, Europe and the “Greater Middle East” 
including not only the Arab world but also Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Is-
rael and Turkey around a far reaching set of commitments aimed at helping 
transform the region politically, economically and socially. Based on the 
2002 Arab Human Development Report, the initiative sets three reform 
 
3 http://mepi.state.gov. Hüseyin Bağci 
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priorities: promoting democracy and good governance, building a knowl-
edge society and expanding economic opportunities.
4  
It is not clear where the “Greater Middle East” stops. If it can include Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, it can also include the Caspian, Pakistan, and Central 
Asia. In the process, the strategic rationale for a Europe and Transatlantic 
role becomes steadily more vague, and the risk that new tensions and dif-
ferences will emerge over given cases grows.
5 
It is also expected that during the NATO Summit in İstanbul on 28th June 
2004, functions of the NATO members regarding the “Greater Middle East 
Project” will be defined. It is also claimed that at this summit, it will be 
clarified in terms of military qualifications how the region level democrati-
zation procedures would be supported.6  According to Anthony H. Cord-
esman, the Bush Administration sees 2004 as the year in which giving 
NATO new and expanded missions in the “Greater Middle East” can re-
unite the alliance behind meaningful missions and roles.
7 
2.4 Resemblance with the Helsinki Process  
The GMEI idea resembles the Helsinki Process with the logic it brings up. 
Setting the issues apart under separate pillars and therefore receiving con-
cessions on one side, while appeasing on the other have been helpful in the 
past. 
A major policy of the USSR during the Cold War was decoupling the US 
from Western European planning and to promoter East West détente in 
Europe without the participation of US. In 1968, Soviets proposed that a 
conference solely of European nations be held to discuss general security 
issues. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the concerns of the 
 
4  Marina Ottaway and Thomas Caroters “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a 
False Start” Policy Brief, 29 March 2004, Carnegie Endowment, p. 1. 
5  Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Transatlantic Alliance: Is 2004 The Year Of The 
Greater Middle East?” Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, January 2004, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, p. 14. 
6  Faruk Demir, “İstanbul: Yeni NATO İçin Hazır Olmak” 2023 Dergisi, 18.5.2004 
7  Anthony H. Cordesman, op.cit., in note 5, p. 2. The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
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NATO members eventually resulted in the inclusion of US and Canada in 
the process.
8 
The Helsinki Process was launched in 1972 due to the pressure coming 
from the Soviet Union in order to win formal recognition of the post-WWII 
European borders. After long negotiations, which lasted for three years un-
der the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 35 
countries signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Act was not a treaty 
binding the signatories, but rather a statement of principles.  Over the next 
fifteen years, the Helsinki accords turned into an important tool through 
which the US and the Western Europe pressured the Warsaw Pact countries 
to improve their human rights records and move slowly towards political 
reform. 
In 1975, the work of the CSCE was not considered as a major achievement. 
Rather it was symbolizing the acceptance of the status quo of the two 
blocks. This did not guarantee the possibility of eventual victory for neither 
side, but did mean to ensure avoidance of nuclear battle.
9      
Helsinki Final Act consisted of three baskets. The first one dealt with terri-
torial and security issues and recognized the USSR’s presence in Eastern 
Europe. Basket two called for economic, scientific and environmental co-
operation. And the last one committed parties to support freer movement of 
information and people through family reunification, improved access to 
outside media and exchange programs. In addition the Final Act provided 
for regular follow-up meetings to review the implementation of the agree-
ment.  
Although progress was achieved slowly, more than a decade, through many 
meetings with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries towards 
some concessions on human rights issues in return for gaining concessions 
on arms control issues, during the Vienna review between 1986-1989, the 
 
8  Cyril E. Black, J.E. Helmreich, P.C. Helmreich, C.P. Issawi, A.J. McAdams, “Re-
birth-A History of Europe Since WW II” (Westview Press 1992) p. 127. 
9 Ibid.,  p.128. Hüseyin Bağci 
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real breakthrough on human rights issues was reached due to growing do-
mestic pressure for change in Warsaw Pact countries.
10  
The CSCE became a permanent institution in 1995 and was renamed as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is now 
involved in supporting democratic transitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet successor states and the Balkans. 
Excluding the security side, one can easily see the similarity between the 
Greater Middle East Initiative and the Helsinki process. On the other hand 
US is not willing to offer the states of the region anything on security front 
in exchange for significant commitments on political and economic reform. 
Because it is obvious that the Arab countries would immediately bring up 
the Arab-Israeli conflict to be solved as a security issue.        
3. Reasons of the Interest in the Region 
3.1 US Interest in the Middle East 
We can analyze the core US interests in the region under three main head-
ings. These are preserving the security of Israel, maintaining the unhin-
dered flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices and thirdly ensuring regional 
stability.
11  
Israel has a very close relationship with US due to their strategic alliance, 
historical relationship, religious and cultural bonds, and the enormously 
effective Jewish society in US administrative and economic environment. 
And recently they share the same threats from the same sources mainly in-
ternational terrorism and religious radicalism. In line with its relationship 
with Israel, US has been promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process. But 
considering the fact that US-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rela-
tions are dependent on Israel-PLO relations, US does not play a role more 
than facilitating talks and transmitting messages between the sides.  
 
10  Marina Ottaway and Thomas Caroters, op.cit. in note 4. p. 6. The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
  89
Maintaining the unhindered flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices is also 
vital for US, because almost two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves 
are concentrated in the Gulf region. After the production cuts realized by 
OPEC during and following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, there was a 
5%GNP loss in the American economy.  
And finally US has a strong interest in preventing any single power from 
controlling the Gulf or vital access routes to it, such as Egypt’s Suez chan-
nel. In parallel with this aim, other than Israel, US has based its Middle 
East policy on three important regional countries which are Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt.    
3.2 EU Interest in the Middle East 
Keeping in mind that there is no such thing as a common European Middle 
East policy
12, it may be argued that EU and its major constituent states have 
a set of strategic interests in the Greater Middle East that are often com-
plementary to US interests but sometimes divergent from them. The main 
EU interest in the region and especially North Africa, the Mediterranean 
basin and Turkey is to promote stability and prevent the spread of Middle 
Eastern conflicts to Europe.
13 As mentioned above Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership initiated by EU, which would lead to the Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area by 2010 is an important attempt on behalf of EU to con-
tribute stability and welfare in the region. Taking neither the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC) countries, nor Iran and Iraq, proves that EU’s concern 
about stability in the Mediterranean outweighs its concern about the secu-
rity of oil and gas supply.
14 
Similar to US and maybe more powerful than it, EU has a major interest in 
maintaining the unhindered flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices. In con-
 
11  Robert Satloff “America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990’s: Interests and 
Policies” in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (ed.) “Allies Divided-
Transatlantic Policies For The Greater Middle East” (MIT Press 1997), pp.10-11. 
12  Eberhard Rein “Europe and the Greater Middle East” in Robert D. Blackwill and 
Michael Stürmer (ed.) “Allies Divided-Transatlantic Policies For The Greater Mid-
dle East” (MIT Press 1997), p. 42. 
13  Robert Satloff, op.cit., in note 11, pp.19-21. Hüseyin Bağci 
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trast to US, which imports less than 20% of its oil and gas from the region, 
EU imports nearly half of its oil and gas from the Middle East and is much 
more dependent on the region. 
A third key EU interest on Middle East is to prevent migration from the 
Greater Middle East to Europe. Especially the booming Muslim migration 
into Europe during the 1960’s and 1970’s from North Africa to Southern 
Europe, from Turkey to Germany and from India and Pakistan to Britain, 
has provoked deep concern among many Europeans about the cultural, so-
cial and economic implications of the demographic change within societies 
far more homogenous than the American society.  
In addition to these overall interests, particular EU states have close bilat-
eral relations with regional countries because of their historical, geographi-
cal or commercial ties. French connection to francophone North Africa, 
Italy’s relation with Libya, French-Lebanese ties, British-Gulf States’ rela-
tions and German-Iran relations may be given as examples to these particu-
lar interests. 
Although Europeans play a marginal political and diplomatic rule with the 
issue, EU’s attitude on the Arab-Israeli peace process is more inclined to-
wards the Arabs when compared with the Americans. EU constitutes the 
largest donor to Palestinian authority while Saudi Arabia ranks only as the 
third. Since 1993, EU has contributed $397 million to the Palestinian Au-
thorities and other related relief projects. The basic reason for pro-
Palestinian and pro-Arab stance of EU is the fact that Europeans no longer 
consider Israel’s existence would be jeopardized by the Arab military and 
political power.
15   
3.3 Turkish Interest in the Middle East 
First of all Turks has been in the region as the ruler and protector since the 
fall of the Abbasid dynasty in 1258 and particularly between 1516 and 
1918 by the Ottoman power. This long duration of historical, cultural, po-
litical and religious ties have created strong bonds between Turkey and re-
 
14  Eberhard Rein, op.cit., in note 12, p. 44. 
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gion. Although there have been an alienation process on both sides after the 
I World War, both the Turkish and the Arab societies still feel deep sympa-
thy for each other.  
Turkey has long borders with three of the regional countries and as a 
neighboring country, stability in the region is vital for Turkey regarding its 
security concerns. For the last two decades, Turkey has been fighting with 
the PKK terror, which found shelter from the regional countries. The coun-
try has spent close to $5 billion each year and lost nearly 30 thousand lives 
during this struggle. Loses due to the frightened foreign direct investment 
and missing tourism income is not included in these figures. This threat has 
not been diminished yet. Related with this issue, the possibility of estab-
lishing a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, provokes the idea that there may 
be future attempts to unify Turkey’s Kurd dense areas with this would be 
newly established state.  
Economic relations with the region also need a peaceful environment. The 
ongoing Iraqi crisis has brought up a huge trade loss on behalf of Turkey. 
As the closest industrialized economy to the region, Turkey cannot at the 
moment fully use its advantageous position.  
As a petroleum importer, Turkey is directly affected from the rising tension 
in the region. Every 5 dollars increase in per barrel petroleum prices, in-
creases Turkey’s petroleum bill for $1 billion each year.
16 Oil price, which 
has been $35 per barrel at the beginning of May, has reached over $41 in 
three weeks because of the turmoil in the Middle East.  
4.  Reactions towards the Project 
4.1 Turkey’s Attitude 
From the beginning, Turkey has been seen within the process by US, 
though she had some ups and downs regarding its participation. Prime Min-
ister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in October 2003 about the permission 
granted by the Turkish National Assembly to the government to dispatch 
 
16 http://www.milliyet.com/2004/05/13/ekonomi/axeko02.html. Hüseyin Bağci 
  92   
the Turkish armed forces to Iraq, that contribution to security and stability 
of the country, creating a prosperous and democratic future free from any 
kind of oppression would be their aims.
17  Prime Minister also stated during 
his speech at Harvard University on Democracy and Middle East that he 
wouldn’t accept the idea Middle East is not fit for democracy because of its 
cultural, religious, sociological and historical background. He explained 
Turkey was an example for a Middle Eastern country to be democratic. He 
added that democracy in the Middle East is an outcome that must be at-
tained and the question is not whether such democracy is possible but how 
to meet the yearning of the masses in the region for democracy. Another 
point indicated by the Prime Minister was the method to be used for this 
aim. Methods can differ from country to country he explained. But the im-
portant thing is to maintain a social consensus and the mechanism to pre-
vent the establishment of anti democratic regimes by means of democracy 
in these countries. He emphasized that together with human rights, gender-
equality, supremacy of law, political participation, civil society, and trans-
parency were also among the indispensable elements of democratization.
18    
When compared with the aforementioned goals in the Greater Middle East 
Initiative, it may be concluded that similar views are shared. But giving the 
priority to democratization and the method for reaching this goal may put 
US and Turkey at odds. 
On the other hand, the question whether Turkey is a tool and model in 
changing the region, or one of the countries to be changed throughout the 
process needs to be answered. As stated by Brezinski in Hegemonic Quick-
sand, Turkey’s regional role is seen limited by US due to two considera-
tions stemming from its internal problems. These are Turkey’s transforma-
tion process as a western country, which would be completed by the full 
membership to the EU. And the other issue is the Kurdish population and 
the problems related to it. If EU closes its doors there is the expectation that 
Turkey may go through a reorientation, which would make it difficult to 
 
17 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/Erdogan7October2003.htm. 
18 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Harvard.htm. The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
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estimate its way of inclination. According to Brezinski these two issues 
tend to make Turkey part of the region’s basic dilemmas.
19   
There are also various views from a wide spread of Turkish intellectuals, 
academicians, journalists which are suspicious regarding the moves coming 
from US. Dr. Bülent Aras from Fatih University brings up the question 
why the project considers a greater Middle East, even though the older 
Middle East is big enough and its chronic problems have been still waiting 
to be solved.
20 
4.2 EU’s Attitude  
As mentioned previously there isn’t a unified, single European policy to-
wards Middle East. Daniel Vernet from Le Monde describes the confused 
situation within the EU in his article. Every EU member country realizes 
that a US failure for controlling the situation in Iraq would spill over a de-
stabilizing effect allover the region and eventually negatively affect EU 
too. But still their consensus on a common manner is missing. There is a 
gap between the members, which approved US’s war in Iraq and the ones, 
which did not. Definitely the opposing states like Germany and France 
gained the support of Spain after Jose Luis Zapatero won the elections. On 
the other hand the public opinion in the pro-US members are against their 
governments. Although France did not approve the reasons for war in Iraq, 
she now wants contribute to make the transition period which will begin 
after 30
th of June 2004 to be successful.
21    
Michael Stürmer in his article “What Strategy for the Greater Middle East-
A European Perspective” summarizes the problem areas of this project. He 
points out that the geography considered by the project is more that 280 
millions of Arabs, 70 millions of Turks and roughly the same number of 
Iranians, 5 million Jewish Israelis and 1 million Arabs carrying Israeli 
passports. An within this context he reminds that the majority of the Mus-
 
19  Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Hegemonic Quicksand” KAS- The National Interest, Winter 
2003/04, pp. 3-4. 
20 Bülent  Araslı, “Büyük Ortadoğu Staratejik Akıl ve Değişim İhtiyacı” Zaman, 10 
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lims live in the east of Tehran stretching to Central and South East Asia. He 
points out the fact that poverty is the number one issue in this geography. 
From poverty all other devastating issues, shown in 2002 UN Human De-
velopment Report on Arabs, like backwardness, illiteracy and ignorance of 
the modern world distance to the resources of the information age arise. He 
gives the manners of France and Germany at the Donors’ Conference in 
Madrid, as examples regarding the realization of the project. US collected 
large contributions for Iraq, but France wanted its debts paid and Germany 
refused to forgo its $4.4 billion outstanding debt.   
5. Pitfalls of GMEI Compared to Helsinki Process 
When compared with the Helsinki Process in which it took almost one and 
a half decade for the Western Block to bring the end of the Communist 
block using human rights issues as leverage, GMEI’s prospective goals are 
quite problematic to be reached in the foreseeable future. If the size of the 
geography, structure of the states which take place in this geography and 
the psychological situation of the population living there are taken into 
consideration, the issues get much more thorny and difficult. I will try to 
look on some of these problem areas. 
5.1 Arab – Israeli Peace Process   
After the WW II, Palestine stayed under British rule till 1947. At that time, 
due to newly arriving Jewish settlers there were equal number of Arab and 
Israeli population in the region. In the same year, Palestine land was di-
vided by a UN decision (decision number 181) between the Jewish settlers 
and the Arab population. The following year, Jewish side invaded one third 
of the other piece given to the Arabs and declared the establishment of the 
state of Israel. 
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, there have been five wars be-
tween Arabs and the Israelis. Egypt opted out of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
by the Camp David negotiations in September 1978 and signed a separate 
Israeli-Egyptian treaty in 1979. Throughout this conflict procedure, Pales-
tinians first became a major actor to the conflict, then since 1967 war Pal-The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
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estinian Liberation Organization (PLO) reached the status of a quasi-state. 
Palestinians first set up a state within state on Jordanian territory. After 
they were driven out during the crisis of September 1970, this time Leba-
non served them as a military base.
22  After the 1987 UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, independent state of Palestine was established in Algeria, 
Yaser Arafat became head of state and the same year the Intifada move-
ment began in the Israeli occupied territory. By 1990 there were over seven 
hundred deaths from Israeli bullets.
23 The first serious step towards peace 
was taken in 1993 between Izhak Rabin and Arafat in Washington. The two 
signed a declaration an accepted to set up an autonomous Palestine State in 
Gazza and Eriha.  
Resolution 242 was calling for a “just and lasting peace in the Middle East” 
to be brought by Israel returning territory it captured in the 1967 war in ex-
change for acceptance. But the resolution does not specify how much of the 
territory Israel is to return. The traditional Arab position is calls for the re-
turn of all territory and the reestablishment of the borders that existed prior 
to the 1967 war. On the other hand the position of the successive Israeli 
governments is that UN 242 does not require Israel to return all the territory 
and the amount of land to be handed over will reflect the quality of peace 
and security arrangements. Most Israelis including the pro-peace ones re-
ject a return to the 1967 borders.
24  
Today because of the suicide attacks carried by Hamas and other radical 
Palestinian organizations on one side and the Israel policies, which gets 
tougher every day without indiscrimination on all the Palestinians on the 
other side, a vicious circle has been created. More and more killings on 
each side feed the social hate and thus today the Arab- Israeli peace process 
has arrived to a deadlock. 
 
22  Bassam Tibi, “Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War, To New 
Security” (2nd ed) NY Macmillan Press, 1998 p. 151. 
23  Glenn  E. Perry, “The Middle East: Fourteen Islamic Centuries” (3rd ed) NJ Pren-
tice Hall, 1997, p. 312. 
24  Richard Haas “The United States, Europe, and the Middle East peace Process” in 
Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (ed.) “Allies Divided-Transatlantic Poli-
cies For The Greater Middle East” (MIT Press 1997), p. 64, footnote 3. Hüseyin Bağci 
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5.2 Nature of the Regimes in the Region 
Since the second WW, most prevalent regimes in the region have been so-
cialist republics. Excluding the oil rich countries and the kingdom of Jor-
dan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya have all 
gone through this experience. The common characteristic of all these re-
gimes was that the leader did not trust the citizens to choose or change the 
leaders. These regimes rest on the pillars of the armed forces, the internal 
police, the bureaucracy, the party and the clan. 
Oil reach states in the region on the other hand, are rentier states. A rent is 
a reward for ownership of all natural resources. The surplus between the oil 
cost and price is state’s rent, and with this surplus the state activities are 
run. Oil revenue represent 90 % of budget revenues and 95 % of export 
revenues in these countries. These states do not need tax income for state 
activities. With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms 
of political participation. Therefore in principle no taxation and no repre-
sentation rule is valid for these regimes.  
5.3 Radical Islamic Movements  
Radical Fundamentalism may be defined as the supremacy of tawhid as the 
doctrinal and political foundation, superiority of the sharia and the neces-
sity of establishing an Islamic state.  For these radicals, the freedom of the 
individual is not important, since the individual must always be watched. 
The well being of the individual is secondary to that of the community. No 
splits like the parties, associations are allowed to destroy the social unity.
25  
The institutional structure developed out of shura and ijma, which are 
based on the sharia, is embodied in a state that expresses the general will 
and has the right to set the course for people’s life. Such an environment is 
of course not conducive to the establishment of pluralistic civil societies or 
the flourishing of freedom.
26  
 
25  Ahmad S. Mousalli, “Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses” in “Civil Society 
in the Middle East” Ed. by Augustus Richard Norton, Leiden; New York: Brill 
1995-1996, p.88. 
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As Bassam Tibi emphasizes, there are two reasons for these movements. 
Politically they are a response to the ongoing general crisis in the Moslem 
world. And from the angle of cultural analysis, they have emerged as a re-
sponse to the challenge of cultural modernity.
27   
Radical Fundamentalist Movements do not represent the majority of Mus-
lims or Islamic movements, but they comprise a few groups spread all over 
the world. However equally uncompromising thoughts in the tyrannical 
policies of many Arab states that are no more democratic than these radical 
groups, have flourished these thoughts and their followers in the region.
28  
5.4 Negative US Image throughout the Region  
US almost never had a positive image in the region, but it will be true to 
say that this image has been deteriorating ever since American soldiers in-
vaded Afghanistan and Iraq. In an article written by Seymour M. Hersh in 
the New Yorker magazine, the issue of systematic torture in Iraq is ana-
lyzed.
29 According to Hersh, in the Abu Gharib prison, Iraqis kept as com-
mon criminals or suspects, were tortured by US army officials systemati-
cally under the chain of command. These tortures sometimes took the form 
of physical pain and mostly sexual abuse, humiliation and rape. The orders 
were coming from the military intelligence and the superior officers.   
Regarding the Afghanistan side, the Egyptian journalist Fehmi Huveydi 
writes in the Şark-ul Avsat that the US forces have bombed 128 Afghan 
city and village with special types of bombs, which have been forbidden by 
international agreements. American airplanes used more than 600 of these 
types of bombs through the first 2 months of the invasion. Each of these 
bombs consisted of 200 smaller bombs and they explode 300 meters high 
before they touch the surface, and each piece scatters 300 lethal bullets.
30     
 
27  Bassam Tibi, op.cit., in note 22, pp. 227-228. 
28 Ibid.,  pp.116-117. 
29 http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact. 
30  Fehmi Huveydi, “An Arab Look On The Global Shame” Şark-ul Avsat, 5 May 
2004. 
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6. Conclusion 
As I have argued in the introduction, considering the hurdles and pitfalls in 
front of the GMEI, it will definitely be extremely difficult for US and her 
prospective allies to reach their aimed goals compared to the Helsinki 
Process. Other than the aforementioned difficulties, US have to deal with 
multiple players whereas during the Helsinki process in front of the West-
ern Bloc there was practically one single authority, the USSR, to deal with. 
Whether Turkey could promote democracy and stability in the Middle East 
within recent developments as a ‘’model’’ is widely discussed among 
Turkish scholars. According to Prof. Kemal Kirişçi, for example, Turkey 
would contribute in following points immensely. 
-  Turkey setting a modest example as a concrete reference point of the 
benefits of a democratic and liberal market economy provides in 
terms of stability, relative prosperity and security. 
-  The consequence of economic growth in Turkey are bound to spill- 
over into neighboring Middlee Eastern countries. It is already doing 
it in the form of exports but also in terms of providing an expanding 
market to Middle Eastern exports. Business interactions will help to 
increase as well as assist emergence of a civil society. 
-  The more Turkey becomes engaged by the EU the more Turkey can 
become a ‘’soft security’’ player in the Middle East replacing its im-
age as a ‘’hard security’’’ player on behalf of the US. Even US offi-
cials have begun to better appreciate Turkey’s ‘’soft security poten-
tial recently. In many ways the 1 March 2003 debacle for the US in 
the hands of the Turkish parliament may actually be turning into a 
blessing. The situation in the region would have been much more 
volatile had Turkey become militarily involved in Iraq. Turkish de-
mocratization and economy would surely have been adversely af-
fected by it. 
-  A Turkey engaged by the EU would also be a Turkey that carries its 
experience in the area of regional integration and cooperation to the 
Middle East. Turkey has long been part of many European regional The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude 
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organizations including the OSCE. This experience could become vi-
tal for efforts to revive regional cooperation schemes that were at-
tempted under Madrid Peace Process. The Middle East, with the ex-
ception of the Gulf Cooperation Council, has a severe absence of ex-
pertise in the realm of region wide inclusive economic and political 
cooperation too.
31 
A recent suggestion which created interest in Turkey but no details yet 
worked out came by Samir Salha from Kocaeli University as an alternative 
project to Greater  Middle East Initiative with OSEGİT (Middle East  Po-
litical Economic and Security Cooperation Organization.  In his suggestion 
Salha suggest that Turkey, Iran, Israil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan   
should come together under one umberalla in order to create stability and 
peace in the region. However, it seems that this suggestion far away from 
the realities in the region there will remain only as an suggestion.
32 
In conclusion, the way to reach the aimed goals of GMEI is full of prob-
lems and success seems challenging if not elusive.  Therefore, the wind of 
change also there as a political reality. Indeed, the future will bring more 
challenges to the region then it was the case in the last century. 
 
31 See  Kemal  Kirişçi, Talking Points prepared for the Security Seminar on Turkey:A 
NATO country between the EU and the Middle East, 23 April 2004, Royal Danish 
Defence College, Copenhagen. 
32  Samir Salha BOP’a alterenatif proje: OSEGİT, Zaman 11.06.2004. Ashot Voskanian 
South Caucasus within the Perspective 
of Contemporary Integration Processes 
Our Oukumene and we 
When referring to the post-soviet realities certain gathering names are usu-
ally used –Baltic States, Central Asia, South Caucasus. These names are, of 
course symbolic and certainly reflect the realities of soviet times. Attempts 
to revaluate them have had a superficial character. The name of our region 
for example has undergone a minor editing – Transcaucasus has become 
South Caucasus. The aim of this change was to take the region away of its 
‘post-colonial’ status – a perspective forced upon by Russia.  However this 
solution does not seem successful, at least for Armenia. Historically Arme-
nia has closely been linked with territories located ‘trans’ Caucasus – 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern. And it was also open towards the Ital-
ian peninsula, Balkans, Arabic world and Iran. This reality is reflected in a 
classical XIX century Armenian song: 
I saw the fields of Urmia, the Mount Lebanon and its cedars, 
I saw the country of Italy, Venice and its gondolas, 
No island is more wonderful than our Cyprus, and no place, indeed is more 
beautiful 
Than our Cilicia, the country which gave me sun… 
This arrow that goes from Persian Urmia lake to Italy sharply layouts the 
frames of regional activity conducted by Armenians for ages. While within 
the Soviet Union Armenia found itself in border lock – the communication 
with immediate southern and western neighbors was possible only via the 
North, thus, to reach Iran one had to cross the Caucasian mountains, go to Ashot Voskanian 
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Moscow and from there take a plane to Tehran.  In this context the defini-
tion of ‘South Caucasus’ takes us back to the narrow perception of the So-
viet times, associating us with North Caucasian peoples, with whom our 
historical and cultural links are, in fact, minimal. 
A similar problem emerged when Armenia joined the Council of Europe.  
If no one questions that Russia, Ukraine or Moldova belong to Europe, and 
if Central Asian states’ being out of Europe was not discussed, it took sev-
eral years to state the right of South Caucasian countries to join the Council 
of Europe. 
During the first years of South Caucasian state’s independence the issue of 
their geopolitical classification was rather formal. Now, when at least three 
concrete globalization projects exist in perspective, whose links with the 
region cannot be questioned, the problem has become actual.  Those pro-
jects are ‘Wider Europe: New Neighborhood’ of EU, ‘Greater Middle East’ 
of USA and the post-soviet CIS and CDT, patronized by Russia.  In the 
situation of common fight against terror, as well within the context of EU’s 
actual enlargement and NATO’s geopolitical shift towards the East the de-
velopments in South Caucasus become more dynamic and the emergence 
of new units is being accelerated. 
The Regional Players 
The issue of linking the region with different globalization projects would 
have been much easier if South Caucasus and its immediate neighbors pre-
sented a more or less homogeneous unit, which exists, for example in the 
case of Baltic region.  But in South Caucasus one deals with an extremely 
complicated historical-cultural and political mosaic, which needs a differ-
ent approach.  The immediate neighbors of Armenia are Georgia and Azer-
baijan, and also Iran and Turkey. Below are presented brief characteristics 
of these regional players within the context of their relationship with Ar-
menia. 
Georgia – a country with similar cultural and religious traditions, which 
faces now numerous problems of transitional period and also bears the South Caucasus 
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weight of Abkhazian and South Osetian ethnic conflicts. Georgia’s rela-
tions with Russia are marked with great amount of problems, from the issue 
of Russian military bases there and to the Chechen terrorist activities at 
Russia-Georgia state border. Georgia tries to balance the situation by de-
veloping and broadening its relationship with Turkey, and centering not 
only on economic, but also on military issues. Cooperation with Armenia 
intensively develops.  The relationship of two countries is being regulated 
by more than 80 agreements.  For landlocked Armenia, which for a decade 
has been in a state of blockade by two countries (Azerbaijan and Turkey) 
the roots, which via Georgia lie to Europe and Russia have an extreme sig-
nificance.  But the obstacles here remain major. Russian railroad is closed 
because of the conflicts in North Caucasus, the European roots which lie 
through Poti and Batumi are not reliable, because the state institutions of 
Georgia are not strong enough yet to ensure necessary control all over the 
state’s territory. Nevertheless Georgia remains the most important part of 
Armenia’s communication chain. 
The other substantial neighbor from the point of view of ensuring the 
communication roots is Iran. Armenian-Iran relationships are positive. The 
parties are interested in enlarging the trade and economic links, cooperation 
in energetic systems’ sphere, strengthening of traditional historical-cultural 
ties and retaining the regional stability. The strategic programs of economic 
cooperation involve: construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, which will 
link Armenia with the new regional pipeline network, diversifying Arme-
nia’s energy roots, building of new power plant, which will contribute to 
development of economy in borderline regions, construction of mountain-
ous tunnel improving the transportation etc. At the same time it is known 
that main directions of Iran’s policy have provoked certain preoccupations 
at the United States and the careful approach of the international commu-
nity because of it creates additional problems in the regional relationships. 
Armenia’s relationships with the remaining two regional neighbors are 
more than complicated. The extreme tension here is expressed by the trans-
port blockade that those states have conducted towards Armenia. Ashot Voskanian 
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There have not been established diplomatic relationships between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan because of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
1. To pressure Ar-
menia in this sense Azerbaijan rejects any exploitation of common trans-
portation links and offers by Armenia and international community to 
search possibilities of cooperation within the frameworks of regional pro-
grams. While trying to limit Armenia’s possibilities of economic develop-
ment and cooperation with the outer world Azerbaijan also creates obsta-
cles for the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relationships.  
Turkey and Armenia do not have diplomatic relationships today.  The rea-
sons are the preconditions presented by the Turkish side. Armenia calls 
upon establishing diplomatic relationships without preconditions and inter-
ested in Turkey’s positive engagement in the South Caucasian region. The 
issue of the recognition of 1915 Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Em-
pire Armenia considers not as a precondition of normal relations’ estab-
lishment, but as an important factor improving the atmosphere of mutual 
confidence, ensuring the regional security and any potential genocide pre-
vention in the future. Opening of Armenian-Turkish border, re-exploitation 
of Kars-Gyumri railroad would significantly contribute to the broadening 
of the trade and economic exchange between two states, presently non-
officially flowing via the third countries and would also create a favorable 
atmosphere for the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ar-
menia attaches importance to the role and consistent efforts of the USA as a 
mediator in the task of improving relationships with Turkey and re-
 
1  The basis of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh people’s 
right to self-determination.  The problem was frozen during the Soviet era and has 
still become actual during the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1988. The resolution 
negotiations are conducted within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group from 
1994 onwards. From 1999 onwards direct negotiations between Armenian and Az-
eri presidents have begun. Armenia always acts upon the principle that any final 
agreement or document must be favored also by Nagorno-Karabakhi party, which 
must continue its participation to the processes within the framework of the OSCE 
Minsk Group as a side of negotiations. In 2001 some progress towards the conflict 
resolution was indicated between the presidents in Paris and Key-West (Florida), 
which the Azeri party later denied to develop. Armenia favors the continuity of the 
negotiations process and will protect in future as well the mission of the OSCE 
Minsk Group in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. 
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establishing the transportation roots. Armenia expects that the EU will in-
clude in the list of requirements for Turkey’s possible EU membership the 
issues of the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations and recognition 
of Armenian Genocide. We hope that the adoption of European values 
would significantly transform the Turkish society, which will lead to re-
gional solutions congruent to European standards. 
Although Russia does not have an immediate border with Armenia, it has 
been the regional superpower and as the former metropolis retains its sig-
nificant presence in the region. The basis of Armenian-Russian relations 
consists of certain commonality of strategic interests. Russia’s co-
chairmanship (together with the US and France) in OSCE Minsk Group 
responsible for the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also 
cannot be ignored. Recently the relationship has become more pragmatic 
and mainly is based on the economic interest. Russian military presence in 
Armenia is the expression of regional realities. Under the light of compli-
cated Turkish-Armenian situation this reality cannot be unexpected. Rus-
sian presence in the region can also be considered within the context of 
NATO’s shift towards the East. This context creates a new reality for Ar-
menia, because Turkey ends to exclusively represent the North-Atlantic 
Alliance in the region.  The competing interests of Russia with West have 
been an explicit reality, but it does not have a confrontational character, 
because proceeds according to the ‘soft sphere-of influence-model'. 
Globalization Projects 
Due to the complex character of South Caucasian geopolitical relations it is 
not obvious, that three South Caucasian states can act unified. At least, two 
historically known attempts to form a South Caucasian federation (1918, 
1922-1927) failed. This requires a broader and more effective supra-
regional perspective plan. Here we face a paradox – supra-regional integra-
tion seems to be more effective then a simply regional attempt. This con-
tention can seem unexpected (as we know EU or NATO consider the abil-
ity of conflict resolution to be the necessary condition which indicates the 
maturity of society and makes possible a country’s membership to those Ashot Voskanian 
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organizations). On the other hand, we can witness the attempt to unify Cy-
prus under the light of an attractive vision: EU membership. Although this 
project failed, this is a promising methodology, which possibly will find its 
extension. It is not excluded that this road for the South Caucasus can be 
successful. Thus, let us consider the main existing globalization projects, 
aimed to encourage the further regional and supra-regional integration in 
South Caucasus. 
All the three South Caucasian states have expressed their firmness to fol-
low the root of European integration.  EU membership is being spoken as 
the perspective goal. In the original EU project ‘Wider Europe: New 
Neighborhood’ however there have not been any mentioning of South Cau-
casus.  The beginning of reconsideration of this first option of March, 2003 
was put in Thessalonica by Xavier Solana in June, 2003, by a document 
presented to European Council. In November 2003 the European Parlia-
ment suggested to the European Commission and the European Council to 
work out a new policy for the South Caucasian states in the framework of 
‘New Neighborhood’, putting special attention to the conflict prevention. 
During these days (June 2004) the decision about the involvement of South 
Caucasian states within the European neighborhood is reached. Of course, 
this does not guarantee that they will be invited to join the EU. Neverthe-
less the two aims are internally linked. 
Unlike the careful approach by the European Union, the significance given 
to the South Caucasus in other projects receives a special emphasis. In 
American position two points of view can be distinguished.  One is the per-
spective of Greater Middle East, to which the South Caucasus in fact does 
not belong but can play certain role as a neighboring region.  The other is 
the broader special perception of Europeanization, which is being devel-
oped by Z. Brzezinski, B. Jackson, A. Cohen, S. Sestanovich and others.  
Those authors comment Europeanization to be not as much a further devel-
opment of forming elite union worked out within the strict frames of the 
EU, but as a more flexible association involving actually all the European 
states, with NATO membership and common fight against the challenges 
threatening the democratic societies to be the basis for it. South Caucasus 
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Within this concept the EU itself appears as one of participants of a collec-
tive process and gives up the role of only unifying, controlling, implement-
ing and supporting center of ‘euro-crystallization’.  For South Caucasian 
states and for Armenia in particular the American model can have certain 
appeal, because it offers a faster and ‘easier’ way of Europeanization.  Evi-
dently, this simpler way is not enough to learn in its completeness the po-
litical and social experience of Europe, which has been developed during 
centuries and which is presently being codified in EU institutions.  On the 
other hand, the way the South Caucasus has to pass will be intermediated 
anyways.  Hence the American concept of Europeanization must not be 
ignored, particularly because the similar idea of Wider Europe is also pro-
posed by the EU. 
In this context the concept of M. Emerson (SEPS, Brussels) seems to be 
interesting. It suggests to sharply distinguish two concepts within the 
framework of EU – the New Neighborhood and Europeanization. Europe-
anization is based on a democracy supporting ideology, liberalism with an 
emphasis on social sphere, multi-ethnical and integrative society.  It refers 
to the countries – members of the Council of Europe and can be considered 
as the preparatory phase for the full membership to the EU. The ‘New 
Neighborhood’ is a wider idea which involves the Mediterranean states of 
Maghreb, Central Asia and other non-European states.  The latter have not 
made the European choice and are not obliged to be directed by the Euro-
pean values. But their close cooperation with the EU is desired and possi-
ble. The certain homogeneity of ‘New Neighborhood’s state’s political 
fields can be ensured by following the reform program suggested by the 
American Greater Middle East project. The EU ‘New Neighborhood’ and 
‘Greater Middle East’ nearly coincide by their volume. It can’t be sus-
pected that the EU and the USA concepts are very much compatible with 
each other. The defining parallelism is seen more vividly when the question 
arises about the possible implementation of the political tools elaborated 
during the EU Barcelona Process within the framework of GME Project
2. 
To those mechanisms belong the associative treaties with EU neighbor 
 
2  Perthes, Volker: Europa and Amerikas Greater Middle East. Ashot Voskanian 
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states, working out of common strategy in Mediterranean, common posi-
tions Palestinian-Israeli conflict, consultations in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, forming of principles of trade relationship, presenting of common 
position on the issue of military force application, involvement of new 
countries etc.  Here it is apparently natural to speak on complementarity of 
the EU and the USA, not about competition. The agreement on Greater 
Middle East Initiative found on the recent days on G8 meeting witnesses 
about closeness of USA and EU (and also Russian) positions. The soul of 
the consensus reached can be expressed by the slogan ‘cooperation versus 
missionary work’. 
Two other integration projects worth mentioning with participation of 
South Caucasus states are linked with the CIS and BSEC.   
The role that CIS institutions played while softening the aftermath of the 
USSR collapse and making the processes smoother is undeniable. Now, 
when the formation of independent states in the post-soviet territory has 
actually completed, the relationship between the CIS states are undergoing 
a smooth and dynamic reconstruction. Here a greater role has been recently 
playing the economic factor. 
The Black See Economic Cooperation also has the advantage of being a 
formed and already experienced institution, which has a whole network of 
working mechanisms ranging from the secretariat to the common bank.  Its 
geopolitical significance is that it mostly makes the South Caucasian states 
close to Central and East Europe and contributes to the common Europe-
anization processes. To the landlocked Armenia it provides with the advan-
tage of immediate relations with an important European sea district.  More-
over, the Istanbul office of BSEC is presently the only Armenian official 
mission in Turkey, which contributes to the frequency of Armenian-
Turkish relationships. On the other hand, there are also lots of problems – 
the first of them to be the closeness of Armenian-Turkish border and ab-
sence of diplomatic relations.  The obstacles for the organization’s work 
are observable (conflicts during the high-ranking official’s nomination, 
failures of visits because of regional tensions) and are often determined by 
the uneasy atmosphere between the participant states. Despite all of these South Caucasus 
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the BSEC has a big potential. That potential is not limited only by the pos-
sibilities of this concrete organization. The forming of Black Sea geopoliti-
cal region could be much more perspective and could play an important 
role for the europeanization processes of the member states. Armenia 
would greet a rise of such a regional alliance, because it could encourage 
our return to the political, economic and cultural region where Armenians 
used to be present for ages. To implement that kind of idea all the regional 
states must make a joint effort. Turkey’s role will definitely be significant 
taking into account both its human and economic resources, and its Euro-
pean ambitions.  For the success of the project it is necessary that Turkey’s 
role is constructive – it must give away the discrimination policy against 
Armenia and open for Armenia the way to Europe, which was closed be-
cause of Genocide of 1915. The Black Sea Region could have a great fu-
ture. 
The Topos of the Dialogue 
This brief outlook on the regional constellations shows the virtual post-
modern  character of emerging alliances. We can see that EU’s ‘New 
Neighborhood’, the America’s ‘Greater Middle East’ and ‘Greater Europe’, 
the forming Black See community and the other associations are not built 
upon the centrifugal principle but upon the principle of Wittgenstein’s lan-
guage games – relationships are regulated by numerous, mostly bilateral 
agreements, treaties or simply by agreed positions. The question put ahead 
of us is whether an analogous CSCE framework is possible, to regulate and 
to encourage dialogue and closest cooperation between Europe, Greater 
Middle East region and the United States of America. I have seen my hum-
ble contribution to answering to this major question in the insider’s presen-
tation of the possible place of South Caucasus – a district related to this 
large region – within the frame of developing global relationships. A few 
words about the idea itself, as an epilogue. 
It possibly makes sense to mention that the Europe – Greater Middle East – 
USA dialogue on the first turn refers  to the so called arrow of instability, 
which goes from Central Asia via Afghanistan to Northern Africa, involves Ashot Voskanian 
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in itself the Arabic world and Trans Caucasus, and is over weighted with 
unresolved conflicts. It is rich not only with energy and other material re-
sources, but also with human potential and is the part of the ancient ou-
kumene, from which the Western world emerged. We will, thus, speak 
about an integration process, in which such elements will unify which 
originally were united. It refers not only the region; we speak about the fu-
ture of our common civilization. So the institutionalization of the dialogue 
is a necessity. Which are the more obvious problems referring to its organi-
zation? 
We remember the formation of CSCE in 1975. The aim then was not the 
establishment of a political order, but the re-confirmation of realities 
formed during the post-war developments, referring to mutual recognition, 
cooperative retaining and development. The CSCE-OSCE has fulfilled and 
is fulfilling this function successfully and here one must search for the se-
cret of success. OSCE has faced with problems and lack of functioning 
mechanisms every time when a need to reform an established order and to 
qualitatively change it would arise. A classical example were the events in 
Balkans of nineties. The other example is the problem of resolution of Na-
gorno Karabakh conflict. We proceed to consider the OSCE Minsk Group 
to be the adequate format for the fair resolution of the problem, but at the 
same time the center of negotiations’ weight has shifted during the recent 
years towards the immediate efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group co-
chairmen countries, as well as of periodical meetings between Armenia’s 
and Azerbaijan’s presidents. 
As former standing representative of Armenia to the OSCE (1995-1997) I 
am pleased to state that the OSCE fulfilled its mission with honor, but I am 
also obliged to say that OSCE succeeded up to the degree, to which the po-
litical tools under its disposal allowed. 
Does this mean that OSCE or any similar organization will be unable to 
resolve problems referring to similar situations only because in the case of 
Europe’s New Neighborhood, South Caucasus and the Middle East we deal 
with geopolitical reality that has just been undergoing a period of forma-
tion, and to which obviously Karl Schmitt’s famous sentence refers: ‘No South Caucasus 
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norm can be applied to chaos. An order must be established, so that the le-
gal order makes sense’? And what were the coalition forces efforts in Iraq, 
if not an attempt to establish an order, referring to which only the legal or-
der makes sense.   
It is obvious that a blind adoption of this formula is unacceptable. It results 
in a schematic missionary work, which has already been rejected by many 
of the region’s states. The problem is different: we will search common 
ways and agree on common goals while resolving the existing conflicts and 
complicated issues in the region. As a place for such a tolerant and aim-
driven discussion, as a topos for a dialogue the role of a new regional or-
ganization can indeed be significant. If the creation of such kind of organi-
zation succeeds, this will be a win/win solution for all the parties involved 
– the USA, which is bearing the main burden of responsibility for provid-
ing the free and stable development in the postmodern world, the regional 
countries, which now face not only the challenges of contemporary devel-
opment, but also the problems of retaining and further developing of their 
historical identities, and also the United Europe, whose program of un-
precedented enlargement puts ahead new questions. At the same time I 
want to insist that the soul of the project discussed will be European so 
much, as much it is principally aimed to the political institutionalization of 
the European idea of discourse ethics. I believe that the states of South 
Caucasus, which have announced their European choice, will contribute 
actively to the establishment and effective activities of such an organiza-
tion. Amichai Magen 
Building Democratic Peace in the East-
ern Mediterranean: An Inevitably Ambi-
tious Agenda 
“I know that it will be extremely hard to proceed with the structuring of a new 
Middle East as long as we shall not see new realities as a result of the bilateral 
negotiations. Yet the bilateral negotiations will not hold water unless we have a 
new Middle East.”         
Shimon Peres, September 1
st 1992 
The conundrum is plain to anyone who wants to see it. On the one side, 
autocratic regimes in the Greater Middle East complain that without a 
“resolution” of the Arab-Israeli conflict they cannot accept calls for exten-
sive political, social or even market reforms. The end of “Israeli occupa-
tion”, we are told, is a sine qua non for domestic change and there could be 
no real progress without “justice” for the Palestinians.
1 Putting aside for the 
moment the logic of these claims, it is clear that crying foul and vilifying 
Israel is highly convenient for the region’s authoritarians – serving at once 
to divert public anger, justify political oppression, excuse sclerotic econo-
mies and resist exogenous pressures to democratise.
2 Yet on the other side, 
the notion that ambitious strategies for Middle East democratisation can be 
effectively pursued in isolation from the Arab-Israeli conflict is erroneous, 
for two very different sets of reasons: 
 
1  See: Walter Russel Mead, Why They Hate Us, Really, Op-Ed, The New York 
Times, April 21 2004; Martin Indyk, Back to the Bazaar, vol. 81.1 Foreign Affairs 
(Jan-Feb 2002).   
2 See:  Barry  Rubin,  The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism, Foreign Affairs (Nov-
Dec 2002). Amichai Magen 
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First, because whatever the logical merit of the Arab argument, the sense of 
grievance is real, deeply entrenched and cannot be ignored.
3 The linkage 
made in the Arab world between Western demands for democratic reforms 
and the “Palestinian issue” was perhaps best conceptualised by the 22 Arab 
authors of the Arab Human Development Report (2002). The conflict, the 
report found, is: “a contributing factor to the region’s democratic deficit, 
providing both a cause and an excuse for distorting the development 
agenda.”
4 An acknowledgement of the linkage was completely absent from 
early drafts of the Bush administration’s new Greater Middle East Initia-
tive, and only made it into the text of the 2004 G8 summit at the last min-
ute. 
These sentiments in the Moslem world are not merely rhetorical expres-
sions. An analysis of the decade-long experience of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the OSCE Mediterranean Partners in 
Cooperation effort (MPC) poignantly show that Arab reference to lack of 
progress in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has consistently served 
to thwart progress across all three baskets of existing regional initiatives – 
in economic, security and political reform.
5 If the linkage between democ-
ratic reforms and peace making is not openly recognized and adequately 
addressed in future policies, what will prevent the new plans from stum-
bling on the same issue? 
Pursuing wholly distinct reform and peace agendas is also flawed for a sec-
ond set of reasons. Namely, it ignores the fundamental relationship be-
tween comprehensive security and peace, on the one hand, and open, de-
 
3  For example, the scrapping of the March 2004 Arab League Summit – which was 
supposed to discuss a proposal on political, social and economic reforms in the 
Arab world produced at an Alexandria conference two weeks earlier – was squarely 
blamed by the Tunisian hosts on: “the deadlock of the Palestinian issue”. Hesham 
Yussef, Director of the Secretary’s Office of the Arab League, cited in Marina Ot-
taway and Thomas Carothers, The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False 
Start, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief No. 29 (March 
2004). 
4   UNDP Arab Human Development Report (2002). 
5   See: President of Malta, H.E. Professor Guido De Marco, A Strategy for the Medi-
terranean, Chatham House, London, October 25th 2000. Building Democratic Peace 
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mocratic societies, on the other.
6 It is correct to link democratic transforma-
tion and efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, not in the negative 
sense done by reform-recalcitrant Arab regimes, but through a positive rec-
ognition that democratic transformation in the region is ultimately the sole 
hope for achieving the conditions of true security and peace.
 7 Separating 
the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the one about lack of human 
rights, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and market economies 
in the Middle East, therefore, misses the crucial interconnectedness of the 
two issues – democracy and peace – to the detriment of both peace-making 
and governance reform efforts. The chronic absence of the “normative di-
mension” from peace-making efforts in the Middle East has been a funda-
mental failure of past strategies, particularly (but not exclusively) in the 
Israeli-Palestinian arena. The old “land for peace” formula needs, in other 
words, to be complemented with a “reforms for peace” agenda.   
The argument made in this article is essentially that in order to unpack the 
“No reform without peace. No peace without reforms” conundrum, the 
West needs to pursue peace in order to support democratisation, and to pur-
sue democratisation in order to support peace.
8 Both goals can and must be 
advanced dialectically (not sequentially or in a simplistic “tit-for-tat” man-
ner) through a robust strategy, led by a revitalized transatlantic partnership.  
It is also submitted that, at least initially, the new strategy should focus on 
creating a better regional context for democratisation and peace on two in-
terrelated levels – Israel-Palestinians and the Eastern Mediterranean.
9  
 
6  In the scope provided, I cannot begin to adequately address the complex relation-
ship between democratic norms and peace. For a brief overview see: Larry Dia-
mond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (1999), chapter 1.  
7  See: Nathan Sharansky, The Middle East Needs a Helsinki, International Herald 
Tribune, March 30, 2004; Natan Sharansky, From Helsinki to Oslo, (2001) Issue 1, 
Journal of International Security Affairs.  
8  I refer to the term “the West” as meaning those nation-states (and the edifice of su-
pranational institutions they control), which are characterised by and committed to 
open societies, representative democracy, the rule of law and market economies.     
9  I refer to the term “Eastern Mediterranean” in a similar way that the term “South 
East Europe” has been used to describe the Balkans – a sub-region on the EU’s 
doorstep with multiple conflicts that need to be comprehensively addressed, through 
democratic region-building. Geographically, the term is not definitive, but includes, Amichai Magen 
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This agenda, while still hugely ambitious, is more concrete than calls to 
transform the Greater Middle East – “from Marrakech to Bangladesh”.
10 Its 
integrated emphasis on democratisation and peace making should make it 
attractive to both Americans and Europeans, which will enhance its credi-
bility and legitimacy in the region. Focus on the Eastern Mediterranean 
also lends itself to extending existing pan-European structures (EU, NATO, 
OSCE, Council of Europe) and integration dynamics (notably Turkish EU 
candidacy) to implement the new strategy – rather than assume the costs 
inherent in trying to generate new indigenous institutions. A US-EU led 
“democratic peace” strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean, furthermore, 
could leverage their combined powers and build on the dependencies of 
Eastern Mediterranean countries on US security and EU trade/aid. A re-
vamped MEPP coupled with a new “Eastern Mediterranean Peace and De-
mocracy Pact” would also help shape an “arc of reform” to Iraq’s north, 
west and south; aiding the country’s post-war transition, and creating new 
opportunities for transatlantic rapprochement. 
Beginning to translate this conceptualisation into policy would involve four 
main aspects – sketched out in the remainder of this article. 
I. Reinventing the “indispensable partnership”  
Close and sustained cooperation between the US and EU Member States is 
essential if an effective peace and reform strategy for Israel-
Palestinians/Eastern Mediterranean is to materialize.
11 Sceptics might posit 
several arguments why such a strategy will falter on this ground alone. One 
claim is that the threats emanating from the Middle East are too amorphous 
to create the same “meeting of the minds” produced by the Cold War, and 
 
from north to south: Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the Palestini-
ans, Egypt (and possible Saudi Arabia). 
10  Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack, The New Transatlantic Project, Policy Review 
(October/November 2002) No. 115, pg. 3-19. 
11  This does not mean that the strategy should be confined to US-EU cooperation, only 
that this relationship represents the core of the actors involved. The strategy should 
involved other transatlantic actors (such as Canada and non-EU members of the 
OSCE) and arrangements (such as NATO, Council of Europe and OSCE).   Building Democratic Peace 
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that there is no sufficient agreement on how to deal with them.
12 A second 
argument is that the rift opened between the US and some European states 
in the last three years is a sign of a deep strategic divergence, undermining 
prospects for future cooperation in a region that has historically divided the 
two.
13 Moreover, one could argue that the EU possesses leverage and 
credibility in the Middle East in large part by virtue of not being associated 
with the US, and that a common US-EU strategy would appear to Arab re-
gimes as being an “imperialist” Western project. 
These allegations have some headline appeal, but none are persuasive in 
the context of the strategy proposed here. The threats emanating from the 
Middle East may be less visible than the red flags and tanks of the Soviet 
Union, but they are understood to be very real and are sufficiently well de-
fined for American and Europeans to coalesce around – even if this coales-
cence will happen over time and grow by accretion. It was less than three 
years ago, for instance, that the two (among others) adopted a UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 that, for the first time, recognized acts of interna-
tional terrorism as representing a threat to international peace and security 
within the meaning of the UN Charter. Today the US State Department is 
reportedly negotiating with its European counterparts a common statement 
of reform principles and a series of coordinating bodies to guide Western 
engagement with Arab governments in the economic, diplomatic and de-
fence arenas.
14 In the intermittent period there has been a positive explosion 
in transatlantic dialogue over the common threats facing Europe and Amer-
ica, and a growing conversation about the need to reorient what Chris 
Patten recently called “the indispensable partnership” towards building a 
democratic peace in the Middle East.
15  
 
12  See for example: The Economist, Leader: 60 Years On (June 5-11, 2004). 
13  An argument exemplified by Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 Policy Re-
view (June-July 2002).  
14 Tamara  Cofman  Wittes,  The Promise of Arab Liberalism, No. 125 Policy Review 
(June/July 2004). 
15  Chris Patten, EU External Relations Commissioner, Europe and America – has the 
transatlantic relationship run out of road? Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, 13th  Feb-
ruary 2004.  Amichai Magen 
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Moreover, a combined peace-making and democratisation agenda for the 
Eastern Mediterranean would provide stronger “glue” than a democracy 
promotion strategy that is absent a conflict resolution component. Some 
European states may vehemently disagree with the current US administra-
tion on a variety of issues inside and outside the Middle East, but there is 
no broad rift among them on what an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal should 
look like. Both have strong interests in finding a stable solution to the con-
flict. Both are formally committed to the logic of a democratic peace 
among Arabs and Israelis – as exemplified in the Quartet’s much-abused 
Middle East Road Map.
16 Both realise – perhaps more so after the Madrid 
and Istanbul bombings in Europe, and America’s debacles in Iraq – that, at 
the very least, transatlantic cooperation is highly desirable because most of 
the goals each side wants to attain are more likely to be achieved if sup-
ported by the other. 
Finally, what about the argument that when it comes to the Middle East the 
EU is better off disassociating itself from America? Apart from striking 
many Americans as being somewhat escapist and disloyal, this approach is 
unlikely to fly for a number of reasons: First, such a disassociation will not 
be confined to policy in the Middle East. An ongoing absence of a shared 
strategic vision will undoubtedly spill over to undermine cooperation in 
areas where Europe has important stakes – including the world trade sys-
tem and the environment. Second, as Youngs asserts, “Where differences 
with the US are overstated genuine opportunities for joining forces may be 
lost, and the danger arises of Middle Eastern states being able to play the 
US and European states off against each other – to the benefit of neither the 
EU nor US. This has happened particularly with Syria, Iran and also Tur-
key”
17. Further rifts would broaden the scope for spoilers to use “divide and 
rule” tactics, to the detriment of both Americans and Europeans. Third, to 
transform the dysfunctional politics of the Eastern Mediterranean through 
the use of “soft” and “sticky” power (which is both a European interest and 
 
16  A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (April 30th 2003). 
17 Richard  Youngs,  European Policies for Middle East Reform: A Ten Point Action 
Plan, The Civility Project, Working Paper No. 1, The Foreign Policy Centre (2004).  Building Democratic Peace 
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its philosophy) would necessitate close EU-US cooperation. As Pirouz and 
Leonard rightly observed: ‘[T]th EU’s “constructive engagement” approach 
– hoping that economic liberalisation will bring about political change – is 
unlikely to disturb the sleep of the autocratic rulers.’
18 Just as America can-
not go it alone with “hard power”, in other words, Europe is unable to deal 
with the multiple threats emanating from its volatile eastern and southern 
peripheries by itself. This is especially true of Iran and Syria. More posi-
tively, Europe and America’s joint dominance of a complex network of su-
pranational institutions (including NATO, the OSCE and OECD) and their 
cumulative 40% of global GDP and trade, afford them unequalled “soft” 
and “sticky” power – provided they leverage it together.
19 
A reorientation of transatlantic relations to the gradual transformation of 
the Middle East is, therefore, both necessary and feasible – provided the 
task is approached collaboratively and with genuine, long-term commit-
ment. Moving towards a EU-US plan for the Eastern Mediterranean would 
involve three main sets of changes: 
-  Both the EU and US need to conduct a thorough review of the way 
each currently approaches security, trade, aid and public diplomacy; 
and to substantially upgrade their individual capacities to build de-
mocratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean.
20 
-  To avoid surprising each other the US and EU need to acquire new 
shared institutional “hardware”, enabling continuous high-level coor-
dination of policy initiation, development and implementation. This 
should not be confined to EU-US relations per se, but involve adapt-
 
18  Rouzbeh Pirouz and Mark Leonard, How to Change the Middle East, Financial 
Times, 15 September 2003.   
19  On “soft power” see: Joseph S. Nye, Limits of American Power, 117(4) Political 
Science Quarterly (Winter 2002-2003) 545-560. On the concept of “sticky power” 
see: Walter Russell Mead, America’s Sticky Power, Foreign Policy (March/April 
2004). 
20  On this point see: Urban Ahlin, Ronald Asmus, Steven Everts, Jana Hybaskova, 
Mark Leonard, Michael McFaul, Michael Mertes, A Transatlantic plan for democ-
racy, International Herald Tribune, March 15, 2004.  Amichai Magen 
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ing and leveraging existing international, Atlantic and pan-European 
structures.
21   
-  New “software” is also required. In essence, Western nations need to 
have fundamentally different relations with countries that commit to 
a democratic peace agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean than with 
countries that don’t; and they need to coordinate these relations 
among them to ensure optimal persuasive impact. Military and civil 
aid, access to markets, trade preferences, movement of persons, dip-
lomatic privileges – all need to be coherently and credibly linked to 
the strategy, and new methods developed to support reformists.  
II. A “Transitional Trusteeship” for the Palestinians 
The imperative of a EU-US led strategy for democratic peace building is 
most starkly manifested in the Israeli-Palestinian context – where a legacy 
of displacement and occupation, a decade of Arafat’s corrupt, authoritarian 
misrule and nearly four years of brutal conflict have combined to reduce 
Palestinian society to pathological chaos, traumatize Israeli democracy and 
empower extremists utterly opposed to co-existence. A committed drive to 
realizing the Quartet’s vision of: “two-states, Israel and an independent, 
viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security” 
should therefore be one of the two major aims of a new strategy for the 
Eastern Mediterranean.
22  
How to get there? Although the Quartet mechanism itself is currently in 
tatters, the common understandings reached by the members of the Quartet 
(the US, EU, UN and Russia) on what is required for a just and stable Is-
raeli-Palestinian peace, represent an important meeting of the minds and 
provides a sound basis for a revamped US-EU strategy. The commitment 
made in the Quartet’s July 2002 Join Statement that: “Implementation of an 
action plan, with appropriate benchmarks for progress on reform measures, 
should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state character-
 
21  See also Richard Youngs, Supra, note 17.  Building Democratic Peace 
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ized by the rule of law, separation of powers, and a vibrant free economy 
that can best serve the interests of its people” appears to embody a shared 
recognition that a simple “land for peace” formula is inappropriate in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context, and that a fundamental democratic transforma-
tion in Palestinian controlled territories is essential if a stable peace is ever 
to emerge.
23  
This conceptualisation of the conflict marks an important departure from 
the Oslo-to-Camp David II paradigm – a paradigm that bet on Arafat’s dic-
tatorship to deliver security and peace with, as Yitzhak Rabin put it: “no 
Bagatz [petitions to a Supreme Court] and no Bet’zelem [an Israeli human 
rights watchdog]”.
24 
Still, a breakthrough is prevented by continued attachment to another de-
bunked assumption – namely that a peace settlement (while it may include 
a hefty dose of international cajoling) essentially depends on political nego-
tiations between Israel and a Palestinian entity willing and able to negotiate 
and implement an agreement. However, not only is there no credible Pales-
tinian regime today for Israel to negotiate with (as the road map and a host 
of unofficial ‘citizen-driven’ initiatives presuppose) but Israeli disengage-
ment from Gaza and the West Bank would leave behind it a power vacuum 
far more likely to be filled by HAMAS and Islamic Jihad than by anything 
resembling responsible government. As Dennis Ross observed on March 
24
th this year: “every Palestinian I spoke with during a recent visit to the 
Middle East agreed, believing that Hamas would gain psychologically and 
practically from an Israeli withdrawal.” And again, in the same piece: “only 
Hamas is so far making plans for the day after the Israeli military with-
 
22  Joint Statement by the “Quartet” (US, EU, UN and Russia) following their New 
York meeting, 16 July 2002.    
23 Joint Statement by the Quartet, Supra,  note 22. See also The Bush Peace Plan 
speech (24th June 2002).  
24  See: Natan Sharansky, Supra, note 7. The EU, by far the single largest donor of aid 
to the Palestinian Authority, was during the Oslo years fully supportive of this ap-
proach, believing that by strengthening Arafat’s executive authority rather than 
what were thought to be potentially destabilizing civil society elements, it would 
promote the peace-process. See: Richard Youngs, Democracy Promotion: The Case 
of the European Union Strategy, (2001) CEPS Working Paper No. 167, pg. 16.     Amichai Magen 
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draws from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. In discussions with both Is-
raelis and Palestinians I heard about Hamas efforts to take credit for the 
withdrawal, absorb Israeli settlements and shape Palestinian governance 
after the Israeli departure.”
25 
If a Palestinian State was established tomorrow, in other words, it would be 
a failed state, a rogue state or both. At a time when the international com-
munity is investing huge efforts to prevent state collapse and to deal with 
the dangerous externalities of rogue states, allowing the birth of either 
would be a grave mistake. 
The notion that Israelis and Palestinians will somehow extricate themselves 
from the trap of war, or that a radicalised, impoverished Palestinian society 
will be able to live in peace alongside Israel after an Israeli withdrawal, is 
folly. Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qurie, has made it clear that he 
has neither the capacity nor the inclination to confront militant groups, 
fearing a Palestinian civil war.
26 Nor is Egypt willing to assume security 
responsibilities for Gaza.  
To build a Palestinian state that is normatively and institutionally (as well 
as territorially) viable; to allow Israel to withdraw from Gaza and parts of 
the West Bank without risking a HAMAS takeover and dangerous regional 
instability; to produce new opportunities for Israeli-Jordanian-Egyptian co-
operation; to remove what the Moslem world claims is its primary griev-
ance against America and its allies; to create a credible democratic reform 
agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean (no oil in Palestine); and to help gen-
erate a new, positive transatlantic agenda – the US and EU should promote 
a “Transitional Trusteeship”, beginning with the Gaza Strip.  
The Trusteeship will be “transitional” in two senses: firstly, it will prevent 
a dangerous power vacuum and facilitate an orderly Israeli withdrawal, in 
accordance with the Sharon plan; and, secondly, it will administer the terri-
tories and prepare the conditions for democratic Palestinian rule in Gaza – 
 
25 Dennis  Ross,  Withdrawal Without Reward, New York Times (March 24, 2004). See 
also: Mark Heinrich, Anarchy in Nablus Evokes Disorder of Arafat’s Rule, Reuters, 
February 5, 2004. Building Democratic Peace 
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which, if successful, would be extended to the West Bank in the context of 
an end-of-conflict peace settlement. In this sense, the Transitional Trustee-
ship complements the Quartet’s vision. 
A number of variations on the trusteeship theme were floated recently – 
notably by US Senator Richard Lugar and former Assistant Secretary of 
State Martin Indyk.
27 My intention here is not to critique or duplicate these 
suggestions, but merely to make several comments on what the goals and 
content of a Transitional Trusteeship should include, in the context of a 
broader democratic peace agenda for the Eastern Mediterranean. These 
comments need to be read in conjunction with the arguments for a “new 
deal” for Israel and the establishment of a Peace and Democracy Pact for 
the Eastern Mediterranean (see below). 
Growing experience with a form of international governance described as 
“Neotrusteeship” (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, 
Afghanistan and Iraq), demonstrates the importance of an international le-
gal mandate (i.e. a UN Security Council Resolution) and robust implemen-
tation mechanisms to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the mission.
28 
Unlike the situation in Iraq – which was a after all a functioning sovereign 
state prior to the American invasion in March 2003 – the urgency of “re-
turning sovereignty” to the Palestinians is low, since there has never been, 
de facto or de jure, Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza (or the West Bank 
for that matter).
29 This factor is important in reducing the pressures to find 
a quick fix and an early exit date. Accordingly – and in order to alleviate 
Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian fears about instability in the event of a pre-
mature exit – the trusteeship will remain in force until it fulfils its mandated 
goals. Still, the preparation of the Trusteeship’s mandate must be preceded 
 
26  Cited in: Daragesh, Palestinian Security Nominee Refuses Oath, Associated Press, 
7th October 2003. 
27  See: Richard G. Lugar, A New Partnership for the Greater Middle East: Combating 
Terrorism, Building Peace, Speech delivered at the Brookings Institute, Washington 
DC (March 29th 2004); Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, 82(3) Foreign 
Affairs (May/June 2003). 
28 See James Fearon and David Laitin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak 
States, 28(4) International Security (Spring 2004). 
29  Legally, sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank remains in the hands of the UN.  Amichai Magen 
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by extensive consultation with all the relevant stakeholders in the region 
who may become part of a peaceful and democratic solution. This will help 
bolster legitimacy and credibility, identify problem issues and spoilers, en-
gage potential partners in peace and prepare the diplomatic scene for the 
Trusteeship.  
The overarching goal of the trusteeship will be to build a Palestinian state 
to a point where full authority can be safely vested in a democratic Pales-
tinian government, grounded in civil constitutional norms, able to provide 
public goods to the Palestinian people, live alongside Israel in peace and 
contribute to Eastern Mediterranean peace and stability. In broad terms, its 
aim would be to bring Israelis and Palestinians to the point envisaged in 
Phase III of the Road Map. This will involve four main dimensions:  
Establishing security: A West Bank Palestinian who recently lost a family 
member to intra-Palestinian factional violence described the PA as a thou-
sand competing authorities each with its own militia.
30 The primary task of 
the trusteeship must therefore be the establishment of a Weberian state mo-
nopoly on the means of violence in Palestinian territories. This will allow 
the IDF to remove the presence of troops and road blocks which make daily 
Palestinian lives so wretched. Without establishing conditions of security, 
as President Bush has said: “Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized 
by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend itself, and the situation of 
the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable.”
31 Achieving a 
monopoly on the means of violence will necessitate the deployment of a 
trusteeship security force capable of: securing the Gaza borders; preventing 
arms smuggling (notably through the Philadelphi route tunnels); facing 
down any spoiler; disarming, demobilizing and rehabilitating militant 
groups (including HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, the Fatah Tanzim and the Al-
Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades); training and gradually transferring security re-
sponsibilities to a unitary, well disciplined Palestinian security force. The 
idea of a NATO-led or other multilateral force transitioning Israeli with-
drawal from Gaza is a challenging one, especially against the background 
 
30 Mark  Heinrich,  Supra, note 25.  
31  The Bush Peace Plan, June 24, 2002.  Building Democratic Peace 
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of the Iraq experience. Certainly, such an operation will have to be care-
fully planned and could only go ahead with Israeli approval. It is nonethe-
less an idea that has gathered momentum over the past year.
32 The vacuum 
left behind by an Israeli withdrawal risks creating dangerous externalities 
not only for Israel, Egypt and Jordan, but also for Europe and the US’s ef-
forts in Iraq. A situation where Hizbollah and al-Qaeda elements infiltrate 
and find refuge in Gaza is not unthinkable. More positively, a US-EU led 
multilateral force – Indyk estimates that 10,000 troops will be sufficient – 
with an explicit peace mandate will send stabilizing signals around the re-
gion, demonstrate American commitment to the Palestinian issue, 
strengthen the credibility of European foreign and defence policy and 
strengthen the EU-US partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
Normative and economic reconstruction: Immediately upon taking control 
and establishing an adequate level of security, the Trusteeship must begin 
to create the social and economic conditions necessary for a free Palestin-
ian society. The Faustian deal, by which extremists provide education, 
rough justice and social services in return for the minds and bodies of Pal-
estinian youth, must be broken, and replaced with modern, normatively ac-
ceptable state structures. A robust post-conflict reconstruction plan is 
needed to disband refugee camps, create new housing and communal infra-
structure, generate entrepreneurship and employment opportunities and 
transform an educational system that thoroughly indoctrinates Palestinian 
children to a life of violent struggle and genocidal hatred for Israel and 
America. Settlements evacuated by Israel should not be destroyed or al-
lowed to fall into the hands of thugs, but administered by the trustees to 
alleviate Gaza’s grave overcrowding problem. A special Donor Group 
(which ideally should include not only The World Bank and IMF, but 
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel) should help the trustees fund 
these projects. At the same time, the trustees, aided by the Donor Group 
should facilitate the establishment of economic structures aligned with 
modern Western standards. Here, the trustees could draw on the expertise 
 
32 See:  Steven  Everts,  Why NATO must keep the Mid East peace, Financial Times (29 
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and courage of indigenous reformists, such as Palestinian Finance Minister 
Salim Fayad, himself a former IMF official. 
Building democratic institutions: Despite risking life and limb, a growing 
number of Palestinian legislators, academics, NGO leaders, journalists and 
human rights activists are voicing their resentment of the PA’s lawlessness 
and corruption, and have called for genuine democratic reforms.
33 Still, af-
ter decades of mal-governance and trauma, considerable time and resources 
will have to be invested in institutional and normative state-building. Elec-
tions should be postponed until relatively late in the game. To prepare the 
ground for a meaningful democratic process, the trustees should focus on 
empowering civil forces (notably women’s groups), nurture the establish-
ment of constitutionalism, promote democratic education and encourage 
the sizeable and highly-educated Palestinian Diaspora in North America 
and Europe to participate in the creation of a rehabilitated Palestinian soci-
ety. Only after a period of “detoxification” and renewal, could sound in-
digenous political institutions and gradual transfer of governmental powers 
emerge – possibly through transitional legislative, executive and judicial 
branches, guided by the Trusteeship. 
Regional and cross-border cooperation: One of the major shortcomings of 
the Oslo-to-Camp David II paradigm has been the general failure of key 
actors in the region (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) to assume respon-
sibility and play a constructive role in the peace process. As Senator Lugar 
recently put it: “the nations of the Greater Middle East must be brought into 
the process of resolving the conflict. They cannot continue to expect the 
U.S. to address these issues on their behalf, and then complain the U.S. is 
not doing it right.”
34 Accordingly, the fourth dimension of the trusteeship 
must be to facilitate collaborative cross-border problem solving especially 
among Israel and Egypt. An often-ignored dimension, cross-border coop-
eration is practically a necessity for tiny, overcrowded Gaza – with its dire 
demographic, employment, water, energy, sanitation, drug smuggling and 
infrastructure problems. Certainly, as soon as conditions allow, Israel 
 
33  See: Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Tomameh, What Happened to Reform of the Pales-
tinian Authority?, Jerusalem Issue Brief  Volume 3 No. 20, March 3rd 2004.    
34 Richard  C.  Lugar,  Supra, note 27. Building Democratic Peace 
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should consider increase the number of Palestinian workers allowed in. At 
the same time, Egypt should allow Palestinians from Gaza greater access 
into empty Sinai, to pursue legitimate economic activities, travel and even 
residence. 
III. A New Vision for Israel 
Western policy makers have grown accustomed to taking for granted Is-
rael’s strength and stability. Ironically both friends and foes of Israel have 
vested interests in perpetuating this image. Friends, in order to put on a 
brave face, help deter those who still seek Israel’s annihilation, and to pro-
mote favourable comparisons between democratic Israel and the rest of the 
Middle East. Foes, in order to portray Israel as a potent aggressor, imperial-
ist in its designs and reprehensible in its treatment of the Palestinian under-
dog. Yet, as only a few have so far dared to publicly admit, the truth of this 
image has over the past four years been compromised to a dangerous de-
gree.
35  
The last four years have taken a terrible toll on Israeli society, leaving 
many Israelis feeling beleaguered at home and isolated abroad. The trauma 
of countless terrorist attacks which have taken the lives of over 1000 civil-
ians, has been coupled with the worst economic down turn in the country’s 
history – with 3 successive years of shrinking GDP – the departure of over 
200,000 Israelis (many of them young, highly-educated and secular), and 
rising anti-Semitism in Europe and the Arab world. A growing number of 
Israelis are worried about the deteriorating state of their society, but are 
powerless to make positive changes in a public arena trapped in a narrow 
survivalist discourse.   
An Israeli withdrawal that does not leave behind it a competent and respon-
sible Palestinian entity, will almost certainly worsen Israel’s security and 
economic situation, which will make Israel more jittery in its responses, 
which in turn would increase regional instability.  Amichai Magen 
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Moreover, unless an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West 
Bank is accompanied by powerful security guarantees and endorsement of 
the international community, it risks being interpreted in the Arab world as 
a victory for terror – emboldening extremists from Gaza City to Damascus, 
from Jenin to Fallujah. Arab aggression against Israel did not begin with 
the 1967 occupation of land, and it is unlikely to cease with the evacuation 
of land alone. 
Domestically, a worsened security and economic situation after withdrawal 
will empower illiberal elements in Israeli politics, silence the majority that 
is supportive of territorial concessions in return for genuine peace, paralyse 
the Israeli left and centre-left, and further strain relations between Israeli 
Jewish and Arab citizens.  
To avoid this dangerous scenario, the US and EU need to reach out to the 
Israeli public, showing the way to a safe, controlled exist from Gaza and 
offering a tangible vision for a better future. The new vision should contain 
both hard and soft security components: 
Ensuring security after an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza: To reassure Is-
raelis, deter those who would wish to take advantage of a “Zionist retreat” 
from “Arab lands” and establish a new security context in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza needs to be complemented 
with collective security guarantees. The June 28-29 NATO summit in Is-
tanbul is expected to generate ideas for promoting deeper military and po-
litical relations with Israel and a number of Arab states. In the aftermath of 
the summit, the US and EU Member States should advance the role of 
NATO as a security safety net in the context of Eastern Mediterranean 
peace-making. Certainly this could include a concerted push to upgrade the 
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (as was envisaged by the 2002 Prague 
summit) – encouraging in particular NATO-Egyptian-Israeli-Jordanian se-
curity cooperation.
36 A more advanced formula would extend the Partner-
 
35  See: Former Speaker of the Knesset (1999-2003) and former chairman of the Jewish 
Agency, Avraham Burg, A Failed Israeli Society Collapses While Its Leaders Re-
main Silent, Forward (August 29, 2003).   
36  The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue encompasses Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.    Building Democratic Peace 
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ship for Peace (PfP) initiative, or its equivalent, to those Eastern Mediterra-
nean countries that subscribe to the democratic peace agenda advanced by 
the US and EU. In the case of Israel, which eventually will be expected to 
relinquish control of the strategic depth provided by the West Bank, the PfP 
framework could serve as a “waiting room” for eventual NATO member-
ship. This will create a phased integration mechanism that could be condi-
tionally linked to progress in the peace process.  
Israel in Wider Europe: A bold offer of greater political and economic in-
clusion needs to be extended by the EU to Israelis – a majority of whom 
wish for closer integration with Europe, but feel alienated by the EU 
mainly because of its perceived pro-Arab bias.
37 Rather than try to act as a 
“counterweight” to American policy or threaten to employ coercive meas-
ures against Israel (an approach which will almost certainly prove counter-
productive) the EU would do well to utilize its new Wider Europe initiative 
to offer Israel a qualitatively enhanced relationship, in the context of a 
withdrawal from Gaza and eventual peace deal with the Palestinians.  
Such an approach is gathering support in some European policy circles. 
Chatham House’s Rosemary Hollis, for example, rightly argued that the 
EU can play a far more effective role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
by recognizing the security risks that Israel will incur in the context of 
withdrawal and offering it a new European “strategic depth”.
38 Some senior 
officials in Brussels are reportedly also contemplating a dramatic upgrade 
in EU-Israel relations, in this context.  
The Wider Europe initiative launched by the Commission in March 2003 
provides a sound basis for developing such a policy. Unlike the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the new initiative proposes country-specific 
 
37 See Poll: Israeli Attitudes Towards the EU, March 10th 2004 (available at: 
http://www.eu-del.org.il/english/DAHAF_SECOND_POLL_RESULTS_EDITED. 
doc).  
38  Comments made in an interview to Ha’aretz. Reported by Sharon Sadeh, Withdraw-
ing from the Arabs to the embrace of the Europeans, Ha’aretz 24th January 2004. 
Dr. Rosemary Hollis is the Head of the Middle East Department, Royal Institute for 
International Affairs (Chatham House).  Amichai Magen 
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“action plans” and contains ample scope for deep political and economic 
ties.  
It is proposed that a two-phase plan be adopted by the EU: To alleviate Is-
raeli suspicions and empower liberal elements, the first phase would be a 
package of “up front” incentives, designed to build trust and encourage a 
secure Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The EU would reach out to Israel 
with a positive political and economic signal, offering full access to the 
Single Market, on a basis similar to that of Switzerland or the European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries. Israel would be invited to join EU pro-
grammes in areas like transportation and energy, Justice and Home Affairs 
cooperation, the environment, culture and education. In addition, the pack-
age could contain enhanced political dialogue, security cooperation and 
stronger European commitments to fight anti-Semitism.  
To encourage sub-regional cooperation between Israel, the Palestinians, 
Jordan and Egypt, the EU should also contemplate measures such as grant-
ing the four cumulative rules of origin, and stating that Arab countries that 
make peace with Israel will also be able to join the cumulative rule of ori-
gin regime for purposes of export into the Single Market. The US could 
complement this policy, thus leveraging EU-US “sticky power”.  
A second phase of a EU policy towards Israel will involve a degree of ex 
ante conditionality and would coincide with a final status settlement with 
the Palestinians. At that stage EU-Israel relations should assume a qualita-
tively new character; forming a model of what a closely-integrated but non-
member relationship will look like for a liberal democracy in the European 
neighbourhood. In this context, political ties with the EU could be further 
deepened with Israel invited to participate in core EU policies and some 
institutions. In addition, the EU should support full Israeli membership in 
pan-European organizations such as NATO, the OSCE, Council of Europe 
and OECD – consolidating a transformation from isolation to inclusion in a 
peaceful and prosperous regional matrix. 
Many Europeans have a visceral contempt for Ariel Sharon and are reluc-
tant to reach out to his coalition government. This attitude is misguided. In 
its foreign policy the EU has been most successful when it has held out the Building Democratic Peace 
  131
prospect of inclusion to countries receptive to the allure of European inte-
gration. If the Sharon government – which already accepted the imperative 
of disengagement from the Palestinians – is prepared to go along with the 
new strategy, there is no reason for Europe to snub it on personal grounds. 
A right wing Israeli government that commits to a US-EU plan will benefit 
from the support of the centre and left. For more right-wing constituents the 
plan is far more likely to be palatable if followed by Ariel Sharon than by 
Shimon Peres. (It was after all, Likud’s Menachem Begin who achieved the 
breakthrough peace deal with Egypt in 1979, evacuated the Sinai settle-
ments and handed back the entire Sinai Peninsula). If, on the other hand, a 
European outstretched arm were to be rejected by the Sharon coalition, the 
Israeli public would, for the first time in four years, have an alternative 
agenda to pursue at the polls. Indeed, the Israeli public has for over a dec-
ade consistently elected governments committed to a peace settlement with 
the Palestinians when it has felt that peace was a realistic possibility, and it 
has punished governments it felt were too hesitant in pursuing peace – 
Rabin defeating Shamir in 1992, Barak defeating Netanyahu in 1999. The 
aim of the US-EU strategy, in this context, should be to create a positive 
alternative vision for Israelis, where none currently exists.    
IV. A Peace and Democracy Pact for the Eastern Medi-
terranean 
A growing body of research indicates that domestic democratisation proc-
esses are strongly influenced by external, especially regional conditions. To 
improve the regional conditions for Arab-Israeli peace and promote democ-
ratic reforms in the Middle East, the EU and US should complement the 
Israel-Palestine strategy outlined above with a Peace and Democracy Pact 
for the Eastern Mediterranean (PDPEM).  
While a fully developed plan for a PDPEM is beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion, the following comments are offered to stimulate further thinking 
on this policy direction. 
The PDPEM concept draws on the Balladur Stability Pact (1993-95) and 
the Stability Pact for the Balkans (1999) – both of which leveraged eco-Amichai Magen 
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nomic and political power to address disputes over borders and minority 
populations, promote economic and democratic reforms, and establish 
commitment to pan-European norms such as the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Charter of Paris, the 1990 Copenhagen Document and other OSCE stan-
dards. 
The text of the 1999 Pact asserts that: “Lasting peace and stability in South 
Eastern Europe will only become possible when democratic principles and 
values, which are already actively promoted by many countries in the re-
gion, have taken root throughout…International efforts must focus on con-
solidating and linking areas of stability in the region to lay a firm founda-
tion for the transition of the region as a whole to a peaceful and democratic 
future.”
39 The same basic logic needs to be applied to the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, though the PDPEM’s specific objectives, structure and instruments 
would of course be somewhat different.  
Like the Balkans Pact, the purpose of the PDPEM would be to deliver 
comprehensive, systemic and normative-based solutions to the region’s 
multiple conflicts. Similar also would be the PDPEM’s reliance on joint 
American and European leadership, and the involvement of the OSCE, 
Council of Europe, the UN, NATO, the OECD and IFI’s. In this context, 
EU-US “hardware” and “software” for democracy promotion and state-
building should be brought to bear in the PDPEM, serving as a model for 
the Greater Middle East.     
Rather than try to generate these conditions indigenously – as was imag-
ined in the “New Middle East” visions of the early 1990s – the PDPEM 
framework would seek to extend areas of stability eastwards; leveraging 
existing pan-European institutions and integration dynamics, and linking 
them with reformists in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
In this context, Turkey’s progress towards eventual EU membership is an 
important piece of the puzzle. A Turkey that fulfils the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria and is firmly anchored in pan-European regional structures 
could well project positive “policy export” on, among others, Syria, Leba-
 
39  Article 11, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, June 10, 1999.  Building Democratic Peace 
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non, Iraq and Iran. Coupled with a robust PDPEM peace and reform 
agenda, Turkey’s accession process could help form an “arc of democrati-
sation” to Iraq’s north, west and south – aiding the country’s post-war tran-
sition. 
In its mechanisms the PDPEM could be led by a US-EU appointed Special 
Coordinator, that will chair an Eastern Mediterranean Regional Table, 
which will be responsible for delivering a coherent common policy and re-
viewing progress under the Peace and Democracy Pact.  
The Special Coordinator and Regional Table would supervise country-
specific “Action Plans”, linking all positive incentives and, where appro-
priate, coercive measures, to progress under the PDPEM. In addition, the 
Special Coordinator and Regional Table could advance five cross-regional 
Working Tables, combining a peace-making and reform agenda: 1) De-
mocratisation, Human Rights and Women; 2) Conflict Resolution; 3) Secu-
rity and Counter-Terrorism; 4) Economic Development and Cooperation; 
4) Education, Norms and Culture. 
In its peace-making dimension, the PDPEM would aim to create the best 
regional conditions in support of the Transitional Trusteeship in Gaza, and 
later the negotiation and implementation of a fair and viable peace agree-
ment between Israelis and Palestinians. One of the key lessons of the Camp 
David II experience has been the central importance of gaining Egyptian 
and Saudi backing for an end-of-conflict deal, prior to bringing the matter 
to a head. The PDPEM would, therefore, use its clout to gain regional sup-
port for a peace-settlement, including the revival of the so-called “Saudi 
Plan” for normalization of Arab relations with Israel.   
Addressing cross-border networks of extremist groups (notably Hizbollah, 
HAMAS and Islamic Jihad) and the states that support them (notably Iran 
and Syria) also necessitates a determined, systemic, regional policy. The 
isolation of militant groups in Gaza and the West Bank, the advancement of 
Palestinian reforms and the establishment of adequate security conditions 
for a safe Israeli withdrawal, will all benefit from the containment of ex-
tremist groups and the creation of a viable democratic alternative to their 
ideology of hate. In this context, special attention must be focused on Syria Amichai Magen 
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and Iran – both of which actively fund, equip and harbour terrorist groups. 
The PDPEM could help prevent existing anomalies such the fact that while 
the US has recently slapped terrorism-related sanctions on Syria, the EU is 
preparing to reward Syria with preferential trade relations. 
Creating the right regional environment for an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
would also involve a comprehensive solution to the problem of Palestinian 
refugees and displaced persons in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
40 Even if 
Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza and the West bank are disbanded and 
their population fully integrated into a new democratic Palestinian state, the 
preservation of refugee camps in these countries (12 in Lebanon, 10 in 
Syria and 10 in Jordan) and their denial of citizenship and other rights, 
would perpetuate the narrative of violent nationalist struggle, and would 
continue to feed extremist groups across the Middle East with a steady 
supply of recruits. The PDPEM would, therefore, need to implement a re-
gional programme to deconstruct refugee camps, support full civic integra-
tion for those who choose to remain in their country of residence and help 
find alternative solutions (including compensation, immigration to Western 
countries and return to an independent Palestinian homeland) for the re-
mainder.   
In conclusion, a combined peace making and democratisation strategy that 
focuses on Israel-Palestinians and the surrounding Eastern Mediterranean, 
has the potential of uniting Americans and Europeans, as well as possess-
ing credibility and legitimacy in the region itself. Rather than allow contin-
ued Arab-Israeli conflict to undermine yet again necessary democratic re-
forms in the Middle East, peace making and democratisation need to be 
brought together in a positive agenda of simultaneous change. The tasks 
inherent in such a strategy are formidable indeed, but the potential benefits 
 
40  According to UNWRA figures from June 30th 2003, there are 10 official refugee 
camps in Jordan where 304,430 registered refugees live and a further 1,718,767 reg-
istered refugees not in camps. In Lebanon there are 12 camps, and out of a total of 
391,679 refugees in the country 225,125 live in camps (mainly along the Israeli-
Lebanese border). In Syria there are 10 camps, housing 119,766 refugees, out of a 
total number of 409,662 registered refugees in the country.  Building Democratic Peace 
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for the region and the rest of the world are too powerful to ignore, and the 
alternatives perhaps too costly to tolerate. Walter Posch 
What Preconditions for a CSCE-like   
Approach for the Region? 
Much time and a lot of heated debates have been spent to discuss what the 
EU and the US can do to transform the Middle East towards more democ-
racy in order to fight threats emanating from the region.
1 The region is 
clearly in crisis and needs change to overcome its apathy. Most of the de-
bates understood the region as passive and in need of benevolent interven-
tion, that may be economic aid, military intervention and – dialogue.  This 
paper tries to focus on the crisis in the region in general; suggest new defi-
nition of the Middle East and divides it into five sub-regions based mainly 
on geography and ethnicity and finally tries to evaluate how far the CSCE-
OSCE experience could serve as a model for confidence building in the 
region.  
1. Social and Political Crisis  
The social, economic and political underdevelopment of Arab countries or 
the Muslim world in general has been object of many debates and confer-
ences. Yet this debate is not new but started in general in the 19
th century or 
even earlier and several nationalistic and socialist reform attempts in the 
region have failed. Today, almost any observer Arab and non-Arab, Mus-
lim and non-Muslim alike agrees that there is a tremendous need for reform 
in the region; the lack of democracy and good-governance are main obsta-
cles for further development and pose a serious potential threat for the EU Walter Posch 
  138  
and the West in general. One of the most important contributions to the de-
bate was the UNDP’s “Arab Human Development Report AHDP” first is-
sued in 2002 the second in 2003.
2  
Arab and other governments admitted the importance for developing the 
human and social conditions even before the first AHDR was published. 
But their aim was rather to enhance their own legitimacy and to maintain 
domestic stability
3 than genuine political reform. But times change! Serious 
steps for reform have been undertaken in many countries, the most coura-
geous in Iran and the most surprising in Saudi Arabia. There are however 
serious doubts whether the Muslim world in general and Arabic countries 
in peculiar can deliver.
4 The backlash after the last elections in Iran, which 
is still one of the more democratic countries of the region, is just one ex-
ample.  
1.1 Integrated West Asian Crisis 
Powerful family clans and “mafia”-like political/economic networks hold 
their grip over many aspects of their societies and are in varying degrees 
able to extend their power into the circles of political decision making. So-
cial structures like clan and tribal bindings, but also ethnic and sectarian 
strive, have contributed to what Fred Halliday calls the “integrated west 
Asian crisis”, a serious weakening and even collapsing of the state as it 
happened in Lebanon and Afghanistan in the 1970 and 1980s or more re-
cently Pakistan and Yemen (seriously weakened) and Somalia (almost non-
existing), “where significant areas are free of government control or where 
 
1  The EU’s Security Strategy cites terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional con-
flicts, state failure and organised crime as key threats. EU-ISS: A Secure Europe in 
a Better World. European Security Strategy, Paris December 2003, p. 8f. 
2 http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/  UNDP, Creating opportunities for future genera-
tions AHDR 2002, and Building a Knowledge Society AHDR 2003.  
3  SOLTAN, Gamal A. Gawad: “Security Perceptions in the Arab World and Euro-
Med Relations,” in: The International Spectator, p. 9. 
4  Turkey’s successful democratisation and her relative success towards liberalisation 
of her society and economy is another reason why she shall be excluded from the 
Middle East. What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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the government seeks to humour radical groups.”
5 Typical regions out of 
government control would be the pashtun-speaking borderland between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan and Baluchistan (the triangle between Afghani-
stan, Pakistan and Iran), to mention only two of them. In most cases ethnic-
ity (Baluchis and Pashtun) and/or tribal bindings mix with ultra-sunni fa-
naticism and drug production. In addition one may cite other state-failures 
like Palestine and as it seems to happen soon – Iraq. Another side of this 
crisis is the successful mingling of historically distinct conflicts like Af-
ghanistan, Palestine and Iraq and viewing them as one and the same strug-
gle of the faithful Muslim against the infidel/imperialist invader – the war 
in Iraq was for many in the region (and even in Europe!) just the final proof 
of US-Israeli hostility towards Islam.  
1.2 The Debate within Islam 
But the real struggle is within Muslim societies themselves: in short it is 
about two interdependent conflicts, the struggle for participation on politi-
cal power of an emerging islamist middle class in the big cities, which is 
mostly rural in origin and the question whether democracy and Islam are 
compatible or in clear contradiction (the radical tradition following the 
Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb d. 1966). Muslim fundamentalist movements 
embrace radicalism in their infancy, as soon as there is a real possibility to 
run for free and fair elections, they participate in the electoral process and 
become part of the political system and loose much of their radicalism. The 
Turkish experience is a point in case, but even the parliamentary system of 
a rather weak democracy like that of Lebanon was strong enough to have a 
moderating impact on the Lebanese Hizbullah; Algeria however is an im-
portant example to show what exactly not to do. Radicals and extremist 
remain nevertheless: Ultra-sunni Islamist groups (jihâdî), mostly extremists 
with wahhabi or salafi background like the “al-Qa’ida” are decided ene-
mies of the Shiites, the West and their own governments, which are often 
described apostate (following the tradition of takfîr wa hijra).  
 
5  See Chapter 1 at Halliday, Fred: Two Hours That Shook The World: September 11 
2001: Causes and Consequences, London 2001. One may add Turkey’s near-
collapse during the 1970s and the insurgency in South-East Anatolia in the 1990s. Walter Posch 
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The inner-Muslim debate on Islam and democracy has started more than 
two decades ago in Iran and continues to this day. As a recent example one 
may mention the former general secretary of the “Organisation of the Is-
lamic Conference – OIC”, Abdelouahed Belkeziz, who has formulated 
Muslim self-criticism and the need for democratisation (a shari’a-based 
democratisation, to be precise) and mobilisation of the economic and intel-
lectual potential of Islamic countries to challenge both extremism and ter-
rorism that are falsely attributed to Islam on one side and underdevelop-
ment and backwardness on the other.
6 Both tendencies: Islamist terrorism 
and serious attempts for democratisation exist among scholars, politicians 
and the faithful alike – it is solely up to the Muslims to solve this problem! 
EU and the US however are able to assist and to help in the fields of de-
mocratisation and good governance as well as in the economy; various pro-
grams for strengthening democracy including the delicate issue of support-
ing NGOs are conducted and shall be continued and even extended. But 
any western support makes only sense when democracy or at least parlia-
mentarism are not viewed as un-Islamic interventions (bid’da) or imperial-
ist concepts.  
Acceptance of democratic and human right principles has to be the first 
precondition for any dialogue and even more for formal relations. This pre-
condition is generally met, at least in theory, by all states the EU cooperates 
with. But a dialogue is based on reciprocity: no attempt however shall be 
made on behalf of the EU to define “moderate Islam”.
7 This term should 
rather be strictly avoided since it is simply not up to non-Muslim observers 
to decide on religious matters and therefore arrogant to do so. It is also mis-
leading, since strictly observant Muslims can be good democrats.  
 
6  Keynote Speech of H.E. Dr Abdelouahed Belkeziz Secretary General of the Organi-
sation of the Islamic Conference to the International Symposium on “Enlightened 
Moderation”, Islamabad, 1-2 June 2004 (www.oic-oci.org /press/english/june%20 
2004/moderation/htm and Speech of H.E. Dr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, the Secretary-
General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, before the Thirty-first Ses-
sion of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, İstanbul 14-16 June 2004 
(www.oic-oci.org /press/english/june%202004//SG-istanbul.htm. 
7   It should be mentioned that “Islam” as a religion and culture and Islamism as a po-
litical ideology are all too often confused.  What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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The social and economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world and its 
interdependence with the deficit of democracy and state failure is nowa-
days unlike in earlier times not only widely accepted as a matter of fact, but 
also seen as a result of own shortcomings rather than of colonialism or neo-
colonialist conspiracies. Nevertheless, governments may still be tempted to 
hide behind the Israel-Palestine conflict and the post-war fiasco in Iraq for 
missed opportunities and undone reform-work. Israel, on the other hand, 
seems to be less interested in a peace solution, which would include a vi-
able Palestinian state, but is rather decided to impose any solution on its 
own conditions. Be this as it may, neither EU and US nor the region can 
escape dialogue; if so: who shall talk to whom and what region are we talk-
ing about.   
2. Defining the Region 
One of the most surprising facts in the debate on the “Greater or Broader 
Middle East” is how ill defined in geographical terms it is. What exactly is 
“greater” or “wider” or simply “other” than the traditional definition of 
Middle East that includes the Arab states,
8 with three non-Arabs: Turkey, 
Iran and Israel.
9 The problem of the definition lies in the fringes of the re-
gion; do Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia belong to it? Is it the 
much-cited zone of insecurity between “Marrakech and Bangladesh” or 
even to the Philippines? Or should one just refer to CENTCOM’s “area of 
responsibility”, that is all countries between Egypt and Kenya in Africa and 
Kazakhstan in Asia? Or would the term “Islamic or Muslim World” more 
aptly apply thus open the way for a quasi-Huntingtonian (Islam against the 
West) and quasi-Islamist (the West against the ummah islamiyyah) ap-
proach and predicting conflict between these two entities.  
 
8  The 17 are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jor-
dan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Iraq.  Somalia 
and Mauritania are no Arab states in the strict sense of the world although they have 
long-standing and intensive connections with Arabian states and societies. Somalia 
is even a member of the Arab League!  
9 Halliday,  Fred:  Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London 1996 p. 27. Walter Posch 
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But even if the “Greater Middle East” should not include the Islamic world 
as a whole it is still big enough to define some sub-regions within the 
GME, each of them has its own crisis that may or may not be related with 
other zones of conflict. Some of the sub-regions described below have a 
more geographical character others are defined rather on the base of ethnic-
ity.  
2.1 North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean 
A consensus has been reached, that Arab countries form the core of the 
(Greater) Middle East. The classic Arab division in eastern mash-
raq/Middle East or the old fashioned Levant and western maghrab/North 
African countries with Egypt as pivotal state forming the centre may offer 
some help. Maghrab i.e. North African countries are for example much 
more concerned with their internal security situation (Islamist radicalism 
etc.) than say Syria, where – like in most mashraq/Levantine countries of 
the Eastern Mediterranean (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, the latter to be 
discussed) – the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is of much 
higher importance. It makes therefore sense to define an “Eastern Mediter-
ranean sub-region” consisting of Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon i.e. the states, which are most affected by the conflict and which 
had to be engaged for any viable solution of the conflict in opposite to the 
“North African sub-region” (Morocco/Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya). 
Finally, one must not forget that the role of Iran must be taken into account, 
due to her staunch support of anti-israeli groups, her alliance with Syria and 
most important her intensive relations with the Lebanese Hizbullah and the 
Shiites in General.   
2.2 Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula 
Southeast of the Eastern Mediterranean we may define the “Persian Gulf 
sub-region” plus the Arabian Peninsula with its abundant oil and gas re-
serves and the USA’s strategic interests. Given the specific character of 
Iraq’s southern provinces, one has to add this country to the Gulf sub-
region too. Arab states of the region have formed the Gulf Cooperation 
Council – GCC, which is by far the most, sophisticated of all intra-What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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governmental frameworks of Arab states. Yemen and Iraq however are not 
members of this framework. The Arab countries on the southern shores of 
the Gulf are monarchies ruled by Sunni autocrats. All of them, with the no-
table exception of Oman, have sizeable Shiite minorities or even majorities 
that are largely excluded from the circles of power. Iran tried on several 
occasions (mostly in the 1980s after the revolution) to incite unrest among 
her co-religionists in the Gulf-monarchies and in Iraq, but plays a more 
positive role in the last years (at least with regard to the Gulf monarchies). 
In general, Shiites of the Gulf seem to realize that they, given their numeri-
cal strength, would benefit most of democratisation in their countries. The 
Shiite population is therefore any longer a serious security concern for the 
Gulf countries what concerns are the activities of ultra fundamentalist 
Sunni jihâdi-groups like Al-Qa’ida. This is especially the case in Saudi 
Arabia where radicals openly threaten to bring down the house of the al-
Sa’ud. 
2.3 The Persian-speaking World 
Iran has however made clear that it supposes herself to be the dominating 
power in the Persian Gulf (or rather to become so after the US have left) 
and has occupied a group of small islands, disputed between Iran and the 
UAE. Iran is with no doubt the most important country of a sub-region we 
may call the Persian-speaking world (Fragner: “Persophonie” or the “reign 
of the Persian language”
10), which includes Afghanistan and Tajikistan but 
thanks to cultural and historical traditions may also be extended towards 
Pakistan. Tajikistan – though with no doubt a persophone country – should 
be excluded from being part of any Middle East conceptualisation, since its 
history and its elites have been shaped by the Soviet Union.
11 In this region, 
tensions between Shiites and Sunnites (some of them connected with 
groups supporting Al-Qa’ida or sharing their world view, like the Taliban) 
 
10  Fragner, Bert G.: Die „Persophonie“: Regionalität, Identität und Sprachkontakt in 
der Geschichte Asiens (ANOR 5), Halle Berlin 1999.  
11  See Perthes, Volker: “Geopolitische Grundlinie im Nahen und Mittleren Osten,” in: 
Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik, 6/2004 p. 687. Walter Posch 
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are extremely high and form a major security concern especially for Paki-
stan but also for Iran in her eastern Provinces.  
2.4 Kurdistan 
Iran is also entrenched in another sub-region: Kurdistan, which to our un-
derstanding is definitely part of the Middle East, although a caveat might 
be posed for the Kurdish regions of Turkey. The lack of a widely accepted 
geographical definition of Kurdistan is part of the problem. Secessionist 
movements among the Kurds have been a major security concern for all 
states involved, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkey alike. Unrest in Iraqi-
Kurdistan however, seems to be very likely since the Kurdish population of 
Iraq is deeply estranged by what they see as the total ignorance of their le-
gitimate claims for autonomy by the International community and the 
newly formed Iraqi government. One should not forget the importance of 
these claims, which have caused bloody unrest and civil war for more than 
two generations in Iraq.  
The question of Kurdistan (and its ability to control the water flow for 
Syria and Iraq) brings Turkey definitely into the Middle East arena, but 
doesn’t make her necessarily part of it given her various and deep-rooted 
connections with the West. NATO and the application for EU-membership 
delineate it clearly from the Middle East; although cultural, economic and 
historical ties remain valid. And Turkey has of course well known and out-
spoken security interests in Iraq: one is to prevent the dissolution of the 
country another one is secure that no independent state of Kurdistan may 
emerge.  
2.5 Five Sub-Regions 
Finally I suggest to amend the classic Middle East formula Arab states + 3 
non-Arabs (Turkey, Iran, Israel) to the (Greater?) Middle East into Arab 
states, two persophones (Iran and Afghanistan) and Israel and to divide the 
Middle East to five regions, North Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, Persian 
Gulf-Arabian Peninsula, the Persophone world and Kurdistan. The EU has 
relations with each of these regions, as long as there are nation states, hence What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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the exception of Kurdistan. The Euro-Med Partnership includes most of the 
North African and Eastern Mediterranean states; relations with the GCC, 
Iran, Iraq and Yemen are on bilateral basis; relations with Afghanistan are 
in the framework of the 2001 Bonn agreement following the end of the 
Taliban. 
As a first conclusion, several adjacent countries and regions have to be ex-
cluded from concept of Middle East: Turkey due to its European and the 
ex-Soviet countries because of their Soviet legacy.
12 Pakistan whose secu-
rity dilemmas and conflict potential is perhaps most intensively connected 
with the Middle East, should nevertheless be dealt with in the context of 
India, given its nuclear capability, the Kashmir conflict and last but not 
least its history. Other regions like South-East Asia, Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa and all non-Arab Muslim states of Africa are to my understanding 
rather recipients of Middle East conflicts than active contributors and there-
fore only loosely connected. Such a conceptualisation does not deny the 
interdependence of conflicts in, say, Pakistan with Middle East countries 
like Iran or Afghanistan, but it helps to precise broader concepts like “Is-
lamic World” or a supposed “Marrakech and Bangladesh”-region.  
2.6 Role of Iran 
Another conclusion concerns Iran: being involved in all sub-regions with 
the exception of North Africa is proof for her importance for the Middle 
East and resembles the historical role Persia had played for centuries or 
rather millennia. Relations with the EU are still friendly (but expected to 
worsen) and its Shiite denomination makes it a decided enemy of the al-
Qa’ida-type Sunni Jihadists – in this case the West and Iran could even be 
natural allies! On first sight, Iran even seems to be in a relative strong posi-
tion. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have ended the rule of old enemies 
like Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. But this geographical and cultural 
proximity is also an impediment: the mullahs simply cannot disengage 
from the Gulf region, notably Iraq or from Kurdistan and Afghanistan, even 
 
12  This does not say, that for example Uzbekistan may not become part of the Middle 
East one day. This depends to whether future elites will be educated in the Middle 
East or elsewhere.   Walter Posch 
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if they would like to do so. Any crisis and conflict in its vicinity touches 
Iran’s security interests – most notable the sensitive issue of ethnic and 
confessional minorities (Kurds, Baluch, Sunnites etc.)  
Iran is clearly competing with the US for power and influence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; US presence effectively bars Iran from playing a dominating 
role in the Gulf region and elsewhere. Hence both sides seem to be eager to 
avoid open confrontation. Tensions and distrust remain high, however and 
an escalation is still possible.
13 Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear technology 
and its alleged connections with international terrorism is one reason for 
US (and not only US) distrust, US-Iranian history (Islamic Revolution, hos-
tage crisis) and Israel’s security concerns, are other reasons. Given Iran’s 
relative might
14 and influence in the region a further worsening of the status 
quo concerning the USA and Iran could have destabilizing effects and re-
percussions especially in regions with notable Shiite minorities (Lebanon, 
Iraq, Gulf). Better relations on the other hand may cause the opposite. If so, 
one has to keep Iran engaged, even when its nuclear program turns out to 
be more serious than expected. At least a viable modus vivendi between the 
USA and Iran, since a rapprochement between them seems extremely 
unlikely, is a further precondition for any CSCE like process.  
3. Towards a “Conference on Security and Co-
operation in the Middle East – CSCME”  
The Middle East Region has been identified as a region of major concern 
for the EU, the threat posed by al-Qa’ida, the general poverty and further 
population pressure cannot be ignored. The Barcelona-process, the focus 
the new EU Security Strategy gives to the region, new neighbourhood pol-
icy, contacts with the GCC, Iran and Yemen and last but not least EU fi-
nancial support for Afghanistan and its commitment to Iraq, are witness for 
the EU’s awareness of its responsibility. But both sides have to prove their 
 
13  See Friedman, George: “U.S. and Iran: Beneath the Roiled Surface,” in Stratfor 
Weekly 23. June 2004.  
14  A discussion on Iran as a “winner” of the Iraq war see at Halliday, Fred: “America 
and Arabia after Saddam,” www.openDemocracy.net 13 May 2004 p. 4f. What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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commitment for a successful dialogue in order to meet the basic require-
ments for a dialogue that may lead to a possible peace process. First, the 
EU should restrain in defining Islam of what kind of Islam it wants to deal 
with (style matters!), second Middle Eastern partners have to be sincere 
about their respect of Human Rights and basic democratic principles; third, 
a serious escalation between the USA and Iran must be avoided and ways 
for confidence-building measures between the USA, Israel and Iran have to 
be found. Complicated and difficult as this is, it will be almost impossible 
to be initiated with a nuclear Iran. 
3.1 Can the CSCE Serve as a Model? 
As it is well known, what later became the CSCE and now is the OSCE 
started with a Soviet initiative in the 1950s. After serious setbacks (i.e. cri-
sis in Hungary and East-Germany) and some preliminary work in the 
1960s, the first “Conference on Security and Co-operation” (1973-75) 
could take place. The now famous three “baskets” dealt with confidence 
building measures in military affairs, economic and humanitarian issues. 
Neither of these baskets seems to be suitable to be copied immediately on a 
one to one basis. The situation in the modern Middle East is simply too dif-
ferent from cold war-Europe. One difference is that in the 1970s the Euro-
peans, who have taken the initiative to organise the conference, were eager 
to involve the main outside powers (USA), whereas now, the initiative 
would be brought from outside to the region and Middle Easterners would 
certainly add such an initiative just to the long list of western interventions 
starting with the Crusades (or Alexander the Macedonian, for the Iranians). 
The principals guiding the mutual relations according to the Act of Helsinki 
I, II and V (I Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sover-
eignty, II Refraining from the threat or use of force, V Peaceful settlement 
of disputes) seem nowadays rather futile after regime change in Iraq – but 
almost anyone in the region would hurry to sign chapter VI (Non-
intervention in internal Affairs).
15  
 
15  Conference on Security and Co-Operation: Final Act, Helsinki 1975. Walter Posch 
  148  
Some paragraphs of the “Document on confidence-building measures (…)” 
seem to be more promising at first sight: prior notifications of major and 
other military manoeuvres and military movements and the exchange of 
observers for example. But reality seems to be rather sobering; at last for 
the foreseeable future one shall not expect Israeli military observers invited 
for a special warfare exercise of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pâs-
dârân) to give just an obvious bizarre example.  
3.2 Regional Partnerships and Initiatives 
League of Arab States 
It has been often overseen, that regional experiences in international Or-
ganisations and confidence building measures exist. The most famous or-
ganisation is of course the “League of Arab States”. Due to its pan-Arabic 
ideology and dedication to the Palestinian cause, its contribution to solu-
tions for other conflicts in the Middle East Peace remains limited. It has 
however supported a discussion on the Arab Human Development Report 
and thus contributed to such important fields like the necessary reform of 
Arab societies and the democratisation in Arab states. The League’s capa-
bilities to force any of the Member States to reform are of course non-
existent. The Arab League seemed further seriously weakened after the 
postponement of their last summit in March 2004, which was a telling ex-
ample for Arab disunity. As an Arab League it wouldn’t have covered the 
Iranians anyway. 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
The “Organisation of the Islamic Conference” offers a much broader 
panel.
16 OIC enjoys wider respect among Muslim member states than the 
Arab League. Founded in 1969 it serves ever since as a financier of Islamic 
scholars and Muslim education. Engaging OIC may be promising; albeit 
not being a security or policy related Organisation per se it has substantial 
influence. Heads of state visit its annual conference and the organisation’s 
secretary general has apparently access to all heads of Muslim states. Its 
various committees address main shortcomings of the Muslim world, like 
 
16 http://www.oic-oci.org/  and  http://www.oicistanbul2004.org.tr/news2.asp?id=26. What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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the lack of inter-regional trade (Committee on Economic and Trade Coop-
eration) or social affairs. OIC even addresses marginalizing of women in a 
positive way. On behalf of an initiative of Pakistan’s General Musharraf, it 
openly discusses religious extremism and fanaticism as an internal threat; 
and deals with it on muslim-theological base. It therefore tackles Islamist 
extremism of “al-Qa’ida” in a way no outsider could ever do. OIC is now 
in a phase of self-criticism and reshaping its agenda, major restructuring is 
to be expected. Much will depend on its new secretary general the Turkish 
Prof. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, head of a scholarly foundation in İstanbul.
17 It 
is obvious that the Turkish model i.e. that Islam and democracy are not 
contradictory but rather complimentary is the last “fashion” in the Islamic 
discussion and outdates the Saudi model.
18 
The OIC may offer a promising additional framework that one-day (hope-
fully) may add valuable contributions to the fight against terrorism on the 
ideological front and win hearts and minds over to the principle of democ-
racy. It also may be able to mend or ameliorate fences of distrust between 
Muslim states and facilitate economic cooperation. But it is too early to tell 
any success now.   
Gulf Cooperation Council 
The “Gulf Cooperation Council - GCC”
19 as mentioned above is the most 
sophisticated of all Arab inter-state cooperation frameworks. Its members 
have signed an agreement on economy
20 and cooperate in security, military 
and many other important matters.
21 It was originally founded as an uneven 
partnership between the powerful Saudis and their neighbours on the litto-
ral shore of the Persian Gulf directed primarily against revolutionary Iran. 
Nowadays the Saudis have lost a lot of their influence and the Emirates and 
Kingdoms can show more profile. A Cooperation Agreement between EU 
(EC) and GCC was signed in 1988, annual joint meetings are held ever 
 
17  On him see and http://www.oicistanbul2004.org.tr/news2.asp?id=26. 
18  Gent, Amalia von: “Saudischer Islam out, türkischer Islam in“, Neue Zürcher Zei-
tung, 24. June 2004; OIC was originally a Saudi-run organisation, Turkey’s new 
role seems a promising change. 
19 Http://www.gcc-sg.org. 
20 Http://www.gcc-sg.org/Economic.html. 
21 Http://www.gcc-sg.org/cooperation.html#coop2. Walter Posch 
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since. The EU plays in spite of its relative longstanding relations with the 
Gulf countries a less important role than in North Africa and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Geography is one reason, another reason is the wealth of 
the Gulf countries – they simply don’t need economic aid; but the main 
reason is the fact that the Persian Gulf region is a zone of special interest 
for the USA.  
Internal dissent in GCC countries on behalf of the Shiite population is defi-
nitely declining. This happen thanks to the rapprochement between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia: either side has ceased inciting the religious minorities in 
the other country (Sunnis in Iran, Shiites in Saudi Arabia). By the end of 
the 1990s, both have given up their rivalry on the leadership in the Muslim 
world and focused more on their own internal relations.
22 This general rap-
prochement made other steps possible like the solution of Saudi Yemeni 
border conflicts.  
The positive example of Saudi-Iran détente is just one side of the coin. Iran 
poses still a threat to smaller Gulf countries; for today it is not the fear of 
Iranian meddling among the Shiite minorities, but rather Iran’s strength and 
the re-emergence of Iranian nationalism, which perceives the Persian Gulf 
sub-region also as his own “zone of special interest”. The Iranian occupa-
tion of three Gulf Islands and Iran’s unwillingness even to discuss this mat-
ter, gives a telling example for her nationalism. This could pose a chance 
also: Persian Gulf states are interested in security, Iran in international rec-
ognition. The CSCE’s first basket (confidence-building measures in mili-
tary affairs) may be a viable start for engaging Iran positively. Such a start 
is of course only possible with a nuke-free Iran.  
“Iraq-6” Consultations 
Iraq remains the most pressing issue for the time being. The possible brake-
down of the country seems to have initiated a sober and constructive at-
mosphere and a viable consultation mechanism among Iraq’s neighbours. 
There is rarely any information available about the topics discussed and the 
 
22  The bitter state sponsored rivalry between Sunnites and Shiites however continues 
to this day especially in Pakistan albeit privately financed.  
 What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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conclusions drawn but it seems clear that the question of Kurdish autonomy 
is on the agenda. As much as is known, these talks are on ambassador level 
(civilians, military and security). Turkey and Iran have perhaps the longest 
experience of intervention in Iraq and divergent interests, they managed to 
this day to check their obvious differences and avoid open confrontation. 
Transforming the permanent consultations of the “Iraq-6” might form the 
nucleus of a CSCE-like process. Since its initiative comes from the region 
it may have a real chance of success. A positive effort of Iraq’s neighbours 
may contribute to its stabilization and to the stabilization of the Kurdistan 
sub-region as a whole; whereas a breakdown of the security situation may 
provoke unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan with spill over effects to Kurdish popula-
tions elsewhere.  
Although the suggestion of extending these talks to a 6 + 4 + 1 formula 
(neighbours, Quartet and Iraq) as suggested by Perthes,
23 sounds logical, 
there seems to be less sympathy for it on the side of Iraq’s neighbours. It is 
obviously an attempt to talk seriously entre nous without foreign participa-
tion. On the other hand, the CSCE has begun also as series of conferences 
and one should hope that the “Iraq-6” consultation mechanism maybe 
somehow institutionalised. Keeping, say the OIC or the Arab League in-
formed on Iraq, would create more transparency and offer an institutional 
framework for the Near East Quartet or others to learn about what the 
“Iraq-6” have decided, at least as long as they are unwilling to accept the 
6+4+1 formula or a similar one.   
4. Conclusion 
I have named two preconditions for initiating a CSCE-like process (or even 
a CSCME): no more deteriorating of US-Iranian relations and the sincere 
will to begin with the implementation of democratic reforms. To many, it 
seems clear however, that without touching the Israeli-Palestine conflict a 
comprehensive CSCME shall never be possible. But it is also obvious that 
a solution, at least one satisfying the Palestinians and in due course the Ar-
 
23  Perthes, p. 685. Walter Posch 
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abs and Muslims as a whole is far from being achieved. Here one should 
not be too enthusiastic and without any false hopes: the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict will simply continue for the foreseeable future, demanding its solu-
tion, as a precondition is therefore a no-starter. On the other side it is clear 
that the democratisation of states and societies in the Middle East will not 
happen overnight but be rather a long process. In both cases backlashes are 
to be expected.  
OIC and Arab League may support the inner Islamic or Inner-Arab discus-
sion on reform issues and may indeed offer a genuine structure for consul-
tation and confidence building among the Arab and Muslim neighbour 
states, tangible results shall not be expected too soon however. But confi-
dence-building measures can be started on a bi- and/or multilateral basis 
between the GCC and Iran immediately – and have to include the US in 
due course in order to achieve a viable peace structure. The same is true for 
Afghanistan, where Teheran’s cooperation is as necessary as it is in the 
framework of the Iraq-6. In theory one could suggest the following (opti-
mistic) model: existing dialogue – most notable Euro-Med but also GMEI 
continues of course; Afghanistan, Iraq and the Gulf local confidence-
building measures pay off and a framework of consultations on sub-
regional basis in which the USA and Iran are involved, emerges. This may 
lay the foundation for a more comprehensive structure in which finally, Is-
rael and Palestine may also be included. In an ideal world, this mechanism 
could be what the European Security Strategy wants: “international organi-
sations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to inter-
national peace and security” but still there would be no possibility of sanc-
tions when rules were broken.
24 
Having said this, the chances for such a structure seem rather meagre; if 
one takes Teheran’s nuclear program into account and observes the mutual 
distrust between Iran the USA and Israel. A likely deterioration between 
Teheran and Washington could lead not only to a breakdown of the “Iraq-
6” mechanism and contribute to further insecurity in Iraq, it certainly 
 
24 EU-ISS:  A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Paris De-
cember 2003, p. 15. What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach? 
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would lead Tehran to a more negative policy in Afghanistan and may ignite 
unrest among the Shiites in the Gulf region and lead to a confrontation be-
tween Hizbullah and Israel. It would be “a great tragedy where no one will 
win” to cite the Iranian parliamentarian and co-founder of Hizballah, Ali 
Akbar Mohtashemi-Pour. Bearing Teheran’s nuclearization attempts in 
mind, one has to conclude that a deterioration of the strained US-Iranian 
“non”-relations will most certainly happen.  
 Nassif Hitti 
The Fantasies of a Middle Eastern OSCE 
David Easton used to say it is better to build an ugly model for a real world 
than a nice model of an imaginary world. I remember these words every 
time I hear about a new proposal to reshape the Middle East. 
A prerequisite for the success of any architectural design lies not only in 
how imaginative or how attractive the design is, but in the quality or nature 
of the soil where the building is going to be erected. The same logic applies 
to the world of political architecture, mainly in the Middle East where we 
are witnessing a rush of different copied versions of designs to be imple-
mented such as the design of the Organization of Security and Co-operation 
in Europe which started as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, better known as the Helsinki process. The sudden obsession about 
a new architecture for the Middle East came on the aftermath of the 11
th of 
September earthquake that hit the US and the shockwaves that followed in 
Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The epicenter of this earthquake lies in 
the Middle East; a region whose frontiers are defined and redefined by the 
threat perception in Washington particularly but not exclusively. The re-
gion is perceived as the sick man of the world, as the Ottoman Empire was 
perceived a century earlier as the sick man of Europe. The Middle East is 
the region of new nontraditional sources of threats that necessitate non tra-
ditional, comprehensive responses; Sources to be found at the societal level 
in ideology, culture and education among other things. It is becoming a re-
curring theme in the discourse of the US strategic community to hear that 
the American extended homeland defenses reach into the heart of the Mid-
dle East, a region whose geographic parameters are elastic and constantly 
defined and redefined these days. It is the region of the world of Islam not 
taking into consideration the different specificities of the countries from Nassif Hitti 
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Morocco to Pakistan that necessitate different responses. A major interna-
tional consensus has emerged around the rejection of the status quo as a 
source of radicalization, namely religious one with globalized means and 
international scope. A definition that, unfortunately, put in the same basket 
of problems fears, phobias and solutions, all expressions of Islamic revival 
and all Islamist  movements. A major goal has been set, the imperatives of 
change, though there is no agreement on how to manage change in a region 
which is very attractive to all forms of interventions and interferences be-
cause of its weaknesses and richness at the same time. Thus the Middle 
East on the turn of the century is a disordered, vulnerable and highly pene-
trated regional Order. Regional policies are much less influential than in-
ternational policies in the shaping of its agenda. Past lessons tell about the 
impossibility of restructuring or creating a new regional architecture, be-
fore addressing the key regional issues, or the all legitimizing issues. Un-
able to set its own agenda but very resistant to imposed agendas from ex-
ternal actors this is the first lesson of regional politics in the Middle East to 
reckon with, unless one is willing to engage in the futile policy of trying to 
put the cart in front of the horse. Twenty years after Helsinki, the Europe-
ans tried but rapidly learned the lesson in the Middle East. When the Barce-
lona process was launched in 1995, in the wake of the optimism created by 
the Madrid Peace Conference, and reinforced by the Oslo Accord between 
the Palestinian and the Israelis making for a psychological breakthrough, 
the first basket of the Process aimed at creating A Charter of Peace and 
Stability in the Mediterranean region. Soon the Europeans understood to 
their great frustration that this is an impossible task as long as the Arab-
Israeli-Conflict has not been settled, or that the settlement process has pro-
gressed substantially and solidly on all tracks. If the regional actors are 
weak and embattled, the regional issues are strong, resistant, and capable of 
frustrating external plans, initiatives, and policies. The Casablanca process 
or the multilateral track of the peace process, which started a year before, 
as part of the Madrid Conference, fumbled and reached also a dead end be-
cause it failed to acknowledge this reality. When the bilateral track in the 
Madrid process started to run out of steam, it was impossible to continue 
with the functional cooperative multilateral tracks. The Fantasies of a Middle Eastern OSCE 
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The driving force in the regional Order lies in the identity based politics 
rather than in the interest based politics such as is the case in the West. 
Whether it is Arab nationalism or Islamism or a brand of the two, identity 
assures the dual function of legitimizing and de-legitimizing political ac-
tion. The regional Order is a paradoxical Westphalian Order. While states 
stick to a definition of sovereignty that is becoming irrelevant in today’s 
world, the same state is highly penetrated by processes of transstate soli-
darities emanating from the logic of the UMMA [the NATION], being 
Arab or Islamic or both. The same state is also constrained to pay a lip ser-
vice to this UMMA and to define its discourse and explain its policies ac-
cording to the symbols of that UMMA. Trans-state solidarities function 
following the model of communicating vases in physics, influencing per-
ceptions by creating a homogenization of perception of priorities, of goals 
and of actors, across the Arab state system. 
In the triangular relationship between the state, the society and the external 
actors pushing for ISLAH, the state tries to trade off its security, the secu-
rity of the regime, against assuring the stability for these external actors. 
The state tries also to play on identity issue against interference to seek the 
support of the society against change called for from outside. Meanwhile 
lack of credibility is what characterizes the call for ISLAH, called for from 
the same outside, particularly the American one. In the eyes of the society, 
the problem is the messenger not the message. Lack of understanding is 
what characterizes the perception of the same external actors of the societal 
priorities in a complex regional Order where the logic of the state operates 
next to the logic of the UMMA but not always in a smooth fashion. Yet one 
fact remains to be underlined: the post-Saddam world of the Middle East 
forced the issue of reform and change on the national agenda and made the 
state constrained to talk about reform and make the latter a key element n 
the official discourse. 
Many factors thus tend to indicate the failure of establishing parallels or 
analogies between the EASTERN EUROPE of the seventies and the MID-
DLE EAST TODAY, in order to seek a CSCE and later on an OSCE in the 
region. In the former case, the process addressed directly the major political 
and security issues with the Soviet Union, issues of normalization, of rec-Nassif Hitti 
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ognition of the borders among other things, which of course cannot be the 
case in the MIDDLE EAST as long as the Arab-Israeli-conflict is not prop-
erly settled. Thus, there was no avoidance of addressing serious security 
issues in the European case. Also the configuration of power in the MID-
DLE EAST does not bear any resemblance to the pyramidal shape of the 
Eastern European Order where it was enough to bring the Soviets on board 
to make the train leave the station. Equally important is the absence in the 
Eastern European Order of the specificities I referred to about the Arab Or-
der such as the trans-state solidarities and the interpenetration of issues. 
Eastern Europe is a more normal State Order. This facilitates the processes 
of regional restructuring. In the Arab case also the Regimes were made to 
know bluntly that the aim is to change them which pushed them to fiercely 
resist, profiting from the triangular relationship referred to earlier. In the 
Eastern European case, it was known that the end result of the process will 
ultimately bring change but it was part of a more nuanced trade off with the 
Soviet Union. Equally important is the fact that the stateness is more devel-
oped in the Eastern European Order than it is in the Arab Order, which 
again renders the matter easier in the former case. Last but not least the so-
cieties in the Eastern European Order were looking to Washington as the 
savior, as the holder of the banner of democracy and freedom which were 
the key issues in that context, and not as the usurper or the strong and un-
conditional supporter of the enemy, of Israel, as is the case in the Middle 
East. 
Thus dropping the OSCE approach will be a very wise decision. Such ar-
chitecture will have to wait for better days when the aforementioned condi-
tions are met. Nevertheless ISLAH whether it is reform, or perhaps mod-
ernization, good governance or development remains a must. The issue 
goes beyond the artificial dichotomy of home-grown versus externally im-
posed reform. Indeed a dual avoidance approach needs to be adopted; 
Avoid making reform hostage to the settlement of regional conflicts or us-
ing the latter as a pretext to circumvent the necessity of reforms, and avoid 
focusing on reforms as a prerequisite for just and comprehensive conflict 
settlement policies that are urgently needed. REFORM and CONFLICT 
SETTLEMENT issues should not be relegated to a secondary status by ei-The Fantasies of a Middle Eastern OSCE 
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ther or of the actors concerned. They are indeed interrelated and the pro-
gress in one could reinforce the progress in the other process. Change is a 
goal, if not shared by everybody at least in terms of scope, frequency, and 
content, it remains a regional imperative and an international one. A pre-
requisite for change is to get rid of externally suggested grand designs and 
to liberate oneself in the region from fears and phobias of the OTHER. 
What is needed is a comprehensive vision of change with an integrated ap-
proach that addresses all aspects of conflict settlement and reforms. A vi-
sion based on cooperation and coordination between the external and inter-
nal dynamics. What is needed is a US-EUROPE- and UN-initiative for an 
externally coordinated action and active engagement in the process of re-
gional conflict settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict and state building in 
Iraq. What is needed is a comprehensive support for actors engaged in re-
forms and modernization in the Arab world. It might appear as a tall order, 
but thinking of the threats and dangers of a fragmented, chaotic, and con-
flict torn Middle East, there is no choice but to take that road. Ian O. Lesser 
Institutional Issues Surrounding a 
CSCE-like Approach to the Middle East 
Introduction 
The perceived success of CSCE in transforming societies in the East, and 
contributing to the end of the Cold War, has inspired attempts to apply the 
spirit and method of CSCE to troubled political and security environments 
outside Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy and Spain led an 
effort to create a CSCM – a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
the Mediterranean.” The Madrid process spurred multilateral frameworks 
for negotiation and cooperation in the Middle East, REDWG in the eco-
nomic arena, and ACRS in the security realm, both inspired by the CSCE 
experience. More recently, both EU and NATO approaches to political and 
security dialogue in the Mediterranean have relied on an implicit model of 
cooperation borrowed from CSCE.  The OSCE itself has attempted to ap-
ply this approach to dialogue efforts on Europe’s periphery.  More broadly, 
much of the western discourse about new institutional approaches to reform 
and stability across the “greater Middle East”, including North Africa and 
the Gulf, is inspired by ideas and experience drawn from Europe, and from 
the CSCE history in particular. 
Viewed from an American perspective, and under current conditions in the 
Middle East, what are the organizational and institutional issues surround-
ing a new attempt to pursue CSCE-like processes in the region? This brief 
analysis identifies some of the key questions to be taken into account. Ian O. Lesser 
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The Assumed Value of Institutions 
Assumptions about the importance of institutions in promoting political 
change and security are deeply rooted in thinking on both sides of the At-
lantic. The absence of effective institutions for cooperation contributed to 
conflict in Europe prior to 1945, and the creation of an elaborate architec-
ture for political and security relations is widely seen as a factor for stabil-
ity in modern Europe. Quips about “inter-blocking” institutions aside, 
European, Russian, and American leaderships have not been shy about cre-
ating new and elaborate institutions for the management of problems in the 
Atlantic area. 
Key European and Atlantic institutions, including NATO, are in flux, and 
could take quite different forms over the next decade. But it is unlikely that 
any of the institutions operating today will disappear over the coming 
years, even if their composition, roles and missions change.  Europe, and 
the Atlantic area, will still have a surfeit of architecture for security and 
cooperation. By contrast, the “south” – from North Africa to Pakistan (or 
even from West Africa to Indonesia) has very little, if any, functioning in-
stitutions along these lines. If the demand exists to put a cooperative archi-
tecture in place across the greater Middle East, this architecture will have to 
be created out of whole cloth, or formed as an extension of existing frame-
works in the north. 
What Stakes, What Preferences? 
To what extent are European, American and, above all, southern interests 
in a new CSCE-like approach convergent?  Europe has an interest in politi-
cal reform, prosperity and stability in the south as an increasingly central 
part of its own approach to security on the continent.  The new risks ema-
nate from the south, and policies toward the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East can help to shape a troubled environment. But for Europe, and espe-
cially for southern Europe, a structure for this already exists in the form of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), and the rein-
forced approach to security cooperation through CFSP and ESDP. Much Institutional Issues Surrounding a CSCE-like Approach 
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has been invested in the Barcelona process, and much of the content of a 
more effective European security policy will inevitably be focused south-
ward. So how much energy and interest will be left over for the creation of 
a new institution(s)? 
That said, Europe (a generalization, of course – in fact there are likely to be 
pronounced national differences) could see virtue in new CSCE-like proc-
esses, a new geometry, to repair dysfunctional dialogues, to circumvent the 
public relations baggage associated with EU and NATO initiatives, to en-
gage publics and elites apart from regimes, and not least, to engage Wash-
ington in a more multilateral approach.  
For the U.S., the stakes and interests are essentially the same, reinforced by 
a post-9/11 obsession with promoting political change and forestalling the 
growth of more active anti-American movements, with security spillovers – 
in short, extended homeland defense.  In the security arena, the American 
preference might be to use NATO for new, multilateral efforts at coopera-
tion. But the center of gravity for “change” across the south is not in the 
hard security realm, and much of it is not about security at all. NATO is not 
an appropriate vehicle for promoting the development of civil society, the 
rule of law and democratic norms. It is even more remote from the need for 
economic reform and institution-building. UN agencies are deeply unfash-
ionable in the U.S., and the EU is the leading actor in economic develop-
ment across most of the region.  If the U.S. wishes to do more to promote 
change and engage new constituencies in the Middle East and the “south,” 
new institutions may be needed.  American efforts to promote variations on 
a “Greater Middle East Initiative” in the context of G-8 and NATO sum-
mits in the Spring of 2004 attest to this interest, as well as the difficulty of 
moving beyond a lowest common denominator approach.  The question of 
resources is also relevant. The U.S. has a global stake in stability in the 
south, but the American side of the funding for the GME initiative is spo-
ken of in the $125-150 million range. Hardly enough for a few education-
related initiatives in one society, quite apart from needs across the entire 
southern periphery of Eurasia. Ian O. Lesser 
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For the south, the dilemmas are acute. Outside governments there is keen 
and growing interest in new processes for regional cooperation and north-
south dialogue. Regimes are less enthusiastic, for obvious reasons. At the 
level of states, there are some potential benefits, especially in the security 
realm. Some states may also see new architecture as a hedge in relations 
with Israel, the West, and regional competitors. But the transparency and 
reform objectives inherent in a CSCE-like approach, with real implications 
for the future of “strong states” vis-à-vis civil society, will be troubling. 
Indeed, some regional governments may begin to explore CSCE-like ap-
proaches without fully fathoming the implications for their own position.
 1 
At base, the CSCE experience was about promoting peaceful change and 
cooperation across ideological and strategic divides – surely relevant in the 
north-south context.  Regimes in the south may need to be convinced that 
such an approach is preferable to cataclysmic change.  
Regimes, elites and publics in the south will carefully scrutinize new initia-
tives with an eye to establishing their indigenous bona fides. The “made in 
America” or even “made in EU” label is unlikely to be helpful, as the re-
cent experience of the G-8 summit demonstrates. In this context, the long-
term, multi-sectoral, multilateral approach associated with CSCE may be 
useful.  
Borrowed Security? 
As noted, the lack of any effective political and security architecture in the 
south is an important asymmetry in north-south relations. If one was start-
ing from scratch to construct a framework for security and cooperation 
across North Africa and the Middle East, how would one begin?  From the 
public diplomacy and symmetry standpoint, there are benefits to centering 
a new initiative in the south, with external actors in supporting roles, if any. 
 
1  An experience during the ACRS negotiations in 1994 is instructive. At one point, 
several delegations from the Gulf and North Africa asked that the “mentor” states 
provide some information on CSCE, especially the “code of conduct,” as a possible 
model for confidence-building in the region.  The text of the code was duly sup-
plied. The ensuing sense of distaste and disinterest was remarkable. Institutional Issues Surrounding a CSCE-like Approach 
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Indeed, this is one of the end-states envisioned from a comprehensive 
Arab-Israeli settlement. Under conditions of progress in the peace process, 
much can be done along these lines as the multilateral negotiations demon-
strated in the mid-1990s. But the prevailing environment does not allow for 
this, and in the post-9/11 world, the north-south dimension is arguably as 
important as the south-south one.  
An alternative arrangement would look northward from North Africa and 
the Middle East, and “borrow” security and stability from Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. This is essentially the approach taken by the EU after Barce-
lona, and by NATO in its Mediterranean Dialogue. It is also characteristic 
of the current, reinforced treatment of these initiatives by both institutions, 
and enlargement processes in general – projecting stability outward from a 
secure and prosperous north to an insecure and underdeveloped south (and 
east). There are advantages to this approach. It builds on existing, capable 
institutions with substantial resources, and it allows southern partners to 
circumvent intra-regional disputes, if they are interested in doing so.  One 
important disadvantage is that the existing frameworks are less well-suited, 
and have been rather unsuccessful in reaching beyond governments in the 
south. As instruments for social and political change, they are relatively 
weak.  
The Problem of Scope 
The three broad-gauge stakeholders in this debate are likely to take differ-
ent views of the proper geographic scope for a new CSCE-like initiative in 
the “region.” There may also be pronounced sub-regional preferences. The 
U.S., although a longstanding Mediterranean power, has never been at-
tracted to the Mediterranean as a frame for strategy or organization. Ameri-
can interests are global, and American strategists think increasingly in 
terms of trans-regional, functional issues. Bureaucratic momentum encour-
ages a North Africa/Middle East/South Asia approach in Washington, but 
the general inclination is to think globally, and in terms of wider initiatives.  
In strictly functional terms, a CSCE-like approach to the “greater Middle 
East” ought to stretch from Africa to Indonesia, and embrace Central and Ian O. Lesser 
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South Asia, too. The problems of insecurity, dysfunctional societies and 
political stasis are similar. Or, if conditions within, and relations with the 
Muslim world are really the problem, why not say so and frame the initia-
tive in terms of security and cooperation in and with Muslim states? In this 
case, the geographic scope would be similarly broad. 
For Europe, and especially southern Europe, the Mediterranean is the cen-
ter of gravity for interests in the south. Existing institutional approaches 
have been framed in a Mediterranean context, although from the beginning 
many proponents of Mediterranean cooperation have taken a more expan-
sive view (e.g., the original proposal for a CSCM embraced the Gulf 
states). Regardless of the prospects for current American-led GME initia-
tives – and the prospects are not particularly bright – the interest in devel-
oping new approaches to reform and cooperation in the “south” is likely to 
endure, and the ideas floated in 2004 will surely be revisited on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Narrower, Mediterranean frameworks may well be over-
taken and subsumed by future initiatives reaching to South and Central 
Asia, and the Gulf. 
For governments in North Africa and the Middle East, in the current envi-
ronment, the most attractive frameworks will be the least intrusive, the 
most diffuse, and the least accommodating of Israeli strategic interests (and 
ones in which Israel will be least interested). At the same time, there will 
be distinct sub-regional interests, with states in the Gulf and the Maghreb, 
for example, keen to assure themselves that new processes will not be cap-
tured by developments in the Levant. 
The position of Turkey merits special mention. There is a tendency among 
Americans and some Europeans, to envision a special role for Turkey in 
new Middle Eastern initiatives (Turkey as “model,” or “example”, etc.). 
The briefest discussion with Turkish observers leaves no doubt that this 
view is incompatible with Turkish interests and preferences. Turks may see 
merit in new CSCE-like approaches to the “south”, but they are clear that 
Turkey is on the northern side of the equation. With critical decisions re-
garding Turkey’s EU accession pending, the last thing Ankara wishes is to 
see the country portrayed as a valuable “Middle Eastern” ally. In institu-Institutional Issues Surrounding a CSCE-like Approach 
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tional terms, Ankara is likely to take a highly conservative approach, look-
ing to the extension of current EU and NATO initiatives to accomplish 
CSCE-like objectives beyond Turkey’s borders. 
Looking Ahead 
Despite many competing interests and preferences, the emerging environ-
ment is likely to encourage a search for new institutions and initiatives in-
spired by CSCE. There is a strong desire for more comprehensive (in terms 
of substance and reach) approaches to change in the “south,” and existing 
arrangements through the EU and NATO are not well-suited to this role – if 
the objectives are ambitious.  
At a minimum, new approaches will have to satisfy three conditions that 
are not now being met. First, the concept will have to be capable of uniting 
somewhat (but not entirely) disparate transatlantic interests and instru-
ments. A broad-based, multi-basket approach could offer plenty of scope 
for this. Second, if “change” is really the objective, the framework will 
need to engage and encourage non-state actors in the south in a vigorous 
way; and that is unlikely to happen unless Middle Eastern governments are 
convinced that new institutions are in their long-term interest. Without this, 
Europe and the U.S. will have to choose explicitly whether to back states or 
agents of change within societies across the Middle East. During the Cold 
War, CSCE was useful, in large measure, because it allowed the West to 
obscure this distinction. Finally, a new CSCE-like approach should offer a 
means of marshalling sufficient resources to make a difference. One of the 
shortcomings of Middle Eastern initiatives currently on the table is the 
striking gap between purpose and funding. Changing societies across a 
large region – in a time frame that has any sort of policy relevance – cannot 
be done “on the cheap.” The idea of a Marshall Plan for the region, how-
ever defined, may be as important as the CSCE image in considering new 
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